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

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

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

Superman we are not.

But that doesn't mean NEW TIMES isn't busting evil in the chops, fighting for the little guy, stripping the pants off phonies and generally shaking hell out of the establishment.

Like Mighty Mouse, we are small but powerful feisty. Out of all proportion to our size, we make waves. Strike fear in evil hearts. Give the tremble to fat cats. Shake the rafters. The Mouse that Roars, that's us.

Some recent roars.

Every two weeks, NEW TIMES comes along with a stick or two of dynamite in its fist.

There was our story on "The Ten Dumbest Congressmen," with our nomination for King of Dumb. How they screamed! There was "Pre-



scription Payola," about doctors who will risk your life for a color TV. There was "Southie is My Home Town," a look at the people of South Boston you didn't find in other media. (After a century of the shaft, maybe they had reasons for coming off as brawling racists.)

In "The Little Camera that Couldn't," NEW TIMES dissected Polaroid's SX-70, as a symbol of a consumer economy gone wild. In "A Wallace Is a Wallace Is a Wallace," we looked underneath the new moderate George and found—guess what—the same old George. In "Happy Days Are Here Again," we saw the new depression as upbeat—a chance for the whole Whole Earth thing. "The Gourmet Freeze-Out" ripped the foil off a big restaurant ripoff. "The Consulting Con Game" laid bare a cushy professorial racket. "They Shoot Ten-Year Olds, Don't They?" was a heartwarming look at New York's shootin' cops with their 007 license to kill. "That Championship Season" stripped the cover-up from the sex scandal that decimated Notre Dame's football team.

Is NEW TIMES mad all the time?

Golly, no. Don't get the idea we do nothing but dredge up embarrassing facts and tweak important noses. NEW TIMES. is *the magazine of what's happening* and that's a spectrum that includes love and music and lifestyles and movies and all manner of rare new ideas. For instance, we reported on Erhard Seminars Training (est), one of the most fascinating of the new life therapies. We got inside the world of bisexuality. We published our *own* medical research on pot—"Attention: Smoking Grass May Be Good for Your Health."

And of course we continue to report on the eternal battle of The Little Guys vs. The Big Guys. Like the story on Sam Lovejoy, who toppled the big bad nuclear tower. And the young hillbillies of Mendocino County who were

damned if they'd let their houses be torn down for lack of city plumbing.

Our bright, brash, talented writers and columnists—like Robert Sam Anson, Jesse Kornbluth, Marcia Seligson, Larry King, Amanda Spake, Jim Kunen, Mark Goodman, Frank Rich, Janet Maslin and Nina Totenberg—have one thing in common. They're unafraid. They'll plunge into anything, take chances and stands, crawl way out on limbs. Sure, NEW TIMES may fall on its face sometimes. But never on its knees!

We're plugged into *now.*

Whether you like it or not, you're living in a time of shattering transitions. Nobody knows where the world is heading and if they claim to, they lie!

NEW TIMES—more than any other magazine on the American scene, we think—is plugged into this difficult, exhilarating age. Do we understand what's going on? Do we know The Answers? Hell, we consider ourselves lucky when we know The Questions.

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

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Ramparts

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The war in Vietnam is over. There is no way a few words, or any words, can comprehend the meaning of that consummation. This month we have borrowed our words from the past. What follows is the editorial on Vietnam that appeared in Ramparts *exactly ten years ago, in the issue of July 1965. It posed "The Unreasonable Question" — Why?*

Ten years of horror have elapsed, and the question still awaits an answer. Whatever the future brings, this must remain a tragic victory, for that decade can never be erased, that history can never be excused. And we know now that the unreasonable question can never have a reasonable answer.

The Unreasonable Question

The virgin issue in our Vietnam policy is the moral one. The Lilliputian measures of public dissent have been couched in supremely practical terms: How are we going about the war? Should we be escalating or negotiating? Are our policies efficient? Are we winning?

These are reasonable questions, asked by reasonable men. The *unreasonable* question—the seemingly unutterable question is—*why?*

But this is the essential query. It is what must be asked before any rational discussion of policy alternatives is possible. It is the question *Ramparts* asks in this special issue on the moral disaster of our Southeast Asia policy.

Why is the public told America was *asked* to step into Vietnam, when our initial involvement was actually installing, financing and arming a despotic and unpopular premier as a "democratic alternative" to the overwhelming grass-roots popularity of the Communist guerillas?

Why do serious, concrete, non-Establishment proposals for peace stand so little chance of being heard and understood by American policy makers?

Why—and this is the most disturbing question of all—why is there no significant number of Americans asking these questions? Is the age of consensus that complete? Or have we lost all capacity for moral outrage?

The Cold War and its hot complexes are no longer as simple-minded as they appeared in the late 1940s. This is a post-Vandenberg era: foreign policy should be *debatable.* Indeed, it *must* be debated if this country is to rid itself of the crazy-quilt of little reality that has covered our bipartisan foreign policy through four administrations.

There can be no better place to begin such a debate than over our Southeast Asia policy. We *know* it doesn't work. Let us ask *why.*

—The Editors.
Ramparts, July 1965

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Ramparts
(An Open Letter to Our Readers)

Dear Reader,

A wise and knowledgeable friend of ours, who happens to be a Certified Public Accountant, recently looked at the bottom line of *Ramparts'* balance sheet and observed that the magazine was "totally impossible." We puzzled over that for a few days, and glared at the woeful balances. Dusting off the ledgers which preserved comparable figures from the past, we discovered that in fact the magazine had been impossible for quite awhile – at least for several years. And, while the financial picture did not foretell our doom, it did add up to trouble.

No magazine, however loftily unburdened by the profit motive, can live on air or walk on water. At least in that respect, money talks. It need not always be obeyed, but it cannot be ignored. So this has been a time for taking stock. We needed to assess what the life signs of *Ramparts'* unorthodox survival really are, and from them how we stand.

Some of the indications could be quantified. In the last year, both newsstand and subscriber circulation ended a long decline, levelled off, and judging from the last six months have once again begun a modest rise. That in itself is an achievement, since direct mail promotion, considered the *sine qua non* of a stable circulation, has been far beyond our means. By industry standards, such an upturn in the readership curve is simply not supposed to happen.

This pointed to a deeper and more decisive assessment, one that cannot be quantified because it turns on the *necessity* of the role that *Ramparts* plays. The vital principle at work here is not the liberal creed, "If it is possible, it can be arranged;" it is the radical commitment that what is necessary can be achieved.

So, "taking stock" has led us to examine the ways in which we measure the magazine's importance. And we would like to share with you some of the thinking we have done.

[A NECESSARY VIEWPOINT]

Frankly there have been times at *Ramparts* over the years when the sense of necessity has been elusive. We have seen how muckraking can be homogenized and mass-produced. The right kind of irreverence sells, and the quixotic charms. In the later phases of Vietnam and Watergate, a broad consensus of the American press emerged as a check on the recklessness of power. There's no denying that it was heartening to have their bias on our side – while it lasted and so far as it went. But the press is losing some of the lustre of iconoclastic fervor that has haloed it since the Watergate revelations and the Pentagon Papers affair.

Last March, when President Ford floated his three-year aid plan to rescue the collapsing Saigon regime, we were genuinely surprised to see the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* rush to endorse his last-ditch stonewalling. This particular foreign policy brainstorm was so futile and so short-lived that the editorial opinions in themselves were inconsequential. But such a rejection of the most essential lessons of that entire agonizing decade must be recognized as ominous, for these are among the most sophisticated and intelligent leaders of the mainstream media. The mainstream saw Vietnam as the wrong war at the wrong time, making it easy to ignore their implied openness to other interventions, if similar ends could be more discretely or competently served.

Only a few days after we published our March issue with the cover line "Oil Grab: The War We Must Prevent," we were stunned to see the cover of *Harper's* featuring "The Case for Intervention," embellished with an illustration of U.S. shock troops parachuting onto the oil fields of Arabia. All that was missing was John Wayne leading the battalions of freedom. The battle plan inside was signed with a pseudonym, Miles Ignotus (Latin for "unknown soldier"). The anonymous writer was identified as a professor and "defense consultant with intimate links to high-level U.S. policy makers." After all these years, can these still be credentials? Miles Ignotus insults as well as injures history when he admonishes us that our "appeasement" of the oil-producing nations amounts to "another Munich."

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Harper's is a distinguished liberal journal, and we find ourselves on the same side of the fence in many controversies. But this startling reversion to the interventionist impulse is another indication that the lines of political opposition are sharpening. In the period ahead, central assumptions, interests, and commitments on all sides will be at stake. A resurgent radical-liberal polarization is inevitable, and signs of this are now beginning to appear.

In our May issue we focused on the danger of U.S. subversion directed at Portugal and other European states where leftward changes loom. While we were in the midst of preparing that issue, the *Times* published an astounding editorial, "Lisbon's Real Coup," which fulminated threateningly about a "Communist takeover" in Portugal. The State Department spokesperson, quoted in the *Times* pages the same day, was more candid about the nature of the menace: "This is a very dicey situation. There is this revolutionary spirit, ardor in the country." Indigenous revolutionary spirit is often very dicey. Perhaps for that reason the *Times* chose to characterize the situation as "reminiscent of some Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe after World War II." But, however one views political developments in Portugal, an occupation force of Soviet divisions is nowhere to be seen. We were surprised to find the reversion to Cold War jingoism so explicit, sudden, and complete.

It is astounding what a cornucopia of Cold War rubbish a single paragraph serves up, as if the *Times* did not wish to exclude a single discredited fallacy or myth:

> *"The Soviet Embassy in Lisbon is large and active. Moscow's influence is considerable with a Communist party that was one of the few in the world that defended Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Together with renewed Communist action in Cambodia and Vietnam, and stepped up Soviet arms shipments and other pressures in the Middle East, a Communist take-over in Portugal could not fail to bring into serious question what remains of a shaky detente."*

In this kind of Manichean imagery, details and distinctions fade into monoliths of evil. The old "Red Tide" conjured up by the *Times* magically defies the geography of Europe. The danger of Portugal's "possession" by the Kremlin is practically occult. Perhaps that is why the *Times'* fast and loose catalog of peril contains so much sleight of hand. "The Soviet Embassy in Lisbon is large and active," they warn. A Soviet Embassy, an arms shipment, or an army are treated as interchangeable initiatives. "Soviet" and "Communist" become synonymous. Amazingly, even "Communist actions in Cambodia and Vietnam" are tentacles of the same nightmare organism. The editor is apparently unable to distinguish the Portuguese army from the Khmer Rouge. One almost expects to hear once again that the Chinese Communists are really Russians in disguise.

Even the *Times*'observation that the Portuguese Communist Party was "*one of the few in the world* that defended" [emphasis added] the Czech invasion, paradoxically places the Kremlin in a Communist minority. The *Times* is plagued by an unruly monolith.

James Reston, writing in the less reticent format of a signed column, followed up on the paper's editorial the next day with a call to arms for the CIA:

> *"Foreign espionage is an essential but illegal activity . . . a form of undercover war, and the Communists are waging it with a vengeance now in Portugal, while the CIA is virtually helpless in its present condition to prevent the subversion of that strategically important country."*

Reston's examples of the CIA's "essential" efforts puts them in good perspective:

> *"The internal struggles for political control in key strategic countries such as West Germany, Italy, the Middle East, and even in Cuba often depended on providing money for guns, newspaper presses . . . any many other things which were essential to the struggle, but could not be disclosed to the general public without disclosing them to our adversaries and threatening the sources and even the lives of our agents."*

This is where the influence of viewpoint goes beyond inflammatory calls. It is bad enough when the secret aims and agents of the CIA are assumed to serve the interests of a systematically misinformed nation, but it is worse when the CIA's activities are adopted as "ours" by the press itself.

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The *Times* has been as good as Reston's word. When the Pentagon Papers were published, the government argued that its potentially embarrassing secrets could not be entrusted to the media, since they were the professional expositors of truth. The *Times* was scandalized. Their "responsibility" was a matter of record: Hadn't they lied about the Bay of Pigs? They recalled with pride how they had suppressed their knowledge of the aggression plans all the way through Adlai Stevenson's pathetic denials at the United Nations.

More recently they proved themselves again. For many months they – along with the *L.A. Times* and other major news-gathering organizations – kept the lid on the story of the CIA's elaborate effort to exhume a Russian submarine sunk in the Pacific. When their account was published last February (as bona fide front-page news), the *Times* explained that they were reporting the facts because the game was already up. On what premise could the suppression of this story be explained as responsible journalism? The reasoning would have to be that, if the *Times* could help the CIA to penetrate Russian missile codes and guidance systems, the U.S. could be that much closer to being able to neutralize the Soviet deterrent. And, if the U.S. were close enough to first-strike capability, it would be in a position to advance foreign policies with less concern over the risk of nuclear war, which, it is presumed, would make the world a better and safer place to live.

The syndicated columnist, Joseph Kraft, considered a dean of liberal commentators, celebrated the whole affair as showing the good side of both news suppression and nuclear advantage:

> *"The episode shows dramatically that such operations can have a serious purpose that fully justifies secrecy. It also demonstrates that other elements in the society, including the press, are prepared to treat matters of secret intelligence in a responsible way . . . The affair of the Soviet sub works to right the balance. It involved possible recovery of Soviet code books and nuclear weapons, and was thus clearly an important and legitimate operation."*

The quotes cited here do not reflect isolated lapses of Fourth Estate vigilance. This kind of credulity about government activities and purpose has evidently become quite widespread in the media, perhaps in reaction to a binge of uncustomary exposé. Jack Anderson reported recently that:

> *"The old blather about 'responsibility' to keep secrets instead of exposing abuses has begun to creep back into press parlance. The old pre-Watergate, pre-Vietnam ideals of partnership with government, of cozy intimacy with the high and mighty, of a camaraderie of secrets shared by this peerage but kept from the public, begins to appeal once more to a press concerned that its abrasive successes have earned it a bad name and a hostile reception."*

Outright suppression is only the crudest limit on the adequacy of mainstream journalism. It comes as a surprise now because we have experienced the ubiquity of investigative reporting, the admixture of unauthorized leaks of truth to the usual authorized leaks of deception. But the extreme of actual suppression is a sobering reminder of all the ways in which point of view affects the selection, emphasis, and definition of reported news. This is not to say that the record of gadfly journalism in the mainstream media has not been impressive at times in the last few years. But what is striking is that so much has been reported, and so little has been learned.

[A NECESSARY COMPREHENSION]

It seems that the last serious learning experience about the American system internalized by mainstream opinionmakers was in the 1930s. Unfortunately the chief moral drawn from the Great Depression was that it could never happen again. Armed with Keynes and Samuelson, the U.S. economy would burgeon indefinitely. Now, however, we are beginning to hear more or less tentative speculation about the onset of Depression once again. LBJ's chief economic advisor, Arthur Okun, has gone so far as to compare the economy's prognosis to the old doctor's joke about the common cold: "You should have had pneumonia – *that* we know how to cure." Recession *cum* inflation has confused the economists, but a Depression they know how to cure. (In fact, the last Depression, as radical economists tirelessly point out, was cured by World War II, not by New Deal nostrums.)

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At any rate, the willingness to utter the taboo word Depression, is not an adequate definition of the crisis. We are living at a time when exposé seems to have boggled indignation and surprise. We are presented with a bewilderment of data, but we require more than information: we want some things explained. The premises, frameworks, definitions, catch-phrases and expertise in which the liberal experience is cloaked are threadbare from friction with the truth. Its test of objectivity is balance, while the actual problems and real solutions are extreme. The liberal press is barred from comprehension of the crises that we face, not because their nature is deliberately supressed, but because, even when they seek for explanations with the utmost of earnestness, they haven't got a clue.

If there is to be a serious understanding of our economic destiny, it must be based on a premise that is even more historically audacious than that a new 1930s scale Depression is getting underway. We must understand first of all that this is not merely the periodic trough of a classic business cycle. It is not simply an economic crisis, but a crisis of the economic system. That understanding can be drawn from theories long available about the long-term contradictions inherent in capitalism. But to understand it most concretely, we must look at the ways the profit system has squeezed our lives into patterns of development so grossly distorted that they can no longer be sustained.

Consider the portrait of America given by just one statistic: If you break down the horsepower of "prime movers" that American industry has produced, and place on one side the combined power capacity of all railroads, factories, farms, aircraft, and utility power plants, these all add up to just 6 percent of the national total. The remaining 94 percent has been devoted to the category "automotive," the lion's share going to the private car. If this were just an ordinary economic crisis, the pump-priming prescription would make sense – the answer would be to boost production, to return to the "ten million car year."

But clearly more of the same just means more insanity. What we are suffering from is not a mere insufficiency of production, but the glut of corrosive waste, the appalling social disfigurement of our society the profit system has produced. The misuse of resources summed up in the 94 percent is so vast, so evident in the air we breathe and the immobility of transport, that we know the old prescription can't be right. It is senseless to prime a broken pump. The solution is not more, but different. And that means challenging and breaking the structure of economic power whose health is so much at odds with ours, which prospers only by patterns of production and life that are choking us to death.

[A NECESSARY ROLE]

At times, we confess, we have been tempted to view the spectre of Depression primarily as an acute embarrassment to the Keynesians. But statistical abstractions and political critiques have come to life, and there is no such thing as debunking the mainstream or dropping out at will. People feel dazed and overwhelmed, whether they are pounding the pavement with picket signs or resumes or both. This is a crisis spanning many levels, and in some ways all the levels of our lives.

Ramparts has by no means conquered the bewilderment that comes of dealing with such divergent scales of social space and time. But we are attempting to view society from many angles, to touch people's lives in many different ways. We are trying to make connections and find solutions which can bridge such diversity.

What is required is more than detached analysis which fails to appreciate the pain and hardship a Depression brings. This wound to our society will cut broad and deep. Merely to say that it is only social revolution which can really cure the nation's ills is not enough. Nor is it enough to retreat to personal survival and to hell with all the rest. It is not enough to promulgate strategies and structures for change without looking to the goals that must inspire and direct them. Nor is it enough to set out visions of utopia disconnected from the means of their achievement.

This is the universe of challenges in which we see ourselves at work. No one institution, no magazine, is equal to the awesome multiplicity of tasks. But we hope to be a nexus that brings together diverse energies and insights, where isolated movement, analyses, and appreciations of the human spirit can converge. We want to help gather the threads of a concerted will and wisdom that bind us to a powerful and committed struggle for a future in which decent human beings can be proud to live.

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[AN OFFER WE ARE PROUD TO MAKE]

Out of this period of dearth and privation, history will take either a desperate or creative turn. It is a time for necessities and not for luxuries, and in this crisis we believe that a strong radical press is an ultimate necessity.

We feel that *Ramparts* is uniquely positioned to rise to the challenges ahead, that it has deepened and matured; but it will require your support to carry through. That is a hard thing for us to ask; such an appeal is always on the knife edge between embarrassment and pride. But however much the dignity of poverty can be presumed, it is from a sincere sense of a worthy effort that we are asking for your help.

Before asking anything of you, we underscored that sense by making a special request of four people whose stature and accomplishments in our cultural and social life command a deep respect. Daniel Ellsberg, Joseph Heller, Denise Levertov, and Kurt Vonnegut have agreed to inscribe copies of their books as part of a special subscription offer described below. It's one of several offers, but we take it as a symbol of the many levels on which we feel that this is not merely an appeal for your support, but also an offer we are proud to make.

For those of you who feel that one of these books would be of enduring satisfaction, we urge you to extend yourself if it is within your means. The price of a subscription accompanied by one of the four inscribed books is set at $25, an amount we felt to be the upper limit of what could be considered a "democratically" accessible offer. And if the $150 lifetime subscription which brings with it all four inscribed books is financially plausible and personally tempting, we hope you will take that leap as well.

What this "leap" will mean for each one of you is different; we can only tell you what the magazine will need. For those who feel you are old-timers at "early-renewing," we ask you to bear with us one year further on. For those who are new to *Ramparts*, we ask you to take the plunge of an advance commitment.

What a strong response means to *Ramparts* is many things at once: it is financial sustenance, it is a vote of confidence, it is a source of pride. That is what we meant in the "Few Words" in the March issue when, having explained the absence of a February *Ramparts*, we went on to say, "The worst seems to be over. To us that means survival is no longer a question, though as usual it will be a struggle." Or, in other words, we summed it up: "If you can keep it up, so can we." And that is an offer we are very proud to make.

For the staff,

Patricia Scott
David Kolodney



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



Selling Apartheid

The Facelift in South Africa

South Africa's Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster gave himself an ultimatum, and it is almost up. It was in November 1974 that he asked the world to "give South Africa a six-month chance: you will be surprised where we will stand." Six months later, the world has been highly surprised, but is even more puzzled about where South Africa really stands. The surprises have come from the "détente" in foreign policy. Mr. Vorster has visited Liberia. He is turning the screws on the Smith regime in Rhodesia. He is developing an absorbing game of racial scrabble which is supposed to become an "independent" constitution for South-West Africa (Namibia). Foreign heads of state, all of one political plumage, are coming to relieve South Africa's isolation: Stroessner of Paraguay, Bordaberry of Uruguay, Bokassa of the Central African Republic . . .

But what about "internal détente?" Is there such a thing? The great Nico Malan theatre complex in Cape Town is to be opened to all races. Blacks can now use the costly Blue Train and the Drakensberg Express. So far, this is all.

In the Cape Flats, matters were even less encouraging. The bulldozers came for the squatter village at Philippi at half-past seven one morning, when the men had gone to work. Some had time to get their belongings out of their corrugated-iron hovels before the caterpillars crushed them. Others were less lucky. It rained that night on women and babies sleeping out in the dunes, and next morning the vicious south-easter they call the "Cape Doctor" was blowing, persecuting the squatters with stinging sand as they poked about the wreckage.

You might suppose these people to be drop-outs. But most of them were ordinary urban industrial workers: they want to be respectable, to get to work on time, to bring up clean, educated, non-delinquent children. Jack Silawuli and his wife, for instance, were trying to rebuild the crumpled rubbish of their home. Tall and bespectacled, he gets up at 4:30 to go to work at an international oil company.

"All my wages last month I spent on this house. I moved in November, and I didn't have a nice Christmas, no."

Albertina Bachmani had four children, one with a suppurating ear infection: she herself was nine months' pregnant, her papers were not in order for Cape Province, her husband had walked out on her, and the farmer she worked for illegally for $6.00 a week had given her the sack. You might think nothing worse could happen to Albertina, but the inspector put the tractor across her shack, too.

But why? This seems a senselessly cruel action, when a few miles away the Cape Town politicians talk about modifying "petty apartheid." Unfortunately, it is not senseless. The squatters may look on themselves as urban workers. The Government, however, regards them as tribal Xhosa people, whose presence in urban areas must be temporary and strictly regulated.

Above Left: Children behind a fence that separates them from the white community near Johannesburg. Center: Staircase in an industrial plant, South Africa. Right: South African worker with his pass book. United Nations Photographs

by Neal Ascherson

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Everyone who has not been granted a permit to live and work here, under the "influx control" regulations, must go back home: in the Xhosa case, to the barren and overcrowded "homeland" of the Transkei. The Pass Laws operate hectically, pumping a ceaseless torrent of deportees back to a "homeland" many of the Philippi workers have never known, and drawing in a return flow of migrants, legal or illegal, forbidden to bring families and contracted to stay in the huge satellite locations round the white cities for no longer than a year.

This pumping – flow and return flow – is the heart of white supremacy in South Africa, the circulation of its blood. A white accountant said to me: "In economics, they used to teach that prices use the elevator, while wages use the stairs. That doesn't work in Europe any more. But it works here." In other words, the migrant system – by continuously drawing labor out of a primitive subsistence economy and preventing the formation of a settled urban working class – ensures that labor is always cheap, that wages are always slower to rise than the rate of inflation. The constant pass raids, the harassment of the countless thousands of squatters like the Philippi families, keep this circulation going. The poverty of the African "homelands driving their inhabitants back for another round of urban contract work, has the same function. When this circulation stops, white South Africa, as we know it, will begin to die."

[FORCES OF CHANGE]

At the President Brand gold mine, you step into the cage and fall a mile. The talk now in South Africa is all of other minerals, of a new base-metals boom to accompany the latest rush of industrial expansion. But gold, the old standby, is still rescuing a land which has everything except oil. The price went up 50 percent last year, while President Brand's costs rose only 18 percent: the mine's post-tax profits are $3.6 million a month. At the face, where the heat of the earth's core brings sweat leaking over your eyebrows, the Reef doesn't look like gold: just a slanting line of little black pebbles lodged in the shale.

The 12,000 blacks on President Brand are almost all migrants from outside South Africa. Their wages have risen 140 percent since gold prices started climbing in 1972, reaching a basic monthly minimum of about $55. (The minimum for the 1,120 white miners went up to $566.)

In the compound of Number Three shaft, you look into a room which houses twelve men in bunks. Most are asleep: one man in a black blanket is essaying a husky tune on a wooden flute two feet long. In classrooms, young recruits are being taught Fanakalo, the pidgin language of the mines, which has two hundred words. The teacher points to a drill-bit, to leg protectors, and says a word: the pupils drearily roar it back to him. The kitchens provide a heavy but balanced diet: the white supervisor tells visitors that new miners often put on a stone and a half in a couple of months. It is the efficient but soulless handling of human material for production.

But forces of change are at work. The last 18 months have seen a series of huge compound insurrections, sometimes straight risings over pay, sometimes the fury of sex-starved young men who relieve their frustrations in inter-tribal rioting (28 miners were killed last month when Sotho and Xhosa miners fought at a Natal colliery). The labor supply is dwindling: Malawi has forbidden further contracting, and the other labor-supplying states have agreed to impose new conditions on pay and trade-union membership.

At the same time, the pressure to put black miners in skilled jobs is increasing. The white mineworkers' union sells each job very dearly indeed. But "fragmentation" – the break-up of one white job into several black jobs – goes steadily ahead. Though the white miner retains the monopoly of "blasting certificates," you can watch black miners at President Brand carrying out every stage of the blasting operation while the white man stays within a loosely interpreted "eyeshot and earshot": a mere supervisor.

Industry's hunger for black skills has two effects. One is to intensify the militancy of whites-only unions, like the railwaymen and the building workers, and to edge them into right-wing resistance to the government. The other is to make employers want to stabilize their labor forces – to break gradually with the whole migrant system – and even to see recognized black trade unions as a source of industrial peace. Between these three antagonistic forces – unrest among black migrant workers, pressure from the bigger employers and reaction from frightened white unionists – Mr. Vorster is painfully trapped.

[A NEW MOOD]

"I m so happy to be here: I wouldn't be anywhere else for all the tea in China. Because now I'm going to see the dénouement. Because Whitey is bringing in the scum of Europe as immigrants, and that shows Whitey is on the run!"

It was a Cape Colored speaking, one of the leaders of the Labor Party, which, as the main militant group representing the two million people of mixed blood, won overwhelming control of the Colored Council last month. Once seated in the provincial parliament of the Cape, the Coloreds have now been systematically forced out of every right and assembly they shared with white men. The Colored Council was invented by the Nationalist Government as the separate "apartheid" parliament for Coloreds. But the Labor Party intends to use its new majority to show up the Council as a hated sham: "We'll blow it up in the face of the government, block the budget, confront them at every turn."

It is among the Coloreds and Indians that the slogan of "black consciousness" really means something. It is the recognition that their difference from the Africans, so sedulously emphasized by the regime, matters less than the common exploitation and humiliation they share with them. The Coloreds beloved District Six in Cape Town is being demolished; its population – as old as the city – is being exiled into remote, barren suburbs. The appalling conditions of Colored farm labor in the Cape, resting on classic debt slavery, private prison farms and the persistent use of the "tot" system (the deliberate addiction of children to raw wine) are changing only very slowly, despite the arrival of modern industries avid for labor. What is new is the mood. A white man

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challenged a young Colored using a "Europeans-only" urinal. "How would you like your glasses crammed down your throat, man?" came the retort. The white, paralyzed with shock, staggered into the passageway clutching his zip.

[TWO AFRICANS]

Two Africans of South Africa. One riding very high and perilously; the other silenced but waiting his hour. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, is the best-known African on the political stage. Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress until it was smashed in the early Sixties, after Sharpeeville, spent 10 years as a convict on Robben Island. Now aged 50, he lives under restriction in Kimberley. As a "banned person," he may not meet more than one person at a time, stay out at night, leave the town without special permission, or be quoted. Books mentioning his words must have the passage gummed over.

He is still one of the shrewdest political minds in the country, and – with his gift for laughter and self-mockery – one of the most appealing personalities. What would "internal détente" bring? "More crumbs from the master's table! Vorster's six months were never meant to apply to internal change." He foresees a slow breakdown of job reservation, giving blacks "the jobs that whites have vacated, never jobs which make a black the superior of a white . . . There may be more humane application of the Pass Laws, but influx control will remain. Wages will go on increasing, but all the time the disparity with white wages will remain, and even widen."

Sobukwe sees the Government encouraging the emergence of an "African middle class" in urban areas: in Soweto, Johannesburg's black satellite city, some already have cars and servants. "But government policies will compel these people to identify with the laboring class: they have no real outlet for their wealth. Most revolutions are middle-class, and once they have achieved their aims, they can be just as beastly to those below them. Whatever the government tries there must be a coming together of blacks including Coloreds and Indians."

He recognizes that the day of the African mass political parties is over for the moment. "Separate development has shifted the emphasis: it is development, not liberation, that "homeland" politics are about."

Buthelezi is the monster to Vorster's Frankenstein. He uses his position in the Government-created "homeland" to challenge the whole basis of separate development. To an entranced audience at Soweto, I watched him arguing that "détente" is indivisible, and threatening to sabotage Vorster's overtures to black Africa if he "fails to deliver the goods of racial détente" within South Africa." He went on to lodge his people's claim to the white areas: "The economy which draws you to the Witwatersrand belongs not just to the white man but to all the people of this country." Finally, he brought off a typically African coup of oratory, reading out of the solemn paragraphs of Mr. Botha's "away with racialism" speech at the UN with an ironic intonation which made his listeners howl with laughter.

How far can this graceful, brilliant, touchily proud man play his complex game with Vorster, both striving to use each other? Sobukwe, who can see no good in the "homelands," says: "He's honest, but he's already compelled to work within the framework of government policy. He argues for a federal South Africa, because his own position forces him to seek solutions, and the search for solutions which all races can accept means that he will in turn have to make more compromises . . ."

[THE HARD CORE]

At Nylstroom, in the north Transvaal, there is a cemetery of tiny, hand-carved tombstones. Here lies little Anna Sofia Venter, aged two, and 500 other women and children who died in a British concentration camp during the Boer War. This is very much a heartland of the Afrikaners. Some optimists even talk of a north Transvaal "Afrikanerstan," a tribal homeland for the Boers in a federal South Africa.

The bar at Naboomspruit, a few miles on, is dominated by the head of a glaring warthog. The farmers, with rugby-playing thighs bulging out of tiny shorts, find the détente puzzling. "You can't associate with these Portuguese immigrants. They have living standards lower than the blacks. My boss boy can speak five languages: some of these Portuguese can hardly write their bloody name. But now our government says we can't even call a Kaffir a Kaffir: we have to say Bantu. You give the Kaffir your finger, man, and he'll want your bloody hand. Ja, you can take a Kaffir out of the bush, but you can't take the bush out of the Kaffir . . ." The granny-knot of mental confusion is pulled even tighter, whenever Vorster courts another African leader: "bloody baboons, all of them. But it's our government: we'll go on voting for it."

Everything is changing. But it is unplanned, sometimes unmanageable change. Vorster probably hopes to combine a reduction of petty apartheid with a tougher law-and-order policy to maintain his hold on the white voters. The danger is that he will be left with only the toughness: the pipeline constantly disgorges fresh political trials, and the new and determined multiracial trade union movement emerging in Natal may tempt him to a fresh outburst of repression. The African "homelands" are rejecting their dependent role, and suffering from galloping impoverishment which must lead to violence (in one Zululand area, the poverty line for a family was set at $160 a month, and average income turns out to be about $24).

Chief Buthelezi tells white liberals "not to scoff" at Vorster's policy of détente with southern Africa. But, with deadly perceptiveness, he insists that this must be supported by internal change to be credible abroad. The trouble is that the core of white supremacy – the circulation of migrant labor – is not negotiable, even if whites were ready to abandon race discrimination in sport, culture, transport and the rest of daily life. And most of them are not yet ready. Last year, the sales of guns to whites rose even faster than the price of gold.

Neal Ascherson writes for The Observer, The New Statesman, *and* The New York Review of Books. *Copyright © 1975* The Observer. *Reprinted by arrangement with* The Los Angeles Times-Washington Post *news service.*

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

(Nice work, if they can get it)

In law firms and political offices throughout Washington, attorneys and campaign fund-raisers have devoted during the past six months a collective total of thousands of hours to a highly arcane undertaking: The examination, analysis and dissection of a piece of federal legislation known technically as Public Law 93-443, the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act.

Signed into law by President Ford last October 15, PL 93-443 is worth millions of dollars to the Democratic and Republican candidates for president and vice president in next year's elections. But "minor" parties and independent candidates are not so fortunate. For, in the process of drafting the highly complex law, Congress constructed an obstacle course of amendments aimed at non-Republicans and non-Democrats which effectively deny financial parity for even a highly popular presidential candidate who is not affiliated with a "major" party. Meanwhile, contenders for the "major" parties' presidential nominations already are in the process of reaping substantial financial benefits from the federal treasury. Specifically, here's what the Republicans and Democrats are eligible to receive under the new law:

- Each of the politicians seeking the "major" parties' presidential designation will be allowed to spend, between now and the time the two parties hold their nominating conventions next summer, as much as $12 million. And, if they comply with the myriad provisions of the statute, $6 million of that total will come from federal funds raised through government taxation of the voters.
- The costs of the Democratic and Republican conventions, for the first time in the nation's history, probably will be borne totally by the federal government. The law provides as much as $2 million for each of the two conventions, which is roughly what the media-oriented extravaganzas have cost in recent years.
- Following the conventions, the designated national candidates of the two "major" parties will be eligible to spend another $20 million in the general election campaign. And, if the nominees choose the "public financing" option rather than the traditional method of raising campaign funds from individual donors, all of that money will come directly from the federal treasury.
- Finally, the law allows the Republican and Democratic National Committees each to spend approximately $3 million on behalf of their respective presidential tickets, although that money must be raised through individual contributions.

The government is offering all this largesse precisely when the "major" parties have fallen into an exceptionally low state of disrepute among the nation's voters. The GOP even now may be fighting for its political life. And an increasing number of political analysts have come to believe that both "major" parties may, within the coming decade, become only vestigial political organs.

Consider these figures from a survey commissioned and made public by the Republican National Committee: Interviews conducted in late 1974 with more than 2,000 men and women in 42 states produced 18 percent of all voters who identified themselves as Republicans; 42 percent who identified themselves as Democrats; and a phenomenal 40 percent who classified themselves as independents. A regional analysis shows that in the East and Midwest independents now outnumber either Republicans or Democrats.

by Robert Walters

Illustration by Don Battershall

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"Third parties and independent candidates should study the 1974 Campaign Act carefully. 'Major' parties have already done so—and will be bleeding it for every nickel they can get."

In effect, the new law, through massive infusions of federal tax dollars, will prop up two political parties whose *raison d'etre* becomes increasingly questionable. At the same time, it has created financial obstacles to inhibit other groups from entering the national political arena, groups which might better serve the nation's electorate and thus become successors to the Republicans and/or Democrats.

To date, Sen. James Buckley of New York and former Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota have become leading spokesmen for this "independent" point of view. Sen. Buckley, who aligns himself with Republicans during organizational votes in the Senate, was elected to his current office five years ago as the candidate of a "third" party, the Conservatives; Gene McCarthy, a Democrat throughout his years in Congress and a challenger to then-President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1968 Democratic presidential primaries, is currently attempting to organize an independent campaign for the 1976 presidential race.

Both Buckley and McCarthy clearly have an interest in third-party independent political organizations. They have even joined with two other unlikely allies, the Conservative Party of New York and the American Civil Liberties Union, in a civil suit filed in U.S. District Court in Washington which seeks to have much of the new law declared unconstitutional.

"The law threatens to freeze the Democratic and Republican political parties into the political process at a time when neither is performing well and when millions of Americans are alienated from both parties and want another choice," says McCarthy.

"Discrimination against independent and third-party candidates," he continued, "violates the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and discourages full discussion of issues and of political alternatives. The campaign law also establishes the two-party system as an extension of the government. This violates the intent of the founding fathers, who opposed all political parties."

Buckley, for his part, points out several thorny problems: "Public financing will have two significant effects on third parties, neither desirable. In the first place, it will discriminate against genuine national third-party movements (such as that of George Wallace in 1968) because such parties haven't had the chance to establish a voting record of the kind required for financing.

"On the other hand, once a third party qualifies for future federal financing, a vested interest arises in keeping it alive—even if the George Wallace who gave it its sole reason for existence should move on. Thus, we run the risk of financing a proliferation of parties that could destroy the stability we have historically enjoyed through our two-party system."

[THREADING THE MAZE]

A full explanation of the issues raised by those two men lies in the intricate and complex language of the new law, beginning with a series of definitions contained in the section of the statute authorizing federal payments to candidates in the 1976 presidential campaign.

A "major" party is one whose presidential candidate received 25 percent or more of the total number of popular votes cast in the preceding contest for the White House. Only two parties —the Republicans and the Democrats —qualify on the basis of 1972 results. A "minor" party is one whose candidate received at least 5 percent of the popular vote in the last presidential race and a "new" party is one whose candidate received less than 5 percent in the last presidential election. (Note that the legal term, "new," applies to parties which have been in existence and have fielded presidential candidates for many years until they pass the 5 percent threshhold and become classified as "minor" parties.)

In the primary or pre-nomination period, the law does not distinguish between "major" parties and "minor" or "new" parties. This would appear to give presidential contenders for all parties the opportunity to take advantage of a quite generous provision which matches contributions from individuals with an identical amount from the federal treasury.

But there is a catch, one which makes it extremely difficult for those seeking the presidential nomination of a non-"major" party. In order to become eligible for any government payments, a candidate must first demonstrate broad support by raising $100,000—and that total must be composed of at least $5,000 collected in 20 states. Moreover, to encourage the solicitation of relatively small donations, the law stipulates that individual contributions will be matched only up to $250 in each case. In other words, if a wealthy donor gives a candidate $1,000 (the maximum allowed under the law), the federal government will match it with only $250; the remaining $750 is not eligible for matching.

So the first task is raising $100,000. Only then does a candidate become eligible for the federal matching payments—but from that point on every donation of $250 or less received is matched on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

Beginning with the federal contribution toward paying the cost of the parties' nominating conventions, the law distinguishes between "major"

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parties and all others. The former, if they choose to receive government funds rather than finance their conventions through individual contributions, automatically receive a payment of $2 million. A "minor" or "new" party which, for whatever reason, did not run a candidate in the preceding presidential campaign receives absolutely nothing from the federal government.

A "minor" party whose presidential candidate in the last campaign received 5 to 25 percent of the vote qualifies for a federal contribution to its convention on the basis of a ratio also used in calculating payments during the general election campaign: that is, the party's percentage of the vote in the last presidential election contrasted with the *average* percentage of the vote received by the major parties.

That formula is important because it represents one of the few instances in which the drafters of the law were generous toward "minor" parties. Consider a hypothetical 1972 presidential election in which the candidate of "major" party A received 50 percent of the vote, the candidate of "major" party B tallied 40 percent of the vote and the candidate of "minor" party C received only 10 percent of the vote.

Had the formula been constructed on the basis of absolute performance, party C would be eligible for $1 in federal funds for every $9 given to each of the "major" parties. Instead, the law requires that the performance of parties A and B first be averaged, thus giving party C $1 for every $4.50 allocated to the "major" parties. Looking at it another way, the "minor" party receives 22½ percent of the funds given to each of the "major" parties instead of only 10 percent.

In the general election campaign, if the party chooses public financing rather than traditional private funding, the nominee of each "major" party receives as much as $20 million, payable upon presentation of proof that expenses have been incurred. (A "major" party candidate would receive less than the maximum only if he or she made the foolish mistake of not spending enough.) A "minor" party candidate receives a smaller amount, based upon the generous averaging formula explained above.

"Minor" and "new" parties which receive little or no federal money may collect individual contributions, but no presidential candidate is permitted to receive or spend more than $20 million. Finally, there is a provision for non-"major" parties which improves their position among the voters during the election year. It works like this:

If a "new" party whose presidential candidate never before received at least 5 percent of the popular vote manages to surpass that figure in the 1976 election, it will receive a payment based on its 1976 performance. Similarly, a "minor" party which received 7 percent of the presidential vote in 1972 and 12 percent of the presidential vote in 1976 would be eligible for an additional payment based on that 5 percent increase. *But there is one very important restriction:* The payments cannot be made until the election is over and the results are in. The federal money is received after the election, when it won't do much good in terms of campaigning.

A concrete example: If the law had been in effect during the 1968 presidential campaign, Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace, campaigning as the candidate of the American Independent Party, would not have received a dime in federal funds throughout the entire campaign because his party and candidacy did not even exist in 1964. But after the election, Wallace would have received a huge federal payment because almost 10 million people, or 13.5 percent of the electorate, cast their ballots for him.

One of these years, it's likely that in the middle of a presidential campaign, an independent candidate will capture the country's imagination at the expense of the "major" parties, and one of the major inequities of the new law will be exposed.

[OTHER WAYS]

The problem of prejudice against third parties in the wording of the law can be only partially attributed to the inherent bias of a Congress composed almost exclusively of Republicans and Democrats. Some apparently well-intentioned members of the House and Senate sought to seriously consider third party needs, but they were faced with a dilemma—what to do with "fringe" candidates.

Consider the example of Lar "America First" Daly, a Chicago man who for many years specialized in qualifying himself as a minor party candidate for virtually every office on the ballot, including that of president. Campaigning in a red, white and blue Uncle Sam costume, Daly was taken seriously by only a few. But if access to federal funds was available to any individual who submitted nomination papers and paid a nominal filing fee, Daly's successors would be in line for their money.

On the other hand, there is Wallace and his likely successors—men and women who, in the coming years, may well emerge virtually overnight as candidates with a significant base of support. How can (or should) a law make this distinction?

There are ways to make federal funds readily available to the candidates of relatively small parties without turning the federal financing provisions into a program of chaos. The $100,000 threshold for contenders in primaries could be reduced or even eliminated. Similarly, the 5 percent threshold for payments to parties in the general election could be lowered so that a party which gained only 1 or 2 percent of the vote in the last election would receive at least a small federal payment commensurate with its popularity. Finally, a formula surely could be devised making federal payments quickly available to candidates on the basis of their popularity—or lack of it—during an election year.

Some well-meaning politicians are now having second thoughts about the entire concept of federal financing, but they fear even more a return to the thoroughly discredited system of private funding. Undoubtedly, the debate over the best way to pay for politics in this country will rage on for many years, but as long as the 1974 law remains in effect, those voters who are dissatisfied with the choices being offered by Republicans and Democrats should invest time to study the statute. A careful search will help secure federal funds for candidates of their choice. One thing seems clear—the "major" parties already have done so, and they will be bleeding the law for every nickel they can get.

Robert Walters is a free-lance writer based in Washington D.C.

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The American Corporation: A Study in Ineptness

"The time has come to call men and institutions to account; corporate and government alike. The nation is in peril, because of mismanagement and incompetence beyond comprehension."

There used to be a Wall Street rule of prudence never to invest in the securities of a corporation unless its management had brought the company successfully through hard times. In the vernacular of a departed period: unless the company had gone through the wringer and had come out clean. What this rule of prudence implies was that not all managements had good sense, that some – many of them – were not competent to handle large affairs, and that the incompetent would fail under stress, the companies they mismanaged failing with them. This was bluntly advanced as the Darwinian rule of corporate survival of the fittest, the strong and able gobbling up the weak and inept – or whatever parts of them they wanted to digest. The weak, in any case would go to the wall. Society would be strengthened by the perishing of nonsurvivors.

What was it that determined who would survive, who go under? At base, it was capable management of financial and working capital accounts. This did not mean the avoidance of risks. It did mean that, no matter how alluring the possible reward, no risk – however remote the likelihood of its materializing in fact – would be assumed if its materialization could wreck the enterprise. And this meant, in effect, that the successful corporation was one which had assured that its truly liquid assets were at all times sufficient to meet, without discomfort, any reasonably forseeable claims upon them. In a sense, in that *temps perdu,* this justified the argument of successful companies that able businessmen were far more capable of managing immense industrial affairs than was government. For with government management, their claim ran, there would be no way to weed out the weak and inept. The public purse would be open to bail out those who, by law of nature, ought to perish. Survival of the unfit would be the logical consequence.

In its day, and during this specific phase of the nation's industrial development, the argument had considerable force. It reflected the reality of the times. But times have changed, even though the basic laws of corporate survival may not have. The fundamental change, in fact, is that America's corporations no longer follow the rules of survival. They have become gamblers on liquidity accounts, attenuating their capacity to withstand periods of financial stringency in the society. The *average* corporation has grown to practice the self-same financial imprudence that once characterized the nonsurvivors. The consequence is that major, long-established corporations now find themselves in the same plight which was the common lot of ill-managed companies in earlier times.

One fundamental, and necessary, measure of corporate liquidity (of certainty in the ability to meet instantly any financial demands upon a company) is the summation of net working capital minus inventory. Disregarding long-term obligations, and the necessity to budget for their eventual payment, working capital less inventories shows at a glance what would happen to a company if the direst of all events – total collapse of the amount of a company's inventory – were to occur. For the society as a whole, the likeli-

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hood of this approaches zero. For individual companies, it can be a measurable probability. (Producers of thorium found themselves in exactly that position when the only use for thorium, the gas mantle, was erased overnight with the advent of the electric light. Thorium, today, is an essential item in all advanced nucleonics – but what company could survive 60 years waiting for this turnaround?)

What has happened to the basic liquidity measure of America's corporations is shown in the table below.

On a terminus-to-terminus basis from 1961 through 1972, for each $1.00 increase in net working capital America's nonfinancial corporations added $1.33 of inventory. Between 1967 and 1968 they added $1.78 of inventory for each $1.00 of added working capital. But current liabilities are absolute in amount, not subject to shrinkage except by paying them off. Inventories, by contrast, can rise or fall in value by changes in market conditions or by urgency of corporate needs to raise cash with which to meet current liabilities, by selling off inventories at discount prices. Accounts receivable can also vary from their book values if corporations – because of excessive inventories, for example – discount their receivables by selling them to factors at perhaps 16-20 percent below their stated value.

A combination of these occurred in 1969-70, leading to widespread corporate liquidity weakness bordering on a national crisis – a crisis which was alleviated only by the Federal Reserve extending large credits to the banking system to enable banks to buy up the commercial paper of major companies in financial distress.

Having been bailed out in 1969-70, one might have expected that America's corporations would have learned the lesson not only of those two years but of the whole history of U.S. growth and survival of corporations. They did not. What the history of past generations should have taught them they completely disregarded. During the 12 months from 3rd Quarter 1973 to 3rd Quarter 1974, for each $1.00 added to net worth of capital the nonfinancial corporations added $2.05 of inventory. And this time the Fed could *not* bail them out. The Fed was more concerned with attempting to lengthen the maturity schedule of the interest-bearing U.S. publicly-held debt, and was preparing to finance a federal budget deficit for Fiscal 1976 which Dr. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, has estimated at possibly $100 billion under certain assumed conditions.

NET LIQUIDITY OF U.S. NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
(billions of dollars)

year	net working capital	inventories	net working capital minus inventories
1961	$131.0	$95.0	$36.0
1962	137.3	100.5	36.8
1963	142.7	106.8	35.9
1964	149.0	113.1	35.9
1965	157.2	126.6	30.6
1966	164.6	142.8	21.8
1967	174.9	153.1	21.8
1968	182.4	166.0	16.4
1969	185.7	186.4	–0.7
1970	187.4	193.3	–5.9
1971	204.8	200.3	4.5
1972	224.3	215.1	9.2
1973	245.3	247.0	–1.7
1974 (3rd Quarter)	263.3	282.7	–19.1

(Net working capital = current assets minus current liabilities. Current assets = cash and equivalents plus accounts receivable plus inventories plus miscellaneous liquid assets. Current liabilities = accounts payable plus taxes due plus current debt repayments needs plus wages and other payables, all due within one year. Preliminary estimate for 1974 3rd Quarter.)

[A CIRCLE OF MISMANAGEMENT]

The consequence is the depression now wracking all of us. It has come about not because of the oil embargo, nor the rising fuel prices, but because the management tasks of today's giant corporations, especially the conglomerates, are beyond the ability of corporate executives to perform successfully.

For the massive corporations to remain successful, they require massive growth in markets even in the short run. And to serve these markets – so their theory goes – they need additions not only to plant and equipment but also to inventories of raw materials, semi-finished, and finished goods. And as these inventories grow, they need enlarged markets to insure the rapid turnover of their materials and products. Growth is their central strategy, and growth requires prior expansion of physical assets.

What is lost in this circular thinking of the corporations is that continuous expansion involves the deployment of assets in ways designed to maximize unit product sales, even if this leads to increasing disproportions in the forms of the assets held. These disproportions were self-evident in 1969-70. But a nominally private institution – the Fed – pulled them out of the mess which the disproportions represented. Literally, the Federal Reserve in 1969-70 rescued the nation's corporate and banking structure by providing the liquidity which the corporations had dissipated. But it was a mere rescue, not a correction of fundamental corporate malpractices. It staved off disaster, but it did not effect a cure. Corporate medication was beyond the capabilities of the Federal Reserve, except cosmetically.

Moreover, although the working capital minus inventories deficit (the

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basic illiquidity of U.S. nonfinancial corporations) of 1969-70 was relieved by the actions of the U.S. central banks, this was accomplished mainly by tapping the financial resources of Europe, not by diverting new private savings of this country to the corporate sector. But the corporations acted as though such diversion had occurred, in the belief that what had happened in 1969-70 could not happen again. Europe's money spigot could always be turned on if illiquidity developed.

Could it really? In 1973, Europe turned off the spigot permanently, at least on official account. One immediate consequence was a $10.9 billion reversal during 1972-73 in the working capital minus inventories position of U.S. corporations – from a surplus of $9.2 billion in 1972 year-end to a deficit of $1.7 billion in 1973 year-end. In fact, in the closing quarter of 1973, total U.S. corporate inventories (trade and industry combined) rose at an annual rate of about $35 billion compared with the $16-19 billion annual rate which most business analysts had anticipated. For the whole of 1973, corporate inventories rose by almost $32 billion while net working capital (of which inventories are a component) increased only $21 billion, bringing about a new liquidity crisis which neither business nor government had the wit to recognize in time. During the 12 months through September 1974 net working capital of U.S. corporations rose by $21.7 billion, but the inventory component increased some $44.5 billion, increasing the strain on fully liquid corporate assets by almost $23 billion.

Whatever one cares to call this, it surely cannot be called management. The gentlest of terms which one can apply to it is gross misjudgment on an almost universal scale. The corporations have shown themselves to be incapable of recognizing dangers in the aggregate business balance sheet – unable, that is, to handle large affairs with elementary prudence.

[GROTESQUE ACCUMULATION]

The consequence has been the necessity to finance externally the grotesquely excessive accumulation of inventories. During 1961-67, nonfarm, nonfinancial corporations had, on average, financed internally about 66 percent of their requirements for new funds. During 1968-72 internal financing provided little more than 54 percent of their additional funding; in 1973, only 48 percent.

The corporations were sinking deeper into debt, largely on inventory account in the later years. And the net accounts were growing unmanageable. In 1971, credit market funds employed by nonfarm, nonfinancial corporations had shown a ratio of only 12 percent of new short-term debt divided by new long-term debt. In 1973 that ratio had risen to 95 percent.

Excessive inventory accumulations – and plant and equipment expenditures – set in motion a rising demand which appeared to justify the excessive accumulations. But this rising demand was itself the product of the excessive accumulations – or *vice versa,* if you prefer.

Marx long ago pointed out that aggregate circulation of goods and money among entrepreneurs necessarily exceeds net circulation between capitalists and ultimate purchasers. Capitalists have not been oblivious to this fact, as evidenced by their distinguishing between gross and net national product. But, in the euphoric climate of recent years, they appeared to have lost awareness that undue expansion of the former over the latter bespeaks a false, unnecessarily brief, state demand which warns of the necessity for retrenchment, not expansion. Specifically, it sounds a clarion call to put one's financial affairs in order by reducing short-term claims upon assets, and by moving towards increased, not decreased, net liquidity.

The American corporations of today (with some notable exceptions) seem to have lost all sense of this. And blame, in part, rests with government which, as recently as four years ago, projected a decade of economic growth in which risks of overexpansion, or of malproportions among assets, and between the forms of assets and debt maturities schedules, seemed insignificant.

At base, the displayed imprudence and financial mismanagement of America's corporations in recent years represents a concordance of self-delusion between the large business

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interests and an Administration dominated by those self-same interests. Each was engaged in dangerous and mathematically unsound projections as to economic growth. The Administration based its long-term economic objectives upon the sum of the short-term projections made by the corporations. And the corporations rested their short-range policies upon government's long-term projections which were founded upon the short-term extrapolations of the corporations. This was not a case of the dog chasing its tail but of the dog barking at itself in the belief that the more, and the louder, it barked, the more dog food it would somehow create.

Examine, for example, the *U.S. Industrial Outlook* produced annually by the Department of Commerce. Its 1971 edition opened by saying "The upswing year – 1971 – begins a decade of economic growth that starts with GNP crossing the trillion dollar line and will end with it approaching the $2 trillion mark."

The policies pursued by America's corporations during the years which followed suggested that they accepted this nonsense as gospel, or close to it. (My own response was not to renew my subscription.) However, even if U.S. corporations actually *did* accept this manifest absurdity as true, this acceptance had no relation whatever to the necessity for each enterprise to maintain a sound and workable balance sheet. Debt-to-assets ratios must not be allowed to grow top-heavy, however expansive the prospects. In particular, short-term borrowings must not be permitted to grow so large in relation to quickly realizable assets as to compel the liquidation – at sacrifice prices – of inventories necessary for continued operations of a business, or to cause a discounting of receivables, hence a dimunition in net working capital and a decrease in corporate and social liquidity.

[COLLISION COURSE]

We are led to the frightening conclusion that neither the corporations nor government now shows capability of managing the economy. It is less that the economy is unmanageable than that the fiscal policies of recent years – corporate and governmental – have led to a national economic disproportion which *threatens* the economy with unmanageability.

To try to understand this, let us return to the *U.S. Industrial Outlook.* It reasoned in 1971 that because GNP had approximately doubled between 1961 and 1971 it would do the same between 1971 and 1981, approaching the $2 trillion mark in 1981. But just as sound (or unsound) a mathematical case could have been presented that, under exceptionally favorable conditions in no way subject to interruption or downturn, the *maximum* growth in GNP by 1981 would be a linear function, not exponential. This would have led to a conclusion that GNP in 1981 would slightly exceed $1.5 trillion, falling short of the $2 trillion mark by about $500 billion.

In reality, neither of these extrapolations could rationally be assumed to be clear indicators of the future of the U.S. eocnomy. But to take a risk of overestimating future GNP by $500 billion led necessarily to financial carelessness exceeding that of the worst-managed corporation in times past. And this carelessness characterized both government and industry. The *Outlook* predicted two million new housing starts for 1975, as a single example. And the construction industry geared itself to meet this demand. The result: 300,000 unsold single-family dwellings on the market as of recent report, and 400,000 unsold condominium units. One could go on and on with examples of the ruinous consequences of this fairyland reasoning: unsold cars, refrigerators, television sets, etc., etc.

The details, however, are epiphenomenal, and what we should be concerned with are phenomena – more properly with the phenomenon of generalized corporate and governmental mismanagement and imprudence. For this is the real state of things: the United States is, and has been for years, unimagineably mismanaged. Even the hopes of the Council of Economic Advisors for an early and persisting turnaround are based on the same imprudency which has led to the present state of things.

Meanwhile, a new problem arises. Corporate illiquidity and growth in short-term public debt are identical twins. More correctly, the latter aggravates the former and the former exacerbates the latter. And as of 1974 year-end, $148.1 billion (52.4 percent) of marketable interest-bearing public debt fell due within one year. The average public debt maturity had declined to two years, eleven months, exactly one-half of what it had been in 1955.

Some congressmen are protesting to Treasury possible plans to sell the public *any* part of the funds, needed to finance the budget deficit which looms ahead, in the public market for short-term loans. Their argument is that major sales of short-term government issues would dry up the funds needed to be borrowed short by corporations in light of *their* illiquidity.

How the federal deficits will be financed is a subject for later discussion. What is clear in the present, however, is that federal debt financing needs are on a collision course with corporate needs. The profligacy and fiscal mismanagement in each is bringing about conflict of fiscal interest which can transform the parlous economic conditions of today into a national disaster.

What is obvious is that the time has come to call men and institutions to account: corporate and government alike. The nation is in peril, and it is so because of mismanagement on an incredible scale. No amount of finger-pointing, by industry at government or *vice versa,* can alter the fact. Both have displayed incompetence beyond comprehension. The minimal result one can expect is institutional changes in the very foundations of the nation. We cannot continue to conduct national affairs in this way.

This is the substance of the matter. The ways in which governmental and corporate finances have been handled demonstrate not only that the men in charge lack competence but that, within the present frame of institutions, nobody could conduct affairs intelligently.

The very system is self-contradictory. Goads which drive government and corporations to financial excesses are not mere attributes of the system but are the system itself. We shall be fortunate indeed if we escape this financial bog without tearing the nation apart.

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

Target ....Superweapons

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[Editorial]

Stopping the Superweapons

A Fight We Can Win

by David Kolodney

When the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement was signed by President Nixon in May 1972, this victory for detente was heralded as the most significant armaments control advance since World War II. Analysis in *Business Week*, however, revealed the irony of arms control in the SALT mode. The agreement set limits on the ABM itself and the numbers of offensive weapons, but it presumed the replacement of current weaponry with the "qualititative improvements" of *new* systems. This, *BW* reported, would open up a potential $49 billion weapons market. Their figure proved conservative, but, without doubt, the era of the Superweapons had arrived.

In the coming years, decisions that would commit hundreds of billions of dollars for new weapons systems are to be made, with varying phases of finality. There are no precise criteria to define which of these should be ranked as Superweapons. But among them are three paradigms that by themselves account for a total of almost $100 billion. These are Superweapons of the first order: the B-1 bomber, the Trident Submarine, and the successor to current ICBMs (which could be any of a variety of options). In the clearest cases Superweapons have these elements in common: they are strategic weapons designed for Big Power nuclear war, whose cost is mind-boggling and whose military value is nil.

America is in deep crisis and is facing more than one watershed decision about its future. But the defeat of the Superweapons is manifestly a minimum condition for any kind of sanity ahead. This imperative merits top political priority: the Superweapons must be stopped.

It is difficult to grasp the amounts involved. Without trying to lay out the social reconstruction such funding could accomplish, its significance is all the more astounding when conceived as an aggregate of smaller choices. Allowing for customary cost overruns and hidden charges, each Trident submarine will cost $2 billion. San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit system, hardly a best buy, was built for that sum—which means a major urban transit system foregone for every single sub. The average annual spending scheduled for the B-1 bomber could subsidize the operation of every rapid transit system in America to the full amount now collected from all passenger fares.

There are many skewed priorities in our national resources, but in none is the corporate requirement for waste set off so clearly against the urgency of real social needs. In no other priority is the political issue so starkly drawn, nor does it cut so deep. In the battle over the Superweapons we shall see a head-on collision between utility and profit, each desperately in need of victory. And in this battle the economic and political conditions at last are ripe to decisively defeat the war industry's enormous power.

* * *

The significance of the Superweapons issue is revealed in a number of related propositions.

The Superweapons are patently without military value. It is particularly obvious that in an era of invulnerable and unstoppable ballistics missiles, a new bomber is pointless and obsolete. But the notion of beefing up strategic capability in *any* of the ways now planned is equally pointless. The current U.S. armada of missible subs is already a perfect deterrent force. It is invulnerable, and it can destroy the world. Given that, any other weapon serving the same purpose is automatically superfluous.

The Superweapons are the inevitable consequence of military perfection. Nuclear warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems represent a kind of "crisis of overproductivity" in strategic arms. A single weapon system of this type is more destructive than the entire war effort of WWII. With this achievement and only a finite planet to destroy, armsmaking on the strategic level made itself obsolete. The seemingly endless historic progression of limitless numbers, generations, and types of arms reached an absolute plateau. No further improvement was possible.

The ABM showed us the Superweapon way. The Cold War strategic universe of Mega-death and Counterforce had always seemed mad and unreal, but it was linked to the actual ambitions of national policy. Even with all the waste, giveaways, misallocations and blunders of military weapons planning and procurement, strategic imperatives provided a basic thrust for the war machine's juggernaut.

The planned deployment of the ABM, however, seemed to lack even this kind of contact with reality. The important weapons had been built, and overkill had been stockpiled beyond comprehension. But the "military-industrial complex" created to accomplish this had taken on a life of its own. Even though there was no longer a military need for a new manned bomber or an ABM system, there was still a corporate need to build them.

The ABM then was the ideal product: having been wrought of the purest military fantasy, it could be stretched

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and shaped to meet corporate needs, a thin or thick defense, $4 billion or $40 billion, whatever was called for at the time. The ABM and succeeding Superweapons could serve as a kind of "ever normal granary" helping to maintain corporate revenue from year to year at whatever level was required.

The political question of military spending is going to be weighed against alternatives now as never before. In the coming decisions over the Federal budget, a matrix of political options will be expressed. We cannot have both guns and butter after all, and something has to give. LBJ's guns-and-butter illusion made the Vietnam war politically more tenable than it would otherwise have been. But it took a devastating economic toll.

There are differences over the range of deficits that are now considered likely or sustainable in any given year, but the situation is unlike that which prevailed in Johnson's time. Then, each domestic and military program was considered independently and simply funded out of debt with no consciousness of long-term economic cost. Now, even with deficit levels soaring, the notion of limits and trade-offs cannot be ignored.

There is a crucial difference between posing the question in a budgetary vacuum: "Is this weapon worth this much money?" or, on the other hand, asking, "Is this weapon worth the sacrifice of a popular domestic program?" Weapon spending has never been put on the defensive in this way, so that, even though vast amounts were involved, it was difficult to get a purchase on them. Is the B-1 bomber really worth $25 billion? Most would have been content to leave that question to the military experts. But is the B-1 worth giving up a major pollution-control program, or an expansion in mass transit, or a decent adjustment in unemployment payments? After years of publicity about cost overruns and military waste, the public will be much less ready to accept a weapons system as worth the sacrifices now so pointedly defined.

The political tide has been turning against armaments for some time. Even before the debacle of military force in Vietnam was consummated, and before the consciousness of a domestic crisis had set in, armaments already were losing their appeal. Every major survey of popular priorities for government budgeting in the last few years has placed defense spending at or near the bottom of the list, far behind expenditures for social needs of every kind. Improvements in health, jobs, housing, education, pollution control, helping the poor and the elderly, have all received *two to three times* the levels of support accorded to higher spending for defense.

The pontification of generals about "security needs" now carries far less weight. In 1966 the military was ranked third from the top among sixteen public and private institutions in which people expressed "a great deal of confidence." By 1971 the military had suffered the most precipitous drop of all; confidence was off by well over half, down from 62 to 27 percent. During the 1972 presidential campaign, voters in California, one of the most defense-dependent states, ranked "extending and improving military defense programs" twelfth out of a list of fourteen issues as being among the Most Important; and it topped the list of Least Important. Social programs of one kind or another have always been valued by the public. The difference now is not simply that they love social spending more, but that they love military spending less.

The Red Scare isn't working anymore. The money rolled in with ease well past the Fifties. In a period of nuclear trauma, with dog tags and "Take Cover!" drills in the schools, the mere roar of an airplane could often induce a sense of panic. But people are no longer fearful enough to respond well to Pentagon extortion. The Russian threat long ago lost its psychic clout. By the end of the Sixties, the only menace that could be successfully conjured up was that of maniacally fanatic Chinese Reds, so suicidally aggressive that they were willing to sacrifice hundreds of millions dead just to get a nuclear shot at us. And by 1972, even this was gone. According to *Time* magazine that year, "Communism as a threat at home or abroad ranked twenty-second" among popular concerns.

This should not be too surprising. In the 1972 election, Richard Nixon himself had helped to undermine popular fears. With all his demagogery, flag and motherhood, Nixon did what politically he had to do to win his re-election—detente with Russia and rapprochement with China. In effect, Nixon was able to announce to the American people that he had ended the Cold War. He bought his votes at an enormous price. He recklessly spent down the entire Cold War patrimony.

An external enemy is indispensable for calls to arms, especially expensive ones. China was the last good enemy we had. And if the Cold War is over, it is no surprise that people are not willing to pay as much to win it anymore.

* * *

Ford, like Nixon before him, while pressing for lavish military spending, has tried to keep a check on important social programs by threatening to blame economic difficulties on a spendthrift Congress. The question is whether this challenge will be thrown back, whether it is spendthrift military policies that are placed on the defensive. For butter we must sacrifice guns, not "fiscal responsibility." There can be no social program unless that point is made. And, in particular, opposition to the Superweapons should be a first condition for any politician who hopes to be considered socially progressive in this period. Those who have most successfully tried to play both sides—Jackson the Progressive and Wallace the Populist both immediately come to mind—will fail this litmus test. That could—and should—become a major reason why their demogogery will come to grief.

The Superweapons are simply not defensible in open controversy. Only low visibility can save them. That is why it is such an important task to force the issue with the utmost clarity. Every politician should be made to face the responsibility for an obvious choice between the public good and privilege, mismanagement, and waste.

If sufficient momentum is generated behind the issue of the Superweapons, the results could be extraordinarily significant in redefining American politics. It is a fight we should take up and one that we can win.

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The Pentagon's $150 Billion Shopping List

"How do we stop this dangerous, ruinous rivalry? For a start, we can simply recognize that overkill is overkill, and superflous weapons are superflous."

—Sen. John Sparkman, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee

Our economy may be on the rocks, the quality of life in America may be deteriorating for everyone, our foreign policies may be bankrupt, but the arsenal of democracy is to remain alive and well. The Defense Department wants the United States to continue to put its faith in weapons and military power. The U.S. produces the most destructive weapons in the world, the most advanced tanks, planes, submarines, bombers, missiles, and yet we are called upon to try harder to remain "number one." World demand for the products of our advanced industrial civilization is insatiable and growing: U.S. weapons manufacturers sold a record $8.2 billion worth of arms overseas in 1974, an increase of more than 100% over 1973. America's dubious world leadership in weaponry may be the ultimate expression of our philosophy of conspicuous consumption.

The proposed fiscal 1976 Bicentennial federal budget says a great deal about our misplaced priorities. In the new budget President Ford asks the Congress to appropriate almost $108 billion for military purposes, the highest level of military spending in history. This is an increase of $16 billion over last year. At the same time, funding for non-defense programs is projected to decline by more than $25 billion. The Pentagon, according to its five-year plan for 1976 through 1980, plans to spend at least $636 billion over this period.

The new military budget now being debated before Congress contains a bewildering variety of new weapons schemes. The Air Force and Rockwell International want $749 million to continue development of their $21 billion B-1 bomber program so that the U.S. will possess well into the 21st century a bomber that will be able to fly lower, faster, and carry more bombs than any bomber ever built. General Dynamics is working on a submarine for the Navy, the Trident, that will be bigger (two football fields long), quieter, and fire more nuclear weapons than any submarine in history. It will also be the most expensive weapons system in history, at $1.6 billion or more per copy. The Army has Chrysler and General Motors competing to produce the Tank of the Future, the XM-1 Main Battle Tank. The XM-1, estimated to cost almost $2 million each, will shoot further, more accurately, have more armor protection, and a smoother ride than any other tank. Assuming, of course, that everything goes according to plan, which frequently does not happen.

The 1976 military budget asks for funding of new missiles of every conceivable description: anti-ship, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, anti-missile, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, air-to-air, continent-to-continent, laser-guided, radar-guided, electro-optical-guided, television-guided. New military aircraft come in all shapes and sizes and nicknames: Skyhawks, Tomcats, Eagles, Cobras, Prowlers, Hawkeyes, Intruders, Corsairs, Chinooks, Orions, Vikings, Sea Stallions, Sea Cobras, Iroquois, not to mention AWACS and the unpronounceable AABNCPs.

Every three months the Pentagon is required by Congress to publish the current estimated costs of major weapons systems. The latest cost-overrun status report on 40 big ticket items indicates that these weapons alone will cost $150 billion, $41 billion more than originally expected.

The American public has little way of judging whether there is any real need for particular weapons and must rely on the Congress to exercise control over the military budget and the Defense Department. The Congress, however, is barely up to the task of beginning to explore the intricacies of the many complex weapons systems and defense issues buried in the labyrinths of the plus-$100 billion defense budget. Unlike the Defense Department, Congress has little

by David Johnson

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information and even less time. Congressman Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, who has been a member of both the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, puts it this way: "By the time a weapons program reaches the stage at which it becomes a prominent issue for debate in the Congress, the battle is already lost. The Defense Department's near monopoly on relevant information, together with the vested bureaucratic and economic interests which propel the high-budget, high-prestige weapons programs, conspire to give such programs an all but unstoppable momentum." What the Pentagon wants, the Pentagon gets.

Congress has become increasingly critical of high and escalating levels of military spending. Although there is not yet a consensus on how to reduce the defense budget, there is a new and growing recognition that changed international circumstances and economic pressures make it necessary to choose among competing programs and priorities. Many Congressmen are increasingly aware that spending on weapons and forces that contribute to U.S. strength only in a marginal way can no longer be afforded. The American experience in Indochina seems to have taught the lesson that military power is of declining usefulness in coping with the country's problems.

New superweapons are not the answer. Even such a hardline conservative as Senator John McClellan, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has come to admit that any real meaning of national security is far broader than its narrow military component: "Inflation is rapidly becoming as great a danger to our national security and the stability of our society as is the danger from any potential foreign foe."

A number of controversial weapons systems are being critically examined by the Congress during hearings and action on the fiscal 1976 defense budget. Questionable strategic weapons include the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic cruise missiles, and new ABM systems. The bulk of the defense budget, about 75 percent, goes to pay for the projection of U.S. military power overseas in Europe and Asia. Controversial conventional weapons include the AWACS warning and control aircraft, the SAM-D air defense missile system, the C-5A aircraft, the XM-1 tank, and the expensive F-14 and F-15 tactical fighter aircraft.

• **B-1 Bomber.** For the Defense Department, the most vulnerable weapon in the new budget is the B-1 strategic bomber. The B-1 is a weapon that may very well be pricing itself out of existence, although Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas says that he has no "cost breaking point" for the B-1. Many members of Congress, however, are near or have already passed their breaking point with the B-1. The cost of developing and producing 244 B-1s is estimated at $20.6 billion, or $84 million each. The cost continues to skyrocket and inevitably will shortly exceed $100 million per plane.

Critics of the B-1 argue convincingly that the U.S. is well ahead of the Soviet Union in the strategic arms race and point out that the U.S. already has 8,500 strategic nuclear weapons and 500 bombers, compared to 2,800 nuclear weapons and 160 bombers for the Soviet Union. Even a handful of former weapons enthusiasts have come around to acknowledging that somehow, somewhere a line has to be drawn. Says Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "How are we to put a stop to this dangerous, ruinous rivalry? For a start we can simply recognize that overkill is overkill, that superfluous weapons are indeed superfluous, and that many of the new systems being developed, though technologically fascinating, are redundant and unnecessary."

In an age when missiles can deliver devastating destruction in less than 30 minutes, a bomber that takes 10 hours to reach its targets can at best have only a minor role. The existing force of B-52 and FB-111 bombers will in any case provide a bomber force with considerable overkill through the 1980s. The U.S. spends about $5 billion a year on its bombers. Including European-based and aircraft carrier-based planes, the U.S. today already has eight different types of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons in an attack on the Soviet Union.

Two billion dollars has already been spent on the B-1. The fiscal 1976 budget requests another $749 million, including $77 million to initiate procurement. The $77 million is viewed by critics as an effort by the Air Force to get the Congress to commit itself all the way to ultimate full-production of the B-1. The Defense Department projects a request for $1.7 billion for fiscal 1977 and continued funding at $2 billion or more a year through 1983.

As yet, Congress has been unwilling to make a firm decision for or against the B-1. Alternatives such as a B-52 with new engines, a stretched FB-111, and a wide-body jet like the Boeing 747 armed with cruise missiles have been suggested. To counter such speculations, the Defense Department conducted a year-long investigation called the Joint Strategic Bomber Study which, not surprisingly, concluded that B-1 is best. The official conclusion sounds not unlike a toothpaste commercial: "Of the equal-cost forces examined, those containing B-1's performed substantially better. The low-flying, nuclear-hard B-1, with its high quality ECM, out-performed all other vehicles by a wide margin." The most egregious flaw of the DOD's study is that it assumed that the United States needs to spend as much money on bombers as the B-1 costs and compared only "equal-cost" alternatives. Employing typical tunnel vision, the DOD analysts neglected to examine the question of whether the country needs a bomber fleet in the first place and, if so, whether that capability could be obtained at much less cost.

A decision on producing the B-1 is scheduled for November 1976 and it seems unlikely that the Congress will stop the B-1 before next year. Although the plane is viewed with growing skepticism, continued funding of research and development is unfortunately all too likely.

• **Trident Submarine.** Next to the B-1, the most expensive weapon program is the Trident strategic submarine, currently estimated to cost $16.2 billion for ten submarines, each armed with 24 4,000 mile-range Trident I missiles. Each Trident submarine will carry enough nuclear weapons to destroy any country in the world. The U.S. already has 41 strategic submarines carrying 656 Polaris and Poseidon

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
16,000 U.S. Nuclear
7,000 U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe (NATO)*
Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)
155mm Nuclear Cannons and Shells
203mm Nuclear Cannons and Shells
Lance Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Pershing Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Honest John Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Sergeant Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Nike-Hercules Surface-to-Air Missiles
Nuclear Bombs (Air-to-Surface)
Walleye Air-to-Surface Missiles
Nuclear Depth Bombs (Air-to-Subsurface)
2,000 total NATO nuclear capable fighter-bombers — including 500 U.S. aircraft
FORCE OUTNUMBERS SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE 2 TO 1
*One-third of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are designated for U.S. forces, two-thirds for use of U.S. allied forces in NATO.
U.S.S.R.
Atlantic Ocean
Iceland
Eastern Europe
China
Indian Ocean
U.S. Nuclear Fleet — Atlantic
162 Nuclear Capable Ships and Submarines
6 Attack Aircraft Carriers
2 Cruisers
47 Destroyers
32 Destroyer Escorts
30 Ballistic Missile Submarines
37 Attack Submarines
7 Ammunition Ships
1 Escort Research Ship
U.S.N. Nuclear Capable Aircraft
288 Carrier Attack Aircraft
144 Carrier Defense Aircraft
108 P-3 Land-based ASW/Recon Aircraft
5016 U.S.N. Nuclear Weapons
Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM)
Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC)
Nuclear Torpedoes (SUBROC)
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)
Nuclear Bombs
Nuclear Depth Bombs
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
Key:
Areas Where U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Located
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the Philippines
54 Nuclear Capable Fighter Bombers
Storage of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force Nuclear Weapons

missiles with about 4,000 nuclear weapons. The new budget asks for $2.1 billion for Trident, with a $3.4 billion request expected for fiscal 1977. The Defense Department hopes to put the first Trident to sea in 1979.

Existing missile submarines are invulnerable and considered by liberals and conservatives alike to be the "backbone" of the deterrent Triad of bombers and land-and sea-based missiles. Because of this "blue water" sentiment and because it was promoted as a bargaining chip in the SALT talks, the Trident program has had relatively smooth sailing through Congress. Although the rate of production has been slowed to three every two years, the momentum has seemed unstoppable.

The Cadillac of the Sea, or, as Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf calls it, "that great shield for America," is promoted by the Navy primarily because of the advantages of having a longer-range missile permitting a submarine to utilize greater expanses of the ocean and escape detection. In the absence of any evidence about how submarines will become vulnerable in the future, critics of the huge Trident believe that it is premature to be putting so many eggs in relatively few baskets. Longer-range missiles could be installed in existing submarines at much less cost, as, in fact, the Navy plans to do. The drive to build the Trident reflects a compulsion toward mindless modernization in the Defense Department, the pursuit of new technologies and superweapons irrespective of any realistic assessments and with ever more marginal returns.

• **New ICBMs.** The fiscal 1976 defense budget asks for more than $900 million for continuing procurement of Minuteman missiles and research on a variety of new ICBM systems. To date the U.S. has deployed 1054 ICBMs, including 550 multiple-warhead MIRVed Minuteman III missiles, which can deliver more than 2,000 nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has stated that

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Weapons Abroad



the policy of the U.S. is to build up to the limits of the 1974 Vladivostok SALT agreement which had stipulated that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could have as many as 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, including 1320 MIRVed missiles.

With the expansion of the Soviet nuclear missile force in recent years, U.S. ICBMs have become increasingly vulnerable, at least theoretically, to destruction. Some officials, including Dr. Fred Iklé, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have suggested that the U.S. should be moving away from reliance on ICBMs. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has also indicated some differences with Defense Department officials by stating that the much discussed disparity in missile throw-weight between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a "phony issue."

The Defense Department's game plan is to keep all options open by investing billions of dollars in exploring almost all of the various schemes for new ICBMs. This is the all too typical pattern of avoiding hard choices by giving everybody what they want. Options include mobile ICBMs that would be fired from airplanes (a Minuteman missile was dropped from a C-5A plane last fall in a test), mobile ICBMs that would be transported on land by train or truck, and new fixed large ICBMs that would compete with the Russians in who can build the biggest missile. Over the next ten years the U.S. could spend as much as $50 billion in seeking solutions to the problem of Minuteman vulnerability.

Research is also being conducted on a variety of projects to bring to life Secretary Schlesinger's philosophy of a counterforce strategic policy. These programs to increase the accuracy and destructive power of U.S. missiles cost about $150 million in the fiscal 1976 budget. The most well known effort involves developing a maneuvering warhead, a MARV, which would essentially eliminate all missile inaccuracies. Senator Thomas McIntyre, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Research and Development Subcommittee, fears that counterforce improvements will lead to weapons that could threaten a first strike and make nuclear war more likely. In reporting out of his subcommittee a bill that deleted funds for five counterforce programs, Sen. McIntyre argued: "Secretary Schlesinger is trying to move our basic strategic doctrine from our traditional emphasis on mutual assured destruction to a reliance on U.S. nuclear war fighting capability. We're alarmed that Pentagon preoccupation with exotic technologies and doctrines will distract us from our efforts to meet our prime national security requirement, which is to prevent nuclear war."

• **Strategic Cruise Missiles.** A new means of raining death on the Soviet Union and China is being pursued by both the Air Force and the Navy – the strategic cruise missile. Cruise missiles are small, unmanned, electronically-controlled aircraft powered by air-breathing turbofan engines. Strategic cruise missiles with ranges of 1,500 miles or more could be launched from planes, submarines, or surface ships. The Navy is requesting $102 million in the new budget to continue work on a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and the Air Force is asking for $51 million for an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM).

Pentagon interest in strategic cruise missiles is a classic case of imitative behavior in the arms race. Lacking aircraft carriers, the Soviet Union has developed relatively primitive and short-range cruise missiles primarily for attacking surface ships. Now, because the SALT agreements do not limit strategic cruise missiles and the Soviets have a weapon that vaguely seems threatening, the Defense Department wants to have them too, although strategic cruise missiles will do virtually nothing for our military capability. However, this may well open up a new channel for the arms race and could severely complicate efforts to control and limit strategic weapons. Any submarine or surface ship could launch such missiles and it would become impossible to verify arms control agreements.

Some members of Congress support the air-launched cruise missiles program as an alternative to the B-1 bomber. A relatively inexpensive stand-off bomber could launch ACLMs from outside of Soviet anti-bomber defenses.

(Continued on page 58)

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Enough Is Enough

"What does 'security' mean at this moment in the nuclear age? Our 41 Polaris-Poseidon submarines *alone* can guarantee deterrence. Regardless of what program the Russians carry out, more efficient counterforce weapons add nothing to American security."

During the past six years, our nuclear policies have been focused almost exclusively on the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which have occupied the center of the stage in our disarmament negotiations, have been directed almost entirely at seeking precise symmetry in nuclear weapons capabilities even though this was obtained by adding to our arsenals rather than limiting them. Fears that an appearance of nuclear inferiority would be translated into political weakness have driven our nuclear weapons programs to the point that our stockpiles of strategic warheads have quadrupled since 1968. Nuclear testing has accelerated to compete with the Russians in sophistication of weapons design, while funds for improved protection of weapons materials have been withheld.

Meanwhile, India has tested its first nuclear explosive, ostensibly for peaceful applications but, nevertheless, simultaneously demonstrating a weapons capability. Israeli leaders have acknowledged a potential to make atomic weapons so that even if these are not now actually available, they could easily be a factor if another conflict breaks out in the Middle East. The energy crisis has given renewed impetus to international programs developing nuclear power. These programs will soon make fissionable material usable for weapons much more readily available throughout the world. Terrorists are operating with ever-fewer inhibitions, and we have not learned how to deal with them. Given this rapidly changing situation, our myopic views on nuclear security need urgent re-evaluation.

On November 24, 1974, President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev met at Vladivostok to sign a strategic arms limitation agreement which was described as a "break-through" placing a "cap" on the arms race. However, when President Ford finally revealed a few of the specifics of the agreement almost a week later, it became apparent that this was the opposite of an arms control agreement. The ceilings, 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,320 missiles carrying MIRVs (multiple warheads which can be aimed at separate targets), were established significantly above approved present or future levels. The limits of the 1972 Moscow Interim Agreement were even breached, and no restrictions were put on the replacement of old weapons by new ones, thus promoting, in addition, a qualitative arms race.

Even though the Soviet Union had not yet started MIRV deployment, the ceilings allowed it to place MIRVs on virtually its entire modern land-based ICBM force, and no limitation would be put on the number of their warheads. The U.S. could add 4,000 warheads to its already large arsenal by deploying the proposed 10 new Trident submarines: a decided step backward from the Interim Agreement, which would have at least required older submarines to be taken out of the fleet before 10 new Tridents could be added. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has also stated the Vladivostok Accords may require procuring even more than 10 Tridents and restructuring our strategic forces. Clearly, unless the Congress demonstrates unusually firm restraint, Vladivostok can become only a mechanism for sanctioning mutual arms build-ups that in times of economic stress might otherwise be difficult to justify.



B-1 Bomber

Meanwhile, the American public has for six years been bombarded continually with new scare stories of the mounting Russian nuclear threat and with proposals for new U.S. weapons to match it. The Russians have been testing four new ICBMs, one larger than all of their previous monsters; a recent test series neatly coincided with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's October arrival in Moscow to revitalize SALT and to lay the groundwork for the Vladivostok meeting. For its part, while Kissinger was in Moscow, the U.S. put into the pot its SALT "bargaining

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chip," the announcement of the launch of a Minuteman ICBM from the large C5A transport plane. The use of such a launching platform would make any freeze on the numbers of land-base ICBM launchers meaningless unless some verifiable method for including such weapons in the freeze can be devised. Such timing was certainly not accidental but part of the typical negotiating game plan, which in the past has resulted in an accelerated, not slowed, arms race and contributed to the failure of such agreements to control nuclear arms.

Schlesinger has declared moreover, that if the defense budget is cut, we will have only the shadow, not substance, of a first-class military power; inflation, he said, was cutting into our weapons procurement. But how does the perception of inferiority, which the Secretary and others try to create in order to obtain more military funds, realistically affect our national interests? Does it make any sense for both superpowers to play their endless game of piling more weapons on top of more weapons to match the potential stockpiles of the other side? Do more weapons really equate with more security even in the narrow U.S.-U.S.S.R. context? In light of the broader world situation, may we not be aiming at the wrong target? What does "security" mean at this moment in the nuclear age?

To answer these questions, we must go back to the fundamentals of nuclear weapons. In recent years, our eyes have become glazed by a forest of thousands of ICBMs with millions of tons of high-explosive power. We must look again at the trees and refocus our attention on what one primitive 15-kiloton bomb did to the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The city was completely destroyed; blast and fire left large areas a pile of rubble; one hundred thousand people were killed; many died weeks or months later from lingering radiation sickness; others were permanently scarred with burns from the radiating fireball. These were the aftermath of just a single "small" nuclear explosion.

But the people of Hiroshima and Japan were relatively lucky. They were not exposed to radioactive contamination from fall-out because the bomb was exploded 1,800 feet in the air, and all the radioactive fission product debris was carried away and dispersed in the upper atmosphere. However, on March 1, 1954, we were accidently given another graphic demonstration of the effects of nuclear explosions after a 15-megaton thermonuclear weapon was tested at Bikini Atoll in the mid-Pacific. This explosion, nicknamed Bravo, took place on the surface of a coral island, and the radioactive debris combined with dust particles fell

Soviet surface to surface missiles SCUD A and B
Sovfoto

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back to the surface. More than 5,000 square miles were covered with lethal radioactive contamination; still larger areas were heavily contaminated. Fortunately, most of the material sank relatively harmlessly below the surface of the ocean, but one Japanese ship, the Lucky Dragon, which was in the fall-out path about 100 miles away, was heavily contaminated. One fisherman died later of liver damage, and the 22 remaining crew members suffered severe after-effects. After the same test, the inhabitants of Rongelap Atoll at the extreme southern edge of the fall-out pattern, and more than 100 miles away, were exposed to just sublethal radiation exposures. They experienced severe skin burns, radiation sickness, and now 20 years later are developing thyroid growths, some of which have been found to be cancerous. However, they too were relatively lucky. None were killed, but had they been a mile or two farther north, or had the wind veered a few degrees farther south, they would have all been dead.

Again, these accidents were the aftermath of only a single explosion in the almost uninhabited Pacific Ocean. Had this been a Soviet attack on one of our ICBM silos at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, most of that State, including St. Louis some 150 miles to the east, would have been blanketed by lethal fall-out. Thousands of megatons would have to be used if the Russians wished to reduce significantly the size of our ICBM force. As a result of the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons signed in Moscow in May 1972, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to freeze the numbers of land and submarine based ballistic missile launchers at the existing high levels. But even these astronomical numbers were not enough for either side, and the Vladivostok Agreement now sanctions still further additions to the nuclear stockpiles. The Soviet Union has started testing four new ICBMs and a new submarine ballistic missile (SLBM). The U.S. has continued to add to the number of warheads and bombs at a rate of more than three each day, so that we now have about 8,500, all with at least three times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. At the present time, the Russians are far behind with only about 2,800 strategic warheads, since they only started testing MIRVs in 1973, five years after we did.

But does this numbers comparison have any meaning in the real world? The Russians apparently think it does, for Schlesinger reported on January 14, 1975, that they have now at last started to deploy MIRVs on one of their new model ICBMs. By the 1980s, they too could have 7,000 warheads unless their appetites are curbed by then. This seems doubtful since they insisted in the recent Vladivostok Agreement on having the right to put MIRVs on missiles to match not only our presently approved programs but, in addition, the number on more than 10 new Trident submarines. Because their ICBMs are larger than ours, this will permit them to have even more warheads than the U.S. or the same number with higher explosive power than ours.

U.S. planners apparently also take these skyrocketing numbers seriously, for we too insisted at Vladivostok on being allowed to still further expand our existing missiles force with MIRVs. Furthermore, in anticipation of the Russians proceeding with all their programs, the defense establishment has started work on a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, missiles, and MIRVs. Our new warheads will have higher accuracies and greater yields – the present 200 kilotons, more than 10 times Hiroshima, is not enough. These improvements are justified as needed to obtain a better counterforce capability: i.e., to be able to destroy Russian weapons more efficiently in nuclear conflict. But can any of these programs be rationalized in light of Hiroshima and Bikini Bravo? Do we actually wish to fight a nuclear war?

[MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION]

Since nuclear war on any scale would be an unparalleled disaster against which no defense is possible, the basic posture of our strategic policy has long been to avoid its breaking out. We have relied on making the consequences of initiating a nuclear aggression so devastating and so certain that any nation would be deterred from taking such action. Such deterrence has been achieved by having a retaliatory force capable of producing unacceptable damage in the aftermath of any feasible surprise attack. The key element needed in a strategic deterrent force is survivability, since only a few retaliatory weapons on target can produce widespread devastation.

The U.S. strategic arsenal has long satisfied and surpassed this criterion by even the most conservative standards. Our 41 Polaris-Poseidon ballistic missile submarines alone, which will soon be able to fire more than 5,000 nuclear warheads at the U.S.S.R., can guarantee deterrence, but as a hedge against some unforeseen weakness in this system, it is backed up by 1,054 ICBMs and nearly 500 intercontinental bombers.

Secretary Schlesinger, however, since taking over the reins in the Pentagon, has said that we do not yet have enough. In addition to a force which can retaliate massively against the Soviet Union following any possible surprise attack, he believes we must have a more efficient capability for destroying Russian missiles in their silos – i.e., an improved counterforce capability. He calls attention to the large payload of the Soviet ICBMs and to their belated initiation of a MIRV test program. Once MIRVs are extensively deployed on the large Soviet missiles, they could be viewed as a threat to the U.S. fixed land-based ICBMs although not to our bombers and submarines. Schlesinger admits that the realistic dangers even to our Minuteman force are minimal, but nevertheless he believes we must match their potential counterforce capability by increasing the yield and particularly the accuracy of our own ICBMs. Our next generation of missiles will have terminally-guided maneuverable re-entry vehicles, nicknamed MARVs, which permit our warheads to zero in on their targets.

Even though he admits our deterrent would still be credible, Schlesinger believes that U.S. inferiority in counterforce capability would be perceived as a sign of weakness by the Russians and our allies. He fears the Soviet Union might launch an attack against our ICBMs and other strategic bases, relying on U.S. reluctance to retaliate for fear of having our cities destroyed in return. Such paranoia results from a failure to understand the lesson of the single 15-megaton surface explosion at Bikini. Thousands of megatons would be needed to knock out our ICBM force;

(Continued on page 59)

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The Riddle of Governor Jerry Brown

Part II—The Policies

"Brown talks of a more simple, less consumption-oriented life, but he is asking the hard-pressed as well as the comfortable to make do with less. Can that be done in the absence of a shared vision of the good and just society?"

Our political speech tends to be meager and rigid, unlike general American speech, which can be rich, varied, and flexible. Politicians keep using the same tired words and nobody pays attention any longer when they speak. Journalists use the same old words to describe what it is the politicians are doing and saying and their descriptions, therefore, do not always help us to be clear or certain about politics. For a long time things did not change very much in politics and the "same old words" could serve adequately. Even now, when considering the *dramatis personae* of national politics, the old language looks almost good enough.

And yet, Reagan and Rockefeller and Ford and Scoop Jackson and Humphrey and Muskie all seem to belong to some time past, some other era of our national life. They seem, somehow, to have survived the Sixties but not to have lived through them. Can the same designations that serve for them serve also for much younger people who not only survived the Sixties but lived intensely through them and were politically formed by their events? I think not.

If one calls the Brown Administration in California a "liberal" administration, and means by that designation that he expects Brown to perform in office roughly the way Jackson or Humphrey, or, say, Hugh Carey, would perform, he is bound to be disappointed. He would be making the same mistake about Brown and his people that the California media have been making.

There are ways in which Brown fits comfortably into the moderate or liberal wing of the Democratic Party. There are ways in which he is very conservative, notably in his belief that suffering and injustice are inescapable in the human condition; that it is as important to understand this as it is to struggle against the suffering and injustice. That belief is the foundation of Brown's conservatism, if he is a conservative at all. It is not, however, the foundation of what the media call his "conservatism," by which they mean his insistence on a balanced budget, on restraint in governmental spending, and on strict accountability for all that is spent. That fiscal restraint, which is shared by all of Brown's major appointees, has its sources in a conviction that for the time being, at least, the cupboard is bare so far as new taxes are concerned and a belief that the major

by Francis Carney

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redistributive or income-transferring programs of the past 40 years are no longer working and that it would be mindless to go on taxing the same sectors of society and spending in the name of liberal shibboleths of New Deal-Fair Deal days. Thus, the fiscal restraint has pragmatic rather than doctrinal origins and; it is not at all what we traditionally call conservative.

Nevertheless, if one wished to search out and dwell upon the conservative potential of the Brown administration, or at least of the Governor himself, there is plenty to go on; there is, for example, the frequent lecturing on the need for such disciplines as work and self-denial, surely a conservative characteristic; then, too, there is the fact that Brown and his appointees in the field have expressed repeatedly their disenchantment with liberal, therapy-oriented penological ideas. In Brown's case, these views seem to spring from deeply held beliefs and might fairly be called conservative. For now, however, it is not the conservatism of Brown's administration, but its potential for ushering in change, the possibility that it might be a harbinger of the politics of the last quarter of this century, which is of interest to us.

[LOCATING TARGETS]

It must be understood – the *caveat* is doubtless superfluous – that we are not considering a revolutionary or even radical state administration. Whenever, during hours of interview with various members of Brown's team, I inched the subject toward something like the "possibility of important structural change in the United States", the response was almost uniform: first came a pained grimace and then, "Oh, come on, Professor. Do you really expect the Governor to go around denouncing capitalism and vowing to work for socialism or something like that?" If I offered questions about their plans for dealing with the power of "agribusiness" or of the "military-industrial complex" right here in California, the Brown people stonewalled it with remarkable uniformity, "Look, what do you want the Governor to do? He can run around shouting about the military-industrial complex and the power of big business and what would he be accomplishing? Should he promise to dismantle the military-industrial complex? Make a politician's promise that he could never keep? No, we have plenty of things we can do in this state with administrative action and some modest legislative changes. Right now that is all we are interested in doing. Later there might be big 'innovative' legislative programs of the sort you have in mind but that is just speculation and depends on the way things develop."

So, though I have spoken of the formative influence of the Sixties on the Brown administration, it must be understood that the intellectual and ideological style is that of those on the left who elected to "fight the injustice of the system from within the system." They have not promised to deliver more than that and they are not likely to make such promises.

Throughout the administration, in fact, there is a consistently expressed distaste for what I will call "Kennedy-Johnsonism" – hyping programs promising to end poverty or injustice and the keeping of legislative boxscores which equates success with the number of bills passed. Every single administrator I talked with insisted that a period of study and learning was going to precede major action. They all offered, in varying styles of expression, that first we "have to be sure to ask the right questions" before we can start giving the answers. Brown himself constantly uses the term "lowered expectations" in his lectures and exchanges. He seems to mean two slightly different things by "lowered expectations." First of all, and most directly, he means that we should come to value material things less than we do. But he also seems to mean that we ought to expect less from government than we have been accustomed to expecting from liberal admistrations because some of the problems and difficulties of life lie beyond governmental reach. That's not very fancy so far as political philosophy goes but it does point to the fact that this administration is beginning modestly rather than with vows to bring the Kingdom of God to earth during the next fiscal year.

Right now, for example, the people in the Governor's office stand pretty pat on Brown's brief inaugural address as the basic outline of the administration program. That agenda would be acceptable to any moderate to liberal Democrat and most of it will be achieved in this session of the legislature by bills well along toward passage or by administrative enactment from the executive branch. The first item of that agenda, however, will be a little harder to come by: to restore the confidence in the political order of that majority of the citizens who either did not vote or register in the 1974 election. Brown also promised to live up to the spirit as well as the letter of Proposition Nine, the political reform initiative of 1974, which he had sponsored and worked for. On employment, Brown accepted a state responsibility to find ways of putting people back to work and promised that state legislation would make it possible for more women to be in the work force through more child-care centers as well as an equal employment opportunity program for women. He pledged also to work to bring unemployment insurance benefits to farm workers and to insure that the latter would also have the right of the secret ballot in representation and strike elections.

In the same general field, he also committed himself to work for collective bargaining rights for public employees. He promised to protect the environment through the development of land-use planning programs and the development of "clear rules fairly enforced without delay." He also promised to work for housing legislation that would revitalize the sick housing industry and improve the quality of the urban environment. To fight inflation he set an example for the rest of government by trimming the appropriation requests for his own office by 7 percent. He demanded, finally, an end to some of the most glaring tax inequities, notably the depletion allowance for the major oil companies, the home office exemption for national insurance companies, and close examination for the exemptions on other "preference" incomes. Not much there to outrage anybody; not much there to launch a "reform" administration.

These are some internal explanations for why this regime of former liberal and left activists is moving so slowly toward its reform goals and for why it seems reluctant to outline its major goals – or even to

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acknowledge that it has any.

First of all, there is a division within the administration, and, perhaps, within Brown himself, between a commitment to spiritual reform and to socio-economic reform. All hands, incidentally, deny this vehemently. But Brown lectures to just about every group he talks with on the need for changes in consciousness, on the need for asceticism on the part of elites, on the need for all to look to non-material pleasures and rewards. Gray Davis, Brown's Executive Secretary and the person with whom Brown undoubtedly spends the most working time, shares these concerns. Davis remarked to me that in his view the Brown Administration would be a successful one if it could ultimately get the people of California to accept a more ascetic outlook, a leaner, less cluttered style of life, a style of life, of course, that would be much easier on the environment and the natural resources of the earth.

Brown has often remarked, in his offhand yet challenging way, that "theology is more important than politics". On other occasions, Brown has suggested that good clues to the character of his administration could be found in Rules 11 and 12 of St. Ignatius, the founder of the Jesuit order. Both rules have to do with the renunciation of all earthly striving. They contain injunctions to "abhor completely and without exception all that the world embraces . . ." (Rule 11) and to seek "greater abnegation and continuous mortification in all things possible." (Rule 12) Of course Brown is a rather successful politician and not a religious reformer; but his theological references occur too often to be dismissed and they raise questions about Brown's own priorities and emphases.

It is doubtful, on the other hand, that key Brown aides like J. Anthony Kline, Robert Gnaizda, James Lorenz, Thomas Quinn and Claire Dedrick are much interested in spiritual regeneration for its own sake. Dedrick, let it be noted, has certainly acknowledged that long run behaviorial changes in the citizenry is a goal of the policies she will pursue in the Resources Agency, but she wants the changed behavior because it will be better for the environment rather than because it is good for people's souls. Similarly, Quinn at the Air Resources Board plans systems of incentive and disincentive to get people, especially Los Angelenos, out of their automobiles and into public transport. Quinn has no doubt that such a change would be good for the Angelenos but he wants it mainly because it will help to produce cleaner air in the state and, quite possibly, have other beneficial social consequences. There is nothing like open warfare or conflict on these questions. There is simply a substantial difference of priority and emphasis which may impede the formation of any overall administration sense of direction.

Then, too, if the Brown administration seems reluctant to take on the great concentrations of private power in California, preferring instead to spend its reform impulse on changes in governmental procedures, it may be due to another striking characteristic of the personnel. Most of the crucial people have come to the administration from prior careers as adversaries of *government.* One must remember that it is from the Sierra Club, the American Civil Liberties Union, California Rural Legal Assistance, public advocacy law firms, the ranks of feminine activism and the ethnic minorities, that so many of the interesting people in the administration have just come. In those roles they usually found themselves in conflict with government itself rather than directly with private economic or social power. If they had demands to make on behalf of constituencies, the demands were made on government.

A number of his aides have told me that Brown himself tends to view certificated elites with even greater suspicion than he does big business. One of them put it this way; "Look, you are always asking what we are doing for the poor, for the victims of discrimination and prejudice. At the same time you keep asking what we are doing to fight agribusiness and the military-industrial complex. But it isn't agribusiness that is screwing Chinese kids in San Francisco or Chicano kids in East L.A. by not teaching them to speak English, it is the hacks in the school system. It isn't the military-industrial complex that works over a welfare mother in Oakland, it is the welfare bureaucracy. It is the licensed physicians and the hospitals who do it to the elderly poor, not swollen profits from business. Those are all things we can do something about and we will continue to concentrate our effort there rather than by taking on capitalism or big business."

[STRAWS IN THE WIND]

A number of straws in the wind, in any case, offer a strong possibility that Brown and his administration are not going to back away from head-on conflict with private power. Tom Quinn of the Air Resources Board will not yield to either Detroit or the oil companies on standards for pollution controls for auto engines and pollutant content of fuels. Quinn, in fact, is more willing to apply direct controls over manufacturers and refiners than he is over the private motorist, whom he feels must be treated more indirectly with systems of incentives and some kinds of disincentives. Claire Dedrick, with the full backing thus far of the Governor, has defied both organized labor and the logging interests of the northern counties by insisting on at least minimal environmental impact reports before the Resources Agency will approve cutting plans. The administration is getting plenty of pressure on this issue because unemployment is heavy in the timber country and small loggers and cutting mills are hurting as well as the larger ones. Brown has been burned in effigy, and the verbal scathing given to Dedrick borders on the scandalous, but they are committed to "clear rules" applied across the board to protect the environment.

For decades the coalition of public agencies and private interests that make up "the highway lobby" has been the untouchable of state politics, the most sacred of the sacred cows. The core organization of the highway lobby has always been the State Highway Commission established back in 1924, in the childhood of the automobile age. But Business and Transportation Secretary Donald Burns has signalled his intention to dissolve the commission and to create a single state Transportation Commission or some other arrangement which would end the autonomy of the highway lobby and bring all transportation policy-making under the more immediate control of the Governor.

(Continued on page 60)

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

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The Marketplace of Hunger

"Taking a conservative view," states the United Nations Assessment of the World Food Situation, "it would appear that out of 97 developing countries, 61 had a deficit in food energy supplies in 1970." In the Far East and Africa, it is estimated that 25 to 30 percent of the population suffer from significant malnutrition. In the developing countries as a whole, the United Nations estimates that malnutrition affects about 460 million people, almost half of whom are children. Less conservative estimates put the figure closer to a billion.

In 60 percent of the developing countries, food production has kept pace with demand, and even exceeded production increases in the developed countries. But in the 40 percent which have not kept up, the "crisis" has been deepening for some time. In the past ten years these countries have been losing ground, rates of production increases having actually declined. Over-all, the shortfalls in 1972 pushed the developing countries back to the per capita food production level they had reached a decade earlier.

For those countries affected by the food crisis, the problems were twofold. First, international markets did not distribute sufficient quantities of food to meet even the minimum requirements of life, much less equity. Secondly, after almost a quarter of a century of international "concern" about economic growth and development of poorer countries, their situation has continued to stagnate and even deteriorate, to the point where not even the most basic need – food – can be met.

For Americans, the world food crisis has had special significance, even if it has not meant hardship. The United States is not only the largest ***exporter*** *of food, accounting for nearly half the grain that moves into world markets, but is also one of the largest* ***importers*** *of food. Together with other developed countries, the U.S. imports more protein from the developing countries than we collectively export to them.*

The United States is also the leading innovator in the field of agricultural technology, and many countries (including the poor ones) look to the United States as a model of how to make an agricultural system "work." As a result, American solutions to agricultural production problems dominate thinking around the world. American corporations are the leaders in the numerous markets which have been spawned by that technology: farm machinery, fertilizers, seeds, pesticides and other kinds of food production equipment.

In the United States, we deal with the poor and hungry through special programs such as food stamps or welfare, rather than attempting to build an economy which includes them as full, working participants. We have enough surplus in this country, both of money and food, to "solve" the problem of the poor without disturbing the economic system's basic operations or correcting its inevitable inequities. Projected internationally, to the hundreds of millions of people who go hungry and unemployed, this approach – essentially one in which the rich can have and waste all they wish with enough left over to keep the poor alive – cannot work.

The solution to the world hunger problem is within human control, but without the full cooperation of the United States, through programs designed specifically to deal with the world hunger problem and through regular U.S. marketing activities, it is unlikely that a solution will be found. The U.S. market position in food is just too significant for international efforts to succeed without U.S. cooperation. We have dabbled in this effort by helping set up such international bodies as the World Food Council and the Consultative Group on Coordination and Investment. Yet, if the efforts of international cooperation do not go deeper than such bureaucratic structures, superimposed on a bankrupt economic strategy, they will become as one official warned, "another international body without feet."

Understanding world hunger will often mean parting with the myths of our own economy, and also parting with myths of the struggle for survival in the poor countries. For we will find that Justice, rather than technology, is in many cases the heart of the solution.

Susan DeMarco and Susan Sechler are co-directors of the Agribusiness Accountability Project. This article was excerpted by Elliot Kanter from their 140-page report. The completed report will be avilable for $3.50 from the Agriculture Accountabilty Project, 1000 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

by Susan DeMarco and Susan Sechler

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In the developing countries, grain represents over 70 percent of the calories in the average diet. During the last three or four years international grain markets, on which many of these countries depend, have gone from surplus and low prices to scarcity and high prices, causing tremendous uncertainty and hardship. The reasons for this change do not lie in the grain fields of the world, but rather in the policies of government.

The United States, producing almost half of the grain which moves into world markets, has a critical impact on these markets. To understand the problems of developing countries which cannot or do not grow enough grain to feed their people, we must look at the assumptions which surround the United States' grain export policies, the history of these policies, who they benefit, and where they seem to be going.

Today, when some analysts are predicting that in the near future there will simply not be enough grain to feed everyone, it is hard to remember that as recently as five years ago the problem was a grain surplus. To be sure, there was no shortage of undernourished people in the world, but there was a marked weakness in "effective demand," an economist's term for people who both want and can afford to buy. This meant stable and reasonable market prices, secure supplies, and bountiful granaries available to a variety of food aid problems.

However these conditions of relative plenty were the unwanted outgrowth of chronic surpluses, not the result of policies aimed specifically at feeding the country. And in 1972 the picture changed radically. Russia and China came into the market, enabling the U.S. Administration to sell off most of the accumulated grain stocks. Two successive devaluations of the U.S. dollar further stimulated foreign demand for U.S. farm products, decreasing their price in foreign markets by increasing the purchasing power of non-dollar currency. The extra purchasing benefits, however, were mostly for the other developed countries. The devaluation imposed severe hardships in many of the developing countries that had been encouraged *for their own security* to hold their foreign exchange reserves in dollars because it supposedly had unshakable value.

There were other factors at work shifting the United States from an artificially low-price to a high-price food export strategy. For one thing, experience had shown that the low price approach was not terribly effective for capturing markets. The other major exporters – Canada, Australia, and the Europeans – simply countered our subsidized low prices by lowering their own prices with subsidies.

Even more decisive, perhaps, was the discovery that world food requirements had grown so imperative that food, like oil, could be priced about as high as the producer chose to go without appreciably reducing demand or exports. It did, however, shift exports significantly in the direction of developed countries, which could afford the new high prices, and away from the less developed countries, which could not.

In 1973-74, at the height of the food crisis, half of our agricultural exports went to the two most affluent areas outside of the United States – Western Europe and Japan. Grain price increases during this time were substantial. Between 1972 and 1974, the average price of grains on the world market doubled – the price of some individual grains tripled. Market demand was so strong and prices so high that the Secretary of Agriculture was moved to declare in 1973 "the promised land for agriculture is near at hand."

For the developing and food-deficit countries, the sudden price increases in the past two or three years were a problem of utmost seriousness. Coupled with rising prices for petroleum related products, foreign exchange requirements posed by suddenly rising food costs brought many of the poorer countries to near financial ruin. (According to World Bank data, using average food prices paid by food importing less developed countries (LDC) during 1967-69 as an index base of 100, the prices paid by these countries rose to 171 by 1973, 274 by 1974, and reached nearly 300 by January 1975.)

In 1960, the external public debt of the Less Developed Countries was $19 billion. In 1970, just ten years later, the debt had risen to $66 billion. Service on these debts has risen to the point that the Agency for International Development (AID) noted recently that the amount of capital flowing out of the LDC's to the developed countries for debt repayment was greater than the amount flowing to the LDC's as aid.

In agricultural trade, the situation has been similarly one of imbalance. Traditionally, agricultural markets are essential to the poorest of the developing countries, who depend on them for export earnings to buy fuel, food and other essentials. However, it is the developed countries that dominate these markets, with some 58 percent of the world's exports from the developing countries; as a result their share of the export market has correspondingly declined.

Furthermore, the LDC's suffer a disadvantage in the relative market values of agricultural goods they have to trade. Most of them use much of their farming potential to produce mainly the "non-competing agricultural products," such as coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, rubber and jute, for which both price and market have lagged far behind the "competitive" products such as grain, in which the developed countries specialize. And the greatest single specialist in these products is the United States.

[INTO ONE BASKET]

Export markets have always been an important way for the U.S. to dispose of agricultural surpluses. But only in the last few years has good become a key item in the U.S. international strategy. "Food is the new currency," declared Hubert Humphrey recently at an international soybean conference in Munich. "Food for crude" is a favorite expression of U.S. Department of Agriculture officials. Grain, particularly, has become a "major tool in the foreign relations tool kit," and as such of great interest to the State Department; it is also a key item in our balance of payments and at the heart of our foreign trade strategy.

The U.S. dominance of international grain markets has increased dramatically in the past decades. Ten years ago the U.S. share of world exports in wheat was just under 38 percent; today it is around 43 percent. In feed grains we

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have 50 percent of the market, in oilseeds, including soy-beans, 57 percent.

As the world's dependence on imported grain has increased, so has the U.S. dependence on the proceeds from selling it. Ten years ago we exported 60 percent of our wheat crop; today we export just over 67 percent. In 1953, U.S. agricultural exports brought in just under $3 billion. A little more than 20 years later the volume had nearly quadrupled, bringing in more than $22 billion. It was an increase of nearly eight times, half of it directly attributable to price increases. As the overall U.S. trade position continues to weaken – in 1974 the U.S. went from a $13 billion balance of payments surplus to a $3.1 billion deficit – the value of food exports becomes increasingly important to government planners.

While many U.S. government agencies help frame this nation's international food policy, it is the Department of Agriculture which can most influence the outcome of major decisions, if not by securing the adoption of a policy it favors, then at least by blocking a policy it opposes. In the last four or five years, the Department has embarked on a course of "let the market decide." The actions which surround this position included abandoning the food reserves system, virtually dismantling farm programs, and taking a "hard line" on international commodity agreements.

The results of this "anti-planning" policy have been predictable. The 1975 Annual Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisors stated:

> *Although economic circumstances have permitted a desirable move to a market-oriented commercial farm policy, they have also brought out a basic characteristic of agricultural markets: large price fluctuations and the uncertainty that these fluctuations generate.*

The answer? According to the Report, "Producers, consumers and government policymakers will learn to adjust to the increased uncertainty."

The impacts of instability in the agricultural sector have always been significant enough to have a tremendous effect on other sectors of the economy, which, in large part, is why a farm program to insulate agriculture from the workings of the so-called free market was established. It was not simply to protect farmers, but also to shield the rest of the economy from the "ripple" effects of fluctuations in supply and demand that characterize agricultural production. Today, because the United States is so important in international food markets, the ripple effects of our free market policy are sent not just throughout our own economy, but around the world.

Yet U.S. officials lay claim to a sort of natural right to increasing U.S. dominance in grain production and they show more than a little impatience with other countries for not seeing matters our way. As recently as February of this year, for example, in his 1975 Economic Report, President Ford chided "less efficient agriculture producers [who] attempt to maintain policies of self-sufficiency and rely on the world market for supplies only in times of shortages."

At the core of this argument is something called "comparative advantage," a concept in world market arrangements related to the idea that a particular country, because of its climate, resources, or cheap labor, can produce a particular commodity more efficiently than can other countries. Thus, it is argued, countries should export those items which they can produce at a comparative advantage, and import from others what they cannot similarly produce.

Applying this theory to the world food market, the Department of Agriculture concludes that to an ever-increasing extent the United States should become the world's producer – and exporter – of basic food grains, especially wheat. Not unnaturally, many other nations regard this reasoning with more than a degree of skepticism. As the recent oil crisis demonstrated to the developed nations, and the recent food crisis to the developing nations, there are real disadvantages to being overly dependent on another country for something as critical as oil or as vital – and subject to unpredictable fluctuations – as food.

From any other vantage point but the most narrowly commercial, the need is to produce more grain for the hungry, not simply for the United States to attempt to gain a more dominant hold on the market by driving, or even negotiating out other producers. However, there are other considerations which make this policy both self-serving and shortsighted.

Without a farm program that would help to distribute the wealth to all farmers, it is the biggest who can weather price fluctuations and expand to meet new demands who will prosper. Furthermore, without special provisions it is unlikely that any of the new markets will be in the poor countries where need is high but purchasing power is low.

There are serious questions that can be raised as to the "efficiency" of locating more than 50 percent of the world's purchasable grain supply in one geographical area, which is susceptible to blight, drought and other natural disasters. As recently as 1970, a major corn blight and drought in the Midwest reduced the U.S. corn crop by 16 percent. With fuel prices high, transportation costs also weaken arguments for centralization of the world's food supply in a limited number of areas.

Furthermore, marginal land brought into production requires heavy use of high cost fertilizer to keep the land at high productivity levels, thus depleting some of the claims of efficiency, to say nothing of the dangers to the soil, lakes and rivers. Scientists have found, for example, that American corn farmers' reliance on nitrogen fertilizer has already begun to put dangerous levels of nitrate compounds into the ground water in some parts of the corn belt.

[THE EMPTIED STORE]

It is difficult to imagine a more critical function of an organized society than food security, although in the United States, our abundance has been so great that most of us take it for granted. Since 1929, a grain reserves system was a critical and controversial part of American agricultural policy. It grew out of measures of desperation taken during the Depression, some of which are bitter memories almost 40 years later – such as the dumping of milk into drainage ditches and the slaughter of

(Continued on page 51)

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Why China Doesn't Starve



Above: Commune members applying fertilizer to the cotton seedlings in a field inter-cropped with wheat.

Top Right: Harvesting cotton

Right: Members of the Hsuhang People's Commune on the outskirts of Shanghai inspect wheat.

The narrow highway connecting Nanking and Yangchou is a maze of bicycles, two-wheeled carts, and other slow-moving vehicles that challenge a bus driver's patience and overwork the loud horn that helps clear the way. Unusual obstacles include a stretch where rice is spread to dry in the sun on half the black-topped roadway. In fields along the way, thousands of men and women work the land with hoes and other tools as their ancestors have for centuries. Others with baskets and shovels clean silt from irrigation ditches, spread compost, scrape mud from canals and fish ponds, and level fields. Water buffalo sun themselves here and there, and occasionally one is seen pulling a plow.

The only evidence of mechanized farming in this typical rural scene in Kiangsu Province are a few tractors, both small hand types and old Russian-made models, pulling carts along the road, and the overhead lines that carry power to irrigation pumps and other rural electric outlets. Is this the agricultural system the People's Republic of China relies on to produce food for a population estimated at between 800 and 900 million, and climbing? How is starvation avoided with such backward methods in a nation with roughly one-fourth of the world's people? What about diesel tractors and pesticides, feedlots and fertilizer tanks, and other scientific advances that agribusiness companies tell us are essential to modern farming?

Answers to questions like these began taking shape during a visit to Yangchou in late January, probably the most informative part of a 15-day trip through rural China. Yangchou had a prominent place on the schedule because an agricultural college, a research institute, and a huge water conservancy project are all located there. We were told that we were the first Americans to come to that area since the 1940s.

Water project engineers explained how irrigation and flood control developments now protect most of China's best cropland, a tremendous achievement in a country plagued through history by drought and devastating floods. A fast-developing program of problem-solving research and technical assistance to people on the land was outlined by scientists at the institute. And professors at the college told how their students spend time working on the communes, with peasants evaluating their performance and submitting their grades to the school.

My conclusion from this and eye-opening visits to other farming areas is that China, staggered by starvation and disease when it closed its borders to Westerners more than 25 years ago, has built a strong agriculture and appears now to be doing a good job of feeding its people. It has done this by making agriculture its first priority, adopting a system that stresses productivity of the land rather than of labor, and refusing to replace labor-intensive practices proven over the centuries with energy-intensive technology.

[SELF-RELIANCE]

The question of whether this agricultural approach is working no longer needs to be evaluated on the basis of reports from Peking. A recent study published by the U.S. government shows that Chinese peasants and highly-mechanized U.S. farmers now produce the same amount of grain on roughly the same amount of land, and that China produces three times as many hogs.

The Chinese reported last winter that they have had 13

by Roger Blobaum

Photographs Courtesy of China Books

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



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good crops in a row, an unprecedented record, and much of the credit is given to the extensive irrigation and drainage system. Another significant result of taming the rivers and developing these water projects has been the ability to shift gradually from two to three crops a year – usually two of rice and one of wheat in much of eastern China – with important gains in total output.

This doubling up is nothing new in China, where multiple cropping and relay planting have been practiced for centuries. Crops are planted between the rows before earlier crops are harvested and it is not unusual to see two or more crops growing together in the same fields. These combinations include fruit trees and vines, which are also planted around chicken and hog pens to utilize manure washed away from feeding areas and to provide summer shade. Food is also produced on all vacant areas in the cities and, as one recent visitor put it: "Almost anyone in China can walk out the door of his home and see where his next meal is coming from."

Members of a small village in the Lou-Tang People's Commune.

Although most of China's arable land has been farmed intensively for 30 to 40 centuries, the fertility of the soil has been maintained through a self-renewing type of agriculture that uses the full range of organic fertilizers. An important source through the ages has been "night soil," the human waste that is composted and put on the fields in all Asian countries. Other important fertilizer sources include city garbage, hauled to the country and composted, and the rich mud reclaimed from the bottom of canals and fish ponds when they are drained and cleaned in the winter months.

Livestock manure has always been a valuable fertilizer source in China and the peasants, unlike big U.S. feedlot operators, have never questioned whether it was "economical" to haul it out on the land. Manure will become even more important now as the result of a decision to try to increase hog production to a level of three pigs per acre of cropland. This decision appears sound economically because pork produced for export is becoming an important cash crop for the communes. There is little doubt that the pigs-per-acre goal will be reached because pig manure is considered an excellent fertilizer by the peasants, fresh pork moves well in the city markets, and hogs are being used increasingly to consume the by-products of food milling and processing.

At the Red Star People's Commune near Peking, for example, by-products from a milk drying plant and a grain milling facility were providing all the feed needed for 1,600 hogs. In a similar setup at Lou-Tang People's Commune northwest of Shanghai, hogs were getting the by-products from a plant turning out sweet potato starch noodles. Using hogs as waste disposal units in this way, of course, is a modern slant on the centuries-old practice of having a pig in every backyard to consume household garbage and other edible wastes.

As more and more land is triple-cropped, however, organic fertilizer sources fall short of requirements and it is necessary to supplement them with inorganic plant foods. About 800 small fertilizer plants are now in operation making ammonium bicarbonate fertilizer from water and coal. China also is constructing ten large fertilizer plants with a capacity of a thousand tons a day and these are expected to be operational in about two years. The Chinese have plenty of natural gas for nitrogen fertilizer manufacturing, but for now, at least, they indicated they will use it only as needed to supplement the traditional organic sources.

Mechanization is taking hold slowly, at least by American standards, partly because an incredible amount of skilled hand labor is available. Another reason is that the Chinese, seeing what has happened in countries where farmers have become captives of high-energy fossil fuel systems, have decided to commit as little of these non-renewable energy resources as possible to food production. The multiple cropping and relay planting, which are more like gardening than farming, also do not lend themselves to large machinery.

It is estimated that 600 million people live in the countryside. Although many are not directly involved in farming, working instead in light industry or providing services in barber shops or clinics or similar places, they are available if needed on an emergency basis to help plant or harvest a crop. The communes, however, have now begun supplementing this vast labor force by purchasing some large Chinese-built tractors ranging up to 110 horsepower.

More popular, however, is the small "hand tractor," a powerful two-wheeled walking unit that can be maneuvered

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Sweet potato starch noodles drying in the sun.

Hogs at the Red Star People's Commune near Peking feed on the byproducts of a milkdrying plant and grain milling.

with ease over the small fields. These gasoline-powered units, which also provide belt pulley power for small rice threshers and similar equipment, have been mass produced since 1964 at Tractor Works No. 1 in Shanghai and elsewhere. This tractor probably wouldn't sell in America because it isn't much to look at. But the factory manager emphasized that it was designed by engineers who spend their summers out on the communes, is just what the peasants ordered, and will be redesigned anytime they decide they want something else.

[TECHNOLOGY THAT WORKS]

The input that farmers make in tractor design is just one example of the emphasis on exposure of scientists to farmers and farmers to scientists. The Chinese peasant may look backward, particularly when he is guiding a plow behind a slow-moving water buffalo, but he is actually involved in a highly-organized program of agricultural education that results in rapid adoption of new farming techniques.

The director of the Agricultural Research Institute at Yangchou, which was relocated there after years in an urban setting at Nanking, explained that scientific farming groups operate at the commune, brigade, and work team levels. "About one million people are directly involved in our network of scientific groups in Kiangsu Province," he said. "In that way research results are adopted promptly."

Most of the institute's research projects are on commune land where peasants propose many of the projects and watch the results. Seventeen problem research centers are set aside for crop experimentation. Both professors and technical people carry the program of experimentation, popularization, and demonstration to rural areas.

This was verified in a question-and-answer session with Sun Ping-Sheng, responsible member of the office at the Evergreen People's Commune near Soochow. "We are stressing scientific farming methods by shortening time of growing, raising output per unit, and popularizing short-term crops," he told us. "We have agri-technicians in every brigade and production team and they work together with commune members to be sure this technology works and is adaptable."

Production problems that appear are researched promptly, mainly because the Yangchou institute's "open door policy" keeps its staff on a three-year rotation. They spend one year doing research at the institute, another working on research projects while living and working with the peas-

Photographs by Roger Blobaum

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ants, and the third year touring the province to gather information on problems to be researched and to share research findings through adult education classes.

It is obvious to a visitor that China has been tremendously successful in getting technology adopted at the farm level. As Sterling Wortman, A Rockefeller Foundation vice president, put it after an extensive look at Chinese agriculture: "Locally, there's no such thing as a good or bad farmer. Various farming regions may differ, but within a given locality the productivity on all lands has been raised to the same standard of excellence."

The scientific team headed by Dr. Wortman found that the Chinese had developed high-yield, dwarf rice varieties that are similar to the "miracle rice" varieties developed by the International Rice Research Institute. "Much of the rice we saw would clearly yield six to seven tons per hectare," he reported on his return. "That's extraordinarily good by world standards."

The research projects also stress the need to keep food free of chemicals and to create an agricultural environment that will endure indefinitely. The projects include work on better methods of controlling weeds without chemicals, of propagating and releasing beneficial insects, of developing insecticides made from herbs, of improving strains of bacteria added to the soil to speed decomposition of crop residues, and of expanding an extensive program of biological control of insects. They reported good results with breeding "nurseries" turning out millions of bugs to attack and eat aphids, for example, and said the golden bee released several years ago has been effective in controlling the cotton boll weevil.

[BREAKING THE CYCLE]

Can this strong commitment to agriculture be sustained in a country like China where there clearly are needs for development of heavy industry and other sectors of the economy? One can only conclude that the total involvement of people in this effort, and the painful memories many have of starvation in the past, will make it possible to maintain this momentum.

There is no need in China to remind people where food comes from or for direct farmer-consumer marketing arrangements aimed at easing the economic stranglehold of a highly concentrated food industry. It is likely that more people have first hand knowledge of agriculture in China than anywhere else in the world. Even the soldiers in China are required to produce most of their own food on their own bases.

All high school students are required to complete courses in agriculture, for example, and all city people in China spend one month every two years working on a commune as a kind of sabbatical. A large proportion of the high school graduates also work on communes for a year or two during the period when they are making arrangements to enter an apprenticeship program, enroll at a university, or take some other kind of training.

Another strength is the commune system itself, which has retained some personal incentives not usually found in a communal society. It includes a system of work credits for labor on the land, sharing of profits from other commune enterprises, and the small private plots where rural families produce most of their own food, keep a pig and some ducks or chickens, and are able to sell whatever produce they can spare on the open market.

The rural commune typically covers an area the size of a Midwest rural county, involves anywhere from 15,000 to 50,000 people, and is set up much like a large farming cooperative. The communes are organized into brigades, which do most of the accounting and handle things like leasing machinery, and work teams which are made up of 20 to 30 families in a neighborhood who work the land in common.

The Lou-Tang Commune, one of the 190 in the Shanghai area, is a typical example with 15 brigades and 138 production teams working a total of 2,400 hectares of land. This commune was set up in 1958 with about 24,000 people in 5,770 households. Rice is grown on 50 percent of its land, cotton on 45 percent, and vegetables on the remainder. It also produces about 36,000 hogs a year. The commune also has 24 large tractors, 120 walking tractors, and has 95 percent of its land under electrically-powered irrigation.

The communes provide such services as farm implement repair and maintenance, hospital services, management for large dairy and other livestock enterprises, carpentry and blacksmith shops, and a wide variety of jobs in light industry. Most of the peasants live either in the town where the commune is headquartered, which is much like a county seat town in our rural areas, or in homes clustered in villages or scattered across the countryside. A few have moved into new workers' apartments, making their former mud homes available for conversion to livestock shelter.

This system also makes it possible to implement a policy of keeping people on the land and avoiding the kind of mass movement to the cities that has caused such critical social and economic problems in Third World cities, not to mention our own metropolitan areas. The light industry being developed in rural areas is the kind that is labor intensive and that can operate so more jobs are available in winter months when farm work is slow. The emphasis is on things like basket weaving, fan and rug making, and hand embroidery that utilize skills handed down through the generations and that turn out beautiful items that can go into the export market and provide a good cash return for the commune. Also emphasized are silk and tea production, both traditional cash crops that involve a tremendous amount of hand labor.

China does not yet aim to be the breadbasket of Asia. The hard-won miracle of the past 25 years has been more immediate and basic than that. Commune by commune, China has become a nation of local breadbaskets, economically interdependent and yet at the same time self-sufficient. With a commitment by the whole society to share both its resources and its labor, it would seem that, for China at least, the ancient cycle of recurring famine has finally been broken.

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A Declaration of Interdependence

by Robert McAfee Brown

Richard Nixon left so many baleful legacies to the American people that it would be difficult to decide which one will inflict the most long-term damage. I have an uneasy feeling that after the dust of Watergate has settled, and even after the Southeast Asians can once again direct their own lives free of an American presence, an even worse legacy will remain: Nixon's attempt to sell us on the necessity for American "independence" by 1980: to do whatever is necessary to maintain, undiminished, our American way of life, no matter what happens elsewhere.

Such a vision is both immoral and impossible. Even if it could be achieved, it would be immoral to assume that a few have the right to all they want while the rest perish, populating a lavish oasis in an ever-widening desert of want and destitution. But I believe the vision is also impossible; those in the desert are simply not going to sit by and let those in the oasis get richer and richer – and fatter and fatter – while the rest starve.

Much of the discussion about food now centers on what is called "lifeboat ethics." The rich nations have their own lifeboats, full up but seaworthy, while the poor nations are in badly provisioned boats that are sinking. So the poor are trying to climb into the lifeboats of the rich. The rich, so the theory goes, are justified in beating off the poor, because if the poor get on board the lifeboats will run short of provisions and be swamped, and everybody will perish. Better that some survive than none.

The image assumes that the lifeboats of the rich are already full to bursting. A counter image could suggest that the rich are in fact on a large yacht, if not luxury liner, and that there is actually plenty of food and space on board, so that the rich, even if they decided to keep the first-class section of the vessel to themselves, could afford to let the poor on board. If the boat imagery is to be retained, that might at least be a more accurate description.

But there is an even more accurate image, the image, also familiar, of our planet as a spaceship. Its value is that it stresses the element of interdependence. On a spaceship, everybody is in it together. No one can be ignored. The entire mission is threatened if there is a mutiny among the crew, and there will be nobody to effect a salvage operation.

Very well. How are the resources aboard this spaceship being divided? Fr. Theodore Hesburgh has put it this way:

> *Take the view of the earth from the moon, which reduces the size of our spacecraft earth. Instead of 3.6 billion people, difficult to imagine, think of a crew of five persons, each representing a segment of humanity. The person representing us and our world, mostly Judaeo-Christian, white, Western, affluent, has the use of 80 percent of the available life resources and amenities aboard our spacecraft. The other four crew members must share the 20 percent that is left.*

That, in itself, is a monstrous statistic of human inequity, which Fr. Hesburgh rightly describes as "iniquitous and unjust." But, he goes on, the situation "is still deteriorating. Our crew man is increasing his share to 90 percent at the moment, leaving 2½ percent for each of the other crew members."

It is frequently the case in our hard and stern world that those who talk about "morality" are written off as naive or sentimental or unrealistic. But in the case at hand, who is unrealistic? The one who says that those with 90 percent of the resources must share them with those who have only 10 percent. Or the one who says that those with 90 percent of the resources should hold on to them, come what may? Love and justice would, of course, indicate sharing as the only appropriate stance. But realism indicates the same thing. Here is a case, where a moral concern coincides with the realistic self-interest of the entire human family. And since nations do not usually act for moral or altruistic reasons, but out of a sense of national self-interest, there is at least the possibility that the rich nations might realize they are pursuing a collision course with disaster. So I reject the notion that a concern to share food resources is "unrealistic." It is the only realism left.

It is clear that there is an immediate need to share, made apparent in statistics so stark that they can hardly be internalized: 15,000 people starving to death every day, two-thirds of the human family going to bed hungry every night. We cannot ignore those realities, since they are not statistics but people. We cannot write them off while we make long-range plans to feed the planet more adequately in the future by new social structures. The immediate needs must be met by stopgap methods, and this is legitimate and imperative, so long as we remember that they *are* stopgap, and that they are not solving the problem but only locating it. The experts have many suggestions for doing this – stopgap, transitional and long-range. It is true that there is inordinate wastage of food in "developed" countries, that we often destroy food

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to keep prices up, that fertilizer would be of more use on Indian fields than on American cemeteries, that grain is more important in the stomachs of people than of cattle's. But it is a long way from knowing something is true to doing something about it.

I believe that almost any gesture, however token, can be a useful *first* step, so long as it is seen for that and no more. Deliberately cutting down on our own food consumption, for example, will not actually help starving people very much, but it may be a consciousness-raising experience that can make us more alert to the problem. The occasional public "fasts" that many organizations sponsor may provide a few meals for people elsewhere; but their main value is to help those who engage in the fast to experience, even if only in the most minimal way, what it means to be hungry, and I have known students for whom this impact has been extraordinary. All such measures, of course, only lay a foundation.

One thing that must rapidly eventuate from such efforts at consciousness-raising is a determination to deal with *immediate* worldwide hunger by the massive transfer of food from areas of affluence to areas of need. This can be done by private humanitarian agencies, by governmental grants and consignments, and by the pooling of the resources of international agencies. Assuming that there are food resources to do this (and I make that assumption), the difficulties with this step are at least two: (a) the relief is only temporary and does not solve the problem, and (b) exploitation becomes so easy (feed "friends," ignore "enemies"). It is crucial that America's post-Vietnam aid to southeast Asia, for example, *not* be unilateral, but through international agencies, with no strings attached.

Such immediate aid to starving areas is crucial from any moral (and, as I have also been arguing, realistic) point of view. Provided . . . provided it is not assumed that this answers the problem. For it does not. It only defines the problem. *The problem is really not hunger. The problem is injustice.* The problem is that we have a system in which the haves increasingly benefit, lavishly, at the expense of the have-nots. It is built into the system that the rich get richer while the poor get poorer. So food, however immediately needed simply for sustaining life, must not be confused with a solution to the problem of hunger.

Here is where the interrelatedness of all of our global problems becomes so overwhelming. For we cannot isolate food as though it were a problem to be dealt with in isolation. Everything else impinges upon it; it impinges on everything else.

Example: we will feed refugees in Cambodia and Vietnam, and that is good. But in large measure we ourselves created those refugees. We napalmed their villages, we defoliated their forests, we rendered their ricefields unploughable. So the problem of hunger is exacerbated by the ugly reality of militarism.

Example: we have food stamps for blacks in American ghettos who don't have enough money to pay regular prices. It is good that they get food, but we have created conditions that make it impossible for them to have an adequate earning capacity. We have segregated their housing, denied them first-rate schooling, and thereby effectively closed off all kinds of jobs to them. So the problem of hunger is exacerbated by the ugly reality of racism.

Example: there are thousands of people in Chile who are starving because inflation rates have soared out of sight and the Chilean government will do nothing about it. And that government, the military *junta,* seized power and remains in power with American connivance and help; our country finances starvation on the outskirts of Valparaiso. So the problem of hunger is exacerbated by the ugly reality of imperialism.

The recital could continue. We will not have solved the one problem until we have solved the other problems, and vice versa. Which means that we will never adequately "solve" the overall human problem of survival and humane possibilities on this planet. We will always be within a certain number of days of world starvation should there be a world-wide crop failure. We will always have to cope with the human tendency to say, "I want mine, to hell with you." We will always have to cope with the temptation, described by T. S. Eliot, of "dreaming of systems so perfect, that no one will need to be good."

But the immensity of the problem must not lead to immobilization of purpose. There are viable proposals for coping with immediate needs. Long-range proposals are less easy to come by, but obviously are more important if we are to draw the human family together. We cannot make it with a system based on military power as the final word, on profits for the few at the cost of misery for the many, on nation-states that seek to be "number one" at whatever cost to others.

Nor, on another level, can we make it if we insist that human need from afar is irrelevant to human affluence at home, if we "stonewall" against change because change is threatening, if we insist that individual and private efforts can solve communal and public problems.

All of this suggests that what we most need is a combination of moral motivation and technical expertise. If motivation alone can be sentimental, expertise alone can be manipulative. Perhaps at the end of the day our American choice will not be whether we *can* give the help needed (we can), but whether we *will* (we may not). For any significant coping with world hunger will be very threatening to American power and prestige, let alone the American standard of living. These are not matters that should be glossed over. They require (in both motivation and expertise) the pressure of the churches and synagogues, along with that of politicians, sociologists, political scientists and all the rest.

This is why it seems to me that concern with hunger will inevitably involve us in politics, and that in political decision-making the ingredient of love must always be related to the question of justice – which may, for our day, turn out to be the crucial question. Aristotle long ago defined justice as "giving every person his [or her] due." Providing food won't be the end of the road. But it is certainly close to the beginning.

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"The Berendt Conversion"

Footnotes to a Future Famine

Under the cloud-dark sky that promised rain by sunset: the noise of an approaching engine. Heads were turned. The soup-tanker was, of course, what everybody was looking forward to, but it couldn't possibly be here for at least another hour and would be later still if the crew had to beat off an attempted hijack. Anyhow, what was coming was a helicopter and those had been reserved since spring for moving people, not goods.

It was a bad time for the unexpected. Five wars were in progress over food.

Therefore soldiers' knuckles paled on the hands that held their guns. Many of them had seen service during hunger riots last year and the year before. Workers trudging down from the hills with burdens of miscellaneous vegetation reflexively glanced around in search of cover. In the supermarket parking lot the non-working refugees reacted also, bar the handful who were too weak. But those were mostly children. This operation had an admirable record. Some days nobody died here at all.

The youngest of the five policemen whose job it was to keep order among the inhabitants of the parking lot was proud of his contribution to this exceptional achievement. Before permitting himself to look up he took time to survey his charges. Most were sheltered by abandoned cars and delivery trucks; even the least fortunate were protected from wind and rain, if not from cold, by tents improvised out of plastic sheet and aluminum pipe. Now and then someone in a tent noticed that someone in a more substantial home was weakening and took advantage of the police's backs being turned to kick out the luckier neighbors. Once there had been an epidemic

Illustrations by Lauren Elder

by John Brunner

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of such attacks and for a week more fatalities were due to murder than to hunger.

Not presently, however. And the young policeman had no opinion, private or public, concerning the latrine rumor which claimed that the protein content of the soup had been cut to increase fatigue and forestall another similar outbreak.

As soon as they realized the chopper was neither shooting nor being shot at, the refugees and workers slumped back in time to where they had been a moment earlier: the latter because payout was as distant as usual, the former—it could be read in their hostile eyes—because they feared more mouths were being brought, more empty bellies.

The soldiers would have done likewise but that the sergeant in charge of the assessment detail ordered them to stand to. The earliest returning of the workers were coming up to the perimeter gate with their day's forage, demanding to be let pass along the barbed-wire corridor into the supermarket, that horrible echoing cavern of a place where the only light came from holes blasted in the walls and meshed over against thieves, or cold refugees jealous that the soldiers and police should sleep under such solid cover.

The young policeman had often wondered what it was like to run that gauntlet at the end of a hard day: to face the scales, then the sonic testers employed to determine how much usable greenery, how much woody matter, and how much dirt and gravel made up the weight of each bag and basket, then let his hand be stamped with a code indicating what food he was to be allotted when the tanker pulled in with its loaf-nets sagging on either side.

Funny . . . As the summer wore to its end more and more of the workers seemed to be losing touch with reality, trying to deceive the assessors by hiding pebbles among the leaves and roots they could legitimately gain credit for, even though they must surely be aware by now that all such trickery was certain to be found out. Indeed, yesterday, a man who should have known better, being father of five children including a recent baby, had been fool enough to alter the *1* stamped on his hand to a *4* and in accordance with regulations had been refused any food at all.

It wasn't fair on the kids for him to have done that.

His eyes strayed to the hillside. To left, to right, and also at his back, the slopes were littered with what had been handsome expensive homes before the ghetto-ghouls began their rampage through this valley. He tried to picture it as it had been five years earlier; failed, because as a kid he had never lived in nor even visited such a wealthy suburb; then tried not to visualize it as it inevitably would be after the winter and failed again. But for the frequent rain this land would already be shedding dust this fall as once it had shed leaves.

The helicopter settled on the patch where the souptanker ordinarily drew up, the most defensible spot. Alerted by radio, the commanding colonel and his adjutant were on hand. An armed private with the professionally paranoid air of a bodyguard jumped out, only condescending to salute after he had swept the vicinity with his suspicious gaze. Then an *important* passenger climbed down, encumbered with a bulging paunch, shook the colonel's hand and marched off with him to the supermarket.

Among the refugees there had grown up a ritual to be performed on catching sight of anybody fat. Behind the wire a defiant old man demonstrated it, being himself as scrawny as a beanpole; he spat on the ground, trod on the spittle, turned his back with an over-shoulder scowl. To this the young policeman was directed to reply with a gesture towards his gun and a threatening glare, rehearsed again and again to render it maximally convincing and save the ammunition that would be wasted were he to have to shoot.

But the landing of the chopper had saved him from—from something. He had been on the edge of—of—of . . . It wouldn't come clear. He could, though, sense it would have been disastrous. (Maybe he himself would in a fit of craziness have spat on seeing how fat the visitor was?)

He did not even drop his hand to his holster. He simply stood and shivered, more from the narrowness of his escape from—from whatever it was he *had* escaped, than from the chill that harbingered the rain.

Who was this person, anyhow, who rated a slow expensive wasteful mode of transport like a chopper in times of planetary dearth; The machine's pilot, a lean man with a close-trimmed dark beard, had got out and stood a few feet away, stretching himself limb by limb as he looked the scene over. The young policeman attempted to utter a greeting, pose a question . . . and abruptly couldn't. His mouth was watering incredibly. He had caught a scent so indescribably delicious it dizzied him. It awoke hunger that seemed to cry out from his very cells.

Hideously embarrassed, he gulped and gulped, hoping the bearded man would not notice. Seemingly he was more interested in the workers returning with their loads of greenstuff and the armed men lined up to receive them.

After a few moments he said, "Get much trouble with thieves, do you?"

The salivation was coming under control. (What *could* have triggered it?) "Not twice," the policeman managed to quote.

The pilot glanced at him as though surprised. "Hmm! It's long since I heard *that* crack! Must have been when the cows went on their involuntary seven-year diet . . . Still, I guess granary guards are much alike wherever and whenever."

The policeman let that pass without bothering about its meaning. Now he could speak normally again, he preferred to put the question he had originally intended about the passenger.

"Government food chemist," the pilot answered.

The policeman essayed a joke. "Looks as though he tests his products on himself, doesn't it?"

A merely polite smile. "If you knew him you couldn't picture him being his own guinea pig . . . Uh-oh. Here it comes!"

Like stabbing needles the first drops of rain. In the parking lot the refugees ducked under cover; workers lining up to be shephereded into the supermarket made what use they could of their bundled twigs and leaves.

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"Inside, quickly!"

The policeman started. The pilot had scrambled back into his seat; now he was patting the place next to him, which had been occupied by the bodyguard. There were two more seats in back. One, the passenger's, was empty. In the other dozed a top sergeant, a man heavyset without being fat, on whom the refugees would not have expended spittle, with great pouches under his eyes and sagging empty jowls that testified to his having lost much poundage since–since whenever. He snored occasionally.

"Come on!" the pilot urged. "The rain's doing half your work for you, isn't it?"

True, true. It dampened spirits as it wet the ground. He climbed three wide-spaced rungs and sat, pulling the door behind him. At once his mouth flooded again. The same scent was in the air, far stronger.

"It's no fit way for a human being to end the day's work," the pilot muttered. He was staring as the workers formed a tidy line between the spikes of barbed wire and of bayonets. "To sweat from dawn to dusk, creep homeward folded double by your load, be told there's too much dirt and grit in it, half-rations for your family tonight . . . *And* it's making more desert when we need less."

The policeman had heard that sort of talk before. But when people were starving by the tens of millions it was no time for fancy fits of conscience. Just so long as they were kept alive.

"You got a patch of dirt on your face," the pilot said after a pause. "Right cheekbone."

The policeman almost raised his hand to rub before he remembered. "Oh, that. No, it isn't dirt. I guess I bruised it somehow."

"Ah-hah?!! The pilot scrutinized him. "Bruise easily, do you? Yes? Do your joints hurt?"

"Sometimes. Seems to be a thing going around."

"Be damned," the pilot said softly. "I knew the refugees were getting it, but I thought at least the guards . . . Here, boy." He reached under the instrument panel and produced a lunchbox previously hidden in shadow. The instant he opened it the delicious scent became unbearable.

"Boy?" the policeman bridled.

"Hell, if you're old enough to vote I'll personally eat the shit you've passed since your birthday." Taking from the box something brown and white, something pink, something round and red. Also a knife.

"Should give you an orange or a lemon," the pilot said musingly. "Don't have any on me, though . . . What's 'going around,' as you call it, is something we've known the cure for since the 18th century – scurvy. I recall at Alexandria it made the soldiers so listless they paid no attention when the enemy approached. Bad stuff. Here, eat this. Best be quick and not let any of the refugees see you with it." He held out a swiftly-fashioned sandwich of bread and ham, and also a tomato.

"Are they real?" the young policeman breathed.

"I should live so long and grow so rich! Hell, no. These are Berendtized."

"All made out of – of . . .?" With a gesture at the workers' forage.

"Sure, but don't be put off. It's not rat-meat I'm giving you. That's officer-grade food, four-hundred-fifty-bucks' worth of power to every pound. You won't taste the same again in a hurry . . . Mark you, when there's nothing else even rat-meat can be tasty."

Taking the sandwich gingerly the policeman said, "I never got that far down. Seen plenty that did, of course. Uh – where were you reduced to rats?"

"Oh, there's nothing very special about rats. After the cats and dogs are all gone . . . In Paris, though: that was something else. We had some very strange meats when we cleared out the zoo – elephant, giraffe, even python. Say, eat up, will you, instead of staring? It's not poisoned!"

The policeman opened his mouth and crammed it in, trying to savor each crumb and morsel, failing because his hunger was so deep, so keen.

"Oh, God," he said at length, and ran his tongue hopefully around his lips to trap a last elusive drop of tomato juice. In back, the sleeping sergeant shifted but didn't open his eyes.

The pilot closed the lunchbox and carefully put it away. There was a little silence, but for the sound of rain. At last the policeman said, "I heard a story about Berendt. Is it true he killed himself by jumping into his own food-converter?"

"It's true he killed himself. Whether he did it in that precise way is just about impossible to find out. They prefer people not to know they killed him."

"What? You just said he killed himself and now . . ."

"Did you never wonder what decided him?"

"Ah . . . well, sure. It seems kind of odd he did it just when he'd succeeded in his life's ambition, right?"

"Ambition," the pilot repeated thoughtfully. "Obsession may have been more like it. The story goes he never talked or thought about anything except his plan to save the world from famine."

"What – what drove him, do you think?"

"Heaven knows. Some people say his father had been eaten. Things like that did happen. It was a vicious winter. Of course it was just a Little Hunger, and at that it was in wartime. The Big Hunger hadn't more than started."

"Where was that?"

"Leningrad."

There was another pause. Now dusk and denser rain had almost veiled the late-returning workers. The soldiers, as wet and cold as their charges, were beginning to raise their voices and threaten to cuff with gun butts.

"For whatever reason," the pilot resumed unexpectedly, "Yakov Berendt made the food-converter his personal crusade. He had no scientific talent, so the first thing he had to do was make a fortune so he could hire top chemists and engineers and dieticians. It cost every penny he had just to build one pilot model. But when he had that, he had proof it could be done. He was able to borrow. Altogether he borrowed over twenty million. Produced the machine he'd always dreamed of. Drop in any kind of vegetation, even the poisonous kind, even the useless kind like straws and twigs, fit the right master tape, and out would come good nourishing food. How could there be any more starvation when there was one of his ma-

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chines in every village?"

"But there isn't," the policeman said, settling back comfortably in his seat and folding his hands on his stomach. It was amazing how full and sleepy that one sandwich had made him.

"Right. There isn't. With the Big Hunger looming larger by the day, the people who had loaned him the money to develop the converter branded him a crank and a lunatic and had him voted off his own company's board. Once they were in control they made sure the price of a Berendt converter was the highest the market could bear. No, there are not converters in every village. But there are in every smart restaurant and hotel. And some private homes, come to that. This guy I'm ferrying around: he has one." The pilot scowled into the gathering dark.

"But in any case," he added, "he was completely wrong to think his machine could save us."

"How's that again?" The policeman's eyes threatened to drift shut; he forced the lids apart and forced himself to concentrate on what the pilot was saying.

"Proof is all about us. Like I said, this project and those like it are making more desert when we need less. There's nothing wonderful about being a villager, you know – what reason is there to think peasants would behave any differently from townsfolk? Just as your rich family in the big city buys dirt-cheap rubbish for the converter and puts on an expensive tape and eats the *haute cuisine,* so villagers would have been content to chuck in leaves and grass and the hell with actually planting anything. Who wants to break his back for corn and cabbages? Food from the converter is better than most of what you get from the ground; they choose only the very finest models to make up tapes from. Why, they've got to the stage now where they can duplicate vintage wines. The experts say they're more consistent than the original."

"I wouldn't know," the policeman muttered. "Never tasted wine . . . Say, you didn't finish telling me why Berendt committed suicide."

"It could have been because of what his partners planned to do with the converter; could equally have been because he suddenly realized his idea was stupid from the start. By the time he got the machine working it was already far too late. We were set for our population crash, one of the classic two-thirds degree. No point in arguing with laws of nature."

"Now wait a minute. Nature doesn't always rule us. We've changed the face of nature for a start. First time we plowed a field, wasn't that going against nature?"

"If it was, it likely didn't work. Things like that succeed when you're working with nature, not against. Heard the news today?"

"Been on duty since dawn. No."

"There's civil war in Brazil. The people who accepted land grants in rainforest areas and cleared them without realizing that when you expose the ground it turns to rockhard crust which won't grow anything: they lost patience and took out after the bastards who sold them this bill of goods. A grenade killed the provincial governor and his senior aide last night: today the country's under martial law." The pilot stabbed the air with his forefinger. "What happened to those Brazilian farms: that's what I mean when I talk about going against nature. You have to coax her, never drive her. And we're still animals for all our cleverness. Animals that outstrip their food supply suffer a population crash, and the rate is almost always two out of three. Rabbits. Lemmings. All kinds of animals. And us. And it's such a horrible state to be reduced to . . . I remember in India, where they had 14 famines in 90 years. As the famine increased, men abandoned towns and villages and wandered helplessly. It was easy to recognize their condition: eyes sunk deep in the head; lips pale and covered with slime; the skin hard, with the bones showing through; the belly nothing but a pouch hanging down empty; knuckles and kneecaps showing prominently. One would cry and howl for hunger, while another lay on the ground dying in misery. Wherever you went, you saw nothing but corpses."

The policeman shivered, though the cabin was snug and windtight.

"And it was bad in Skibbereen, too. That's Ireland. One village called South Reen seemed to be deserted when we went there with supplies of bread. So we looked in some of the houses—hovels, really. In the first, six famished and ghastly skeletons, to all appearances dead, were huddled in a corner on some filthy straw, their sole covering what seemed a ragged horsecloth, and their wretched legs hanging about naked above the knees. I approached with horror, and found by a low moaning they were alive. They were in fever—four children, a woman, and what had once been a man . . .

"In another case my clothes were nearly torn off in my endeavors to escape from a throng of pestilence, when my neckcloth was seized from behind by a grip which compelled me to turn. I found myself grasped by a woman with an infant just born in her arms, and the remains of a filthy sack across her loins—the sole covering of herself and babe. The same morning the police opened a house on the adjoining lands which was observed shut for many days, and two frozen corpses were found lying upon the mud floor, half-devoured by the rats.

"A mother, herself in fever, was seen the same day to drag out the

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corpse of her child, a girl of about 12, perfectly naked, and leave it half covered with stones. In another house within 500 yards of the cavalry station at Skibbereen the dispensary doctor found seven wretches lying, unable to move, under the same cloak—one had been dead many hours, but the others were unable to move themselves or the corpse."

"Well, if it's really a law of nature . . . " the policeman said, staring appalled at the pilot's calm face.

"Oh, I believe in the law all right. It doesn't say the two-thirds we're going to lose can't be the *right* two-thirds." He gave a harsh laugh. "Starting with people who starve others out of megalomania and greed. They'd be *no* loss. This guy, this food-chemist I'm nursemaiding: he's like that. Reminds me a lot of John of Leyden. Real name was Bockelson but he preferred the short form. More like a king's name, I guess.

"And that was how he saw himself. Somehow he cónned a gang of people in Münster into setting up a fantasy kingdom with him and his sidekicks at the top. Well, the Empire wasn't going to put up with that, so they set siege to the place and starved the defenders out. The self-styled king requisitioned all the food in the city and had all the horses killed. At all times the royal court ate well and had sufficient stocks of meat, corn, wine and beer for half a year. The rest were not so lucky. Every animal -- dog, cat, mouse, rat hedgehog – was killed and eaten and people began to consume grass and moss, old shoes and the whitewash on the walls, the bodies of the dead."

"Whitewash?" the policeman said incredulously.

"Oh, sure. People have been known to eat dirt; haven't you seen them? Even short of that, people put some funny things in their bellies. I remember on Guernsey they drank stuff made from parsnips and fruit leaves instead of tea. Smoked some peculiar things too. Made cigarettes out of dried potato peel, bramble leaves, rose-petals . . . even plain grass. Anything to stave off the pangs. Coming back from Moscow we boiled our boots and the leather harness left over after we'd eaten the horses, brewed something warm with the illusion of nourishment."

"I heard about people boiling boots," the policeman said. "Thought it was a joke."

"Not so funny when it happens to you," said the pilot. "Like I say, we'd finished the horses. Deprived of fodder and constantly exposed, they died in great numbers. Often men did not wait until the horses had fallen to devour them . . . A stray horse was instantly killed and dismembered almost living: unlucky animal who moved a few steps away from his master . . . A lot of fights got started over who was to have what bit."

Cold – unspeakable terrible cold – seemed to reach into the chopper. It was so completely numbing, one could not even shiver.

Eventually the policeman was able to say, "I get the feeling we here are – well, you'd have to call us lucky, I guess."

Sure. You're very lucky. Only thing apt to delay your daily rations is a bunch of people half out of their minds and armed with shotguns they have no more shells for. While in Africa . . . You said you didn't hear the news today?"

"Not yet."

"Well, they had to ground the UN relief flights. Seems Zaire got paranoid. Decided they aren't getting enough relief and all their neighbors are getting so much they're planning to trade it to Europe and buy arms in order to invade. So they dusted off their ground-to-air missiles – they got these good ones made in Switzerland – and started shooting down the UN planes. Pilots won't fly the missions any more, and do you blame 'em?"

"That's terrible!"

"Not so much terrible as typical. In L.A., you know, they'd put up a rick of oranges and apples, put gasoline over it and set fire to them. Vegetables were being destroyed and everything. To keep the price up. But there were great queues of guys in soup lines. Nobody had a dime." The pilot shook his head. "It's the 'I-don't-want-it-you-can-have-it' syndrome. See it all the time with spoiled kids."

"I guess maybe it's as well Berendt did away with himself," the policeman said. "Whether he jumped into his converter or not. If he was alive he'd

be the world's most disappointed man."

He hesitated. "Funny, you know. Talking to you makes me think about him as a person for the first time. Always before I've had the impression of him as – well, close to a saint. Spent his whole life for the sake of others and it isn't his fault his dream never came true."

From the back of the cabin, a snorting noise. They looked behind and found the sergeant was awake.

"I've been listening to you, Jacobson," he said, pushing his blocky torso upright. "Spinning those crazy lies to someone who's no more than a kid – it's disgusting. Hear me? What you said about Ireland: it's not true. I got family in Ireland and they just wrote me and said you can buy butter without a ration card. Natural butter! Can't do that here, can you? Does that sound like starvation?" Aside to the policeman. "And I just saw this TV report about Paris, too. And they are *not* burning food in L.A. – lies, all of it!"

The pilot winked sidelong at the policeman, who was bewildered.

"As for Berendt!" The sergeant leaned forward, hands on the back of the pilot's seat and clenching tight as though he would rather have gripped the other's throat. "Berendt did *not* jump into his own machine and there is *not* a little of him in everything that comes out of a converter and it's a load of blasphemous nonsense. I wish you weren't civilian personnel – I'd like to sort you out the way you deserve."

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With a final glare he slumped back and concluded, "Out with you, boy. You've had enough of this bastard's yarnspinning."

Confused, the policeman opened the door to the rain and jumped down. Approaching were a group of men under an umbrella: the food chemist, an escorting officer, and the body-guard.

"They're coming back!" he called to the pilot, who also clambered down.

And said very softly, almost without moving his lips but contriving to make himself heard perfectly: "So maybe Yakov Berendt didn't wind up in a food-converter. But I'll tell you who did. The guy I used to fly around before this one. And soon's I get the chance he'll be the next." With ever so slight an inclination of the head. "Like I said, we need to make sure it's the right two-thirds of mankind we dispose of. Thanks to Berendt we have the means to make them useful for a change. Tell people that. Tell people you can trust."

He clapped the younger man on the shoulder, then went on loudly, "Did everything go off all right, sir?"

"Perfectly, thank you, Joseph," said the important passenger. "Though it took longer than I expected. I hope you weren't too bored."

"Not at all, sir," said the pilot. "Not at all." And made to help the fat man up the ladder.

For several minutes after the chopper had taken off the policeman was in a kind of daze. Extraordinary images kept flashing through his mind; some ludicrous, like a pan full of boots being boiled, and others ghastly, like an emaciated child licking a white-washed wall.

And that parting remark. To be taken seriously? Surely it must be some sort of sick joke!

He was recalled to the present by the roaring noise of the soup-tanker as it ground to a halt among cheers from refugees and soldiers alike. It was a tradition to signal its arrival in that fashion. Automatically the young policeman started to join in.

And checked.

He looked at the bulky tanker with the load-nets dangling from it, thought of the grass and leaves and twigs and roots it would carry in those nets when it left here and returned to its base in the nearest city.

Thought of what would happen to that greenstuff. Thought of tomato juice on his chin, bread, ham . . . and then of the grayish quarter-loaf he would receive at supper, gritty in texture, under its sour crust more hole than crumb. That, and a bowl of the invariable watery broth in which floated a few anonymous vegetables. It was a common game to make bets on their identity. There was never meat, of course. It cost too much.

After a while, he started wondering whom he could trust enough to tell about the Berendt conversion.

* * *

Some of Joseph the son of Jacob's reminiscences should instantly be recognizable, above all the reference to the years of the ill-favored kine. However, a few are likely to leave the reader in the infuriating state, "I'm sure I know where that comes from, but . . . !"

So here are the sources.

The description of scurvy among the soldiers at Alexandria is from Larrey's memoirs; he was Surgeon-General to Napoleon. The Paris Zoo was used to supplement the rations of the besieged during the Franco-Prussian War. (They ate some even odder things than python.) Cannibalism at Leningrad is a recurrent rumor, recurrently denied.

The civil war in Brazil hasn't happened yet; however, the land those poor devils are trying to farm was seen in a British TV documentary three years ago. The description of the Indian famine is from the memoirs of a Dutch merchant called Van Twist, who was there in 1630-31. (The 14 famines were from 1660 to 1750.) The man who took bread to the village of South Reen was a local justice of the peace; this is from a letter he wrote to the Duke of Wellington which W. O. O'Brien quoted in his book The Great Famine.

Authority for the diet of the subjects of John of Leyden can be found in Norman Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millenium. *The comment about what people can be driven to put in their bellies paraphrases a remark in* The Oxford Book of Food Plants; *the authors say, "Nor is it possible to include all those plants [though some are mentioned] which men will try to eat in the desperation of famine." The specific examples given, and the ersatz cigarettes, are from the recollection of people who lived in Guernsey under Nazi occupation, 1940-45, and I found them in Comer Clarke's* England Under Hitler.

The horses eaten almost before their death are from Larrey again. The burning of fruit to keep the price up is quoted verbatim from Hard Times *by Studs Terkel. And except that in those days they were using artillery instead of guided missiles, the shooting down of UN relief planes could well refer to the Nigeria-Biafra war.*

John Brunner's most recent novels include Stand on Zanzibar *(Ballentine),* The Dreaming Earth *(Pyramid) and* Sheep Look Up *(Harper & Row).* *Copyright © 1975 by Brunner Fact & Fiction, Ltd.*

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FOOD

(From page 37)

baby pigs, in a desperate effort to maintain some price floor under agricultural products. Later, under the influence of such concepts as Henry Wallace's Ever-Normal Granary, the reserve scheme came to include wider objectives than price stabilization and income maintenance: specifically, the assurance of a minimum level food supply in periods of depressed production.

In the 1950's the reserve program underwent changes in both concept and purpose. Recurring recessions and frequent severe drops in farm income shifted the objective of the program away from that of protection against inadequate supply, and more strictly toward the maintenance of reasonably stable agricultural prices and protection of producers at least against catastrophic losses of income.

Whatever its merits and defects, this system is now held in small regard by the present leadership of the Department of Agriculture. The Department's aim is to rely on the operations of the private market, with a minimum of public regulation, participation or interference. Accordingly, in 1972 the Department of Agriculture began to dismantle the reserve system "step by step."

The first step was to sell the grain then in storage. In four of the five past years, world consumption has exceeded production in the six major grains. USDA policy has been to meet these demands by selling reserve stocks, drawing them down until, in 1973/74, world stocks reached a low of 108 million tons. According to the Economic Research Service, about 100 million tons of beginning stocks is considered the equivalent of no reserve against the next crop to be harvested. Next the Department sold the Government's storage capacity to private interests. Finally, the 1973 farm bill shifted the Government's approach from one which tended to accumulate food reserves to one which tended to avoid them.

Cycles of food surplus and deficit are the norm. According to Dr. Don Paarlbery, Chief Economist for the Department of Agriculture, "In the four decades of modern farm programs, there have been about six cycles of crop surplus buildings followed by near empty granaries." And yet aside from the obvious hedge against famine, maintenance of food reserves can have a profound effect on stabilizing prices. According to USDA estimates, when stocks accumulate to more than 30 percent of consumption, prices are pushed downward. At less than 15 percent prices begin to rise. At very low levels, or without reserve stocks as we have experienced in the past two years, prices will fluctuate widely.

For the developing countries, a workable reserve scheme is crucial. The persistence of severity of crop shortfalls in developing countries is far greater, and the consequences of sudden inadequate grain supplies when people are at a subsistence level of nutrition are much more severe. Without the stable markets an international reserve would foster, widespread food shortages may even be triggered by sudden price fluctuations. Not only were many countries battered by the sudden and violent increases in the grain markets in the last few years, but within developing countries it was the poorest people who were squeezed out when supplies were short and prices were high.

At the World Food Conference in Rome, the U.S. accepted, in principle, the inevitability of some form of international food reserve – both for general market stabilization and for specific famine relief. But the policymakers – particularly those at the Department of Agriculture – lean heavily towards schemes that will allow maximum play for free market forces. To be sure, there are divisions within the Administration. The statement is open to some binding commitments on countries participating in an international reserve, definite incentives for participating, as well as sanctions against countries which do not participate or which default on their commitments. But the Agriculture Department, the agency most responsible for U.S. food policy, is holding out for a scheme that would "interfere" as little as possible with the market. The USDA would keep the reserves firmly in the hands of farmers and traders, leaving them almost as free to speculate as ever. Only in a crisis of surplus or shortage would countries get together to "consult" and, if consensus is reached, to act.

Even for cases of famine, the USDA opposes a special international grain reserve separated from the commercial market, for the sole use of famine-striken countries. Instead, Department officials feel that the main consideration in this kind of emergency is to have cash available to remove enough grain from the market to ship, not the availability of grain. Their position is that the regular reserve they are proposing would take care of the availability problem, and the cash problem should be considered under the separate rubric of "food aid."

If the Department of Agriculture has its way with reserves, and very likely it will, the hungry of the world will be depending on a reserve system which has no price triggers, little price stabilization impact, no sanctions, and no special relief for the most needy nations. And with the fate of the hungry in developing countries linked to food aid decisions, currently made on a yearly basis, the developing countries will be dependent on our good graces; the power of the U.S. to use food aid as a weapon will remain intact.

[The Hand that Feeds]

The American people have been told and retold, until they have come to believe it, that since World War II the United States has altruistically donated countless billions of dollars in money, goods and services for the relief and improvement of those less fortunate than ourselves. Of these vast amounts, food has constituted a significant part.

In fact, our greed has at least equalled our generosity; and when faced with a choice between self-serving policies and alternatives framed to meet the needs of the ostensible beneficiaries of foreign aid programs, we have generally opted for the former. As a result, our food aid programs have been neither as altruistic as claimed nor – more unfortunately – as effective as they might have been.

With the exception of disaster and famine relief, the U.S. does not have and never has had a food aid policy built around the needy peoples of the world and the nature of their needs. Instead, we have a body of legislation built around such purposes as:

- disposing profitably of farm surpluses which otherwise might create serious domestic economic problems;
- creating new markets for U.S.-owned interests, or expanding or protecting existing ones;
- providing cheap capital for overseas investment by U.S. enterprises;
- "laundering" military assistance which might have been challenged if so identified.

On close examination, the amount of our "contribution" toward meeting world needs is not as great as we have often claimed. The figure of $30 bil-

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lion commonly mentioned as the total value of food aid over the past 30 years actually represents the value of the commodities if a cash market had existed for them, which it did not. Nor does the $30 billion figure allow for the amounts paid back to the U.S. in local currencies or in dollar repayable long-term loans, or for the cost of storage had we not "given" the food away, to say nothing of the losses to farmers if it had merely been dumped on the market. "Cost" proves to be a tricky concept when viewed from all angles.

This is not to say that the commodities were not valuable to those who received them, but rather that the "gift" aspect of food programs has been considerably less than is generally believed. Moreover, while it is true that the U.S. has been the largest contributor in total quantity of food given, this was in large part because we had surpluses to give. When contributions are ranked as a percentage of total GNP, for example, the U.S. rates a low fourteenth among the 16 developed countries who participate in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, 80 percent of the food aid given by the other developed nations is in the form of straight grants, not loans.

[FOOD FOR PEACE]

By far the largest part of American foreign food assistance has been conducted under the authority of Public Law 480. This law was created in 1954 out of the Mutual Security Act and was conceived at the time as a temporary program to be discontinued when domestic food surpluses disappeared. The program was to assist in the reduction of U.S. agricultural surpluses by developing markets in friendly countries.

It was not until 1961 that the Act was amended to authorize outright grants of agricultural commodities to promote development and the language "to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in developing countries" was added to its statement of purpose. In 1966 the Act was revised again to emphasize the importance of food aid to combat malnutrition, promote self help and voluntary family planning activities in developing countries. The statutory requirements that commodities must be in surplus before they would be eligible for sale or donation under the Act was removed. However existing legislation does stipulate that no commodity can be made available for disposition under P.L. 480 if such disposition would reduce the supply below domestic requirements, adequate carryover, and *anticipated exports.*

Title I of P.L. 480 deals with the sale of food products to other countries, commonly referred to as "concessional sales." The term "concessional" relates to the fact that sales under Title I may be financed on negotiated terms, generally more favorable than those available from other credit sources. There is no requirement that commodities sold under Title I be distributed to those most in need in the recipient country. Title I has accounted for about 70 percent of all commodities shipped under P.L. 480.

Title II is the donation or grant part of the P.L. 480 program, currently accounting for about 20 percent of its expenditures. Approximately half of the food made available in Title II is distributed through private international relief organizations such as CARE and the Catholic Relief Services. Most of the programs operated by these organizations are targeted for selected groups with special needs, such as pregnant and nursing mothers, preschool feeding programs and school lunch programs. The rest of the Title II food goes to multilateral relief organizations such as the UN-operated World Food Program.

Emergency disaster and famine relief efforts, accounting for the remaining 10 percent, can be carried out through either Title I or Title II of the program.

Day-to-day decisions on food aid allocation are made by a group known as the Interagency Staff Committee, which includes representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce, and from the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of Management and Budget. Allocation meetings are closed to the public and do not report to any Congressional committee. The Committee's decisions tend to be dominated by its stronger personalities, or by those who speak from the more impressive power base. In recent years, the strongest voices on the Committee were those of the State Department and the National Security Council. According to Department of Agriculture figures, in 1973 Cambodia, South Vietnam and South Korea received 67 percent of all Title I aid. Bangladesh, on the other hand, received 5 percent.

The priorities set for U.S. food aid were explained recently by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, in testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee:

> *Mr. Chairman, let me add a word about the controversy between "political" and "humanitarian [aid]."*
>
> *Few would argue that our programs are designed to achieve both ends. All the countries we assist with P.L. 480 are developing; all are relatively poor; all have deficient dietary standards; many are threatened with disaster, either natural or through war; all have major food needs.*
>
> *The question is not whether to choose between Korea and Pakistan, between Vietnam and Cambodia, between Chile and India.* ***The question is how to find a basis on which our national interests can be served in each country.*** *(emphasis added)*

To be sure, no one expects the U.S. (or any other nation, for that matter, to consciously act in a manner *contrary* to its vital national interests. But two important questions should be considered. First, is the objective of our food aid programs to help feed the hungry, because that is a worthy end in itself, or is it to use food as one of the chips in the poker game of international power politics, with the ultimate purpose of securing advantage for ourselves over our "adversaries": The question goes to the very heart of our food assistance policies.

The second and perhaps even more important question goes to the matter of understanding where our "national interests" lie in regard to food. Government leaders tend to think of our interest in terms of bolstering some regimes or political movements of which (at the time) we approve, or disadvantaging others of which we do not approve. But it requires little foresight to perceive that there can be no stability and no peace in a hungry world, even if the anguish of the millions of unfed or underfed did not weigh on our collective conscience. Viewed in the long run, our national interest lies not in using food to destabilize governments (as we did by refusing food aid and even food sales to Chile under Allende), nor in supporting reactionary, even despotic regimes which we consider "friendly." Rather, it lies in developing ways to de-politicize food aid, by making it part of

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multinational efforts.

[MARKETS OR PEOPLE?]

Hungry nations have found little comfort in a second aspect of P.L. 480, the provision for "developing international markets." Many of the negative results of long-term food aid, such as distorting local markets and reducing incentives to local farmers, arise from this goal.

One important instrument in this form of "development" is the negotiation of "tied" aid. The aid-receiving nation is specifically required to increase the amount of its farm product imports from the U.S. in proportion to the growth of its own domestic market. In addition, the nation's farm exports must not increase in a way which might potentially displace U.S. commercial exports.

In *The Myth of AID,* Michael Hudson describes the impact of this provision:

> *Neither farm sectors nor the balance of payments position is helped. They are contractually obligated not to implement policies of domestic agricultural self-sufficiency and must enter into agreements assuring the United States a guaranteed future share of their domestic markets.*

"Tied aid also provides the U.S. with a powerful trade negotiation weapon. Recent agreements with Egypt for P.L.-financed food included a stipulation for purchase of 2,144,000 tons of wheat from the U.S. South Korea promised to purchase at least 150,000 tons of rice for cash in exchange for P.L. 480-sponsored commodities.

Nor are the "tied" aid requirements limited to agricultural products. The business magazine *Forbes* has reported that the U.S. government

> *put food shipments to India on a month-to-month basis until that country agreed to let Standard Oil of Indiana, which produces fertilizer, market that fertilizer at Standard's price. Late in 1967, AID requested $50 million so that India could buy fertilizer, with the stated purpose of helping U.S. oil companies.*

Another serious departure from the ostensibly humanitarian objective of P.L. 480 is the use of program revenues to provide subsidized loans to American corporations overseas. Until 1971, this was accomplished through the Cooley Loan Program, which made approximately $415 million of local currency repayments available for U.S. business investments.

For the U.S. government, this device had the advantage of putting otherwise idle local currency holdings to work, and of reducing, at least to some degree, the outflow of dollars which might have otherwise been used to finance the same projects. From the point of view of the corporate borrowers, these negotiated loans were advantageous not only because they conserved company-controlled dollar balances, but also because they were offered at highly favorable interest rates.

When P.L 480 switched over from local currency repayments to dollar sales, the concept of the Cooley Loan was modified into a new form called Private Trade Entity Loans (PTE). Under this provision, P.L. 480 commodities are made available to private corporations to sell, and the proceeds from such sales are then considered as loans and used to finance the company's projects. The PTE agreements are more directly related to agriculture than was the Cooley Loan Program. However, any agriculture benefit to the country is directly offset by the very purposes for which the loans may be given. Specifically, loans are required to directly "result in the expansion of sales for dollars of U.S. agricultural commodities," or to directly "assist in developing future commercial markets."

One problem with this program is the distortion it tends to produce in the use of resources in a developing country. On the one hand, food may go for sale in countries which do not have the most acute needs, simply for the investment convenience of an American corporation. Or, on the other hand, the money spent for food by poor people in low-income, food-needy countries may go to finance an American business venture which may not be appropriate for the development of the country, or in fact may directly compete with indigenous enterprises and food needs.

A case in point was a "development" project carried out in Colombia by a subsidiary of Ralston Purina, the world's largest manufacturer of feed grain. In 1958, Purina Colombiania received a loan for $83,000 from the U.S. government through the Cooley Loan Program. It was used to provide technical assistance and credit to encourage Colombian farmers to enter the poultry business. Farmers purchased both the feed and the baby chicks from Purina, raised them, and sold the grown chickens back to the company. Purina also contracted for feed crops such as sorghum and soybeans, offering credit to farmers to grow them and encouraging both government and private lending institutions to do the same.

All of this sounds practical in the abstract. Unfortunately, these operations were not conducted in the abstract but in Colombia – a country where the division of the population into a small class of the rich and a large class of the very poor is uncommonly sharp. In Colombia, 60 percent of the children are malnourished. Only a small class of middle and upper income people can afford chicken and eggs.

The result of the Purina enterprises has been to shift agricultural land and production away from traditional sources of protein such as dry beans, which the poor can afford, to the needs of the poultry industry. Because of this reduction in acreage planted in crops usable by the poor, the protein deficiency in Colombia has actually increased.

So long as the major portion of U.S. food aid is captive to overriding political and commercial concerns, it will do little to advance a goal of long-term food security for the hungry and, more frequently, will even tend to disrupt that goal. Food aid assistance is simply not an area in which the U.S. can satisfy all appetites; it must choose between feeding people in a context which is constructive to long-term development or advancing its own near-term commercial and political interests. The two are simply not compatible.

The U.S. must begin to recognize food aid as a part of a long-term struggle on the part of the least developed countries to achieve food security, and begin to participate in programs – preferably multinational ones – to meet that need. The U.S. knows far more about what works and what doesn't than it currently applies to food aid policy. But until we begin to use that knowledge *for* food aid recipients, our programs will continue to be at best ineffectual, and at worst injurious to uncounted millions of people.

Support the Farmworkers.

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[The Green "Revolution"]

The Green Revolution was for some years widely celebrated as the solution to the world's agricultural production problems. In essence, a technological approach to increasing the yields of basic food crops, it is a carefully worked out combination of techniques and technology which includes the new seed varieties, irrigation, and the intensive use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. Recently, however, the contrast between predictions and results has notably moderated the rhetoric.

The architects of the Green Revolution operated on a simple premise: increase the total food supply and people will have enough to eat. It may have seemed reasonable, but it didn't work. Just increasing the total amount of food grown doesn't mean that the food will be distributed equitably or that a broad income range of farmers will participate in growing it. In fact it can mean just the opposite.

In 1941 the Camacho government of Mexico and the Rockefeller Foundation began discussions about the possibility of establishing a technical assistance program to work on increasing agricultural production. Wheat and corn, Mexico's two most important crops for domestic consumption, would be the major focus of the agricultural research. In Mexico, corn and beans are the subsistence crops grown by millions of rural families living on small acreage. Wheat on the other hand has been a more commercial crop grown on larger acreage.

The guiding premise of this joint agricultural research effort was that American technology was transferable, given the proper inputs, to Mexico. There was even a preferred place for the experiment. In the 1940's the Mexican government had undertaken a campaign to turn the coastal plains of Sonora (land earlier taken from the Yaqui Indians) into a major wheat producing area. To provide the necessary water, irrigation projects were financed, mostly with tax money. The result was the creation of valuable farm land that was then sold to land speculators and those "farmers" well enough connected and financed to purchase the land. This was not a Homestead Act or a land reform effort.

In 1944, Norman Borlaug came to Mexico to take over the direction of the wheat experimentation program of the Office of Special Studies, an autonomous organization attached to the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Borlaug's team concentrated on increasing wheat yields through genetic changes that required irrigation and fertilizer.

There was, for a brief time, an attempt to develop a wheat strain for non-irrigated areas, but that effort was abandoned in 1952. So, Dr. Borlaug's agricultural package became tied to irrigated land. For the wheat farmers of Central Mexico, which had previously been the major wheat-growing area, the new seeds were of little value without the required irrigation.

While Dr. Borlaug was concentrating on wheat yields in the irrigated oasis of Sonora, a Mexican research group, The Institute for Agricultural Investigation (IIA), worked primarily on improving corn seeds for small farms. Rockefeller Foundation scientists were also working on corn, basically to develop a hybrid, which would, much like their wheat seeds, be dependent on irrigation and fertilizer for optimum yield.

In 1955, 97.7 percent of Mexican land planted in corn was non-irrigated. Nonethless, the hybrid/Rockefeller approach eventually won out over the IIA effort to increase yields on ordinary small farms.

Corn, not wheat, is the staple of the Mexican diet. To neglect work on improving corn yields on non-irrigated land is to sacrifice the diets and welfare of most of the people in Mexico. Simple arithmetic shows, as well, that such an approach does not make sense in terms of improving overall food production. Even a modest increase in the productivity of non-irrigated land would do more to relieve hunger than doubling yields on the small fraction of corn acreage that is irrigated.

By the mid 1960's, the Rockefeller Foundation was eager to export the "successes" of its Mexican test project, so the International Center for Improvement of Maize and Wheat was founded. By 1972 it had a budget of $7 million and a staff of 400. Financial support had expanded to include AID, the Ford Foundation and the World Bank. Presently there are eight such regional research organizations.

The technology experimented with in Mexico has been energetically exported as one of the solutions to world hunger, and the techniques developed in Mexico became known as the Green Revolution. The concentrated efforts to increase wheat yields in Mexico did pay off. Mexico is self-sufficient in wheat and is even an occasional exporter. But, beyond the benefits to the large Mexican landowners, how did the other people of Mexico fare?

In 1940, 70 percent of the Mexican people were employed in agriculture; by 1960 that figure was down to 54 percent. Day laborers who work on mechanized farms are usually needed only six months out of the year and are unemployed much of the rest of the year. At peak seasons migrants from central Mexico are brought in to enlarge the work force and keep wages low. The people made surplus by the new agriculture, migrated to urban areas looking for jobs, but as in other developing countries, urban areas had little capacity to absorb them.

Those who managed to stay on the land haven't fared so well either. By 1960, 83 percent of all farmers in Mexico were living at or below subsistence level. Modernization that leaves out 83 percent of the rural people can only be described as "progress" out of desperation.

[TECHNOLOGY IN A VACUUM]

Technology is capable of solving many agricultural production problems; however, it can also create problems. Technology doesn't exist in a vacuum but is applied within a social, political and economic setting.

In parts of India, land ownership still follows forms resembling a feudal society. Landless agricultural workers actually refer to landlords as "masters" and see themselves as indentured laborers. These relationships are handed down from generation to generation. A father passes his debt on to his son, who will just as surely remain in servitude. In India, 50 percent of the land is owned by about 8 percent of the people, and 70 percent of India's farmers have less than one acre.

Land ownership is also highly concentrated in Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Philippines. In parts of Java, landlords get 60 to 70 percent of their sharecropper's harvest. In Colombia the top 5 percent of the rural population owns 70 percent of the land. In Paraguay 1 percent of the farmers own 85 percent of the land.

The skewed distribution of land and the tenancy relationships that have developed represent, as a U.N.

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development report puts it, "forms of local monopolization of the indispensable resources upon which livelihood depends." That monopoly is over more than just land. Small farmers and tenants in most developing countries must use an informal credit market for loans. That informal system is a local land baron or merchant. They borrow from commercial banks at favorable rates, commonly 1 percent per month, and re-lend to local farmers at a tidy profit. Interest rates on loans of this nature run anywhere from 4 to 10 percent a *month*.

The Green Revolution is an industrial approach to food production and many of its techniques are those of U.S.-style agriculture. In most developing countries, land, energy and capital are scarce resources while labor is in abundant supply. Common sense and the efficient use of existing resources would suggest that emphasis should be placed on programs to assist small farmers, agricultural methods that do not drain financial resources, and technology that increases job opportunities. It does not make sense to encourage capital-intensive agriculture which will drive impoverished farmers off the land to become even more impoverished urban dwellers or migrant workers.

The point that the loyal adherents of the Green Revolution will not face is that 30 years of money and brain power have gone into devising a capital/energy-intensive system that is simply inappropriate for most of the world. The responsibility of the United States for pushing an approach to agricultural production so badly suited to the needs of developing countries cannot be excused on the grounds that we meant well but knew no better. Although the term "green revolution" was not coined until these techniques were intensely exported, we have suffered the costs of industrialized agriculture in our own country. We were not lacking in roadside warnings, only the wisdom or willingness to heed them.

[Agribusiness Goes Abroad]

We have an agricultural economy in the United States that is geared to the needs of agribusiness corporations. The integration and concentration of the food system that has occurred over the last three decades forced family farmers, small business people, workers and consumers to adjust to those needs. Often the requirements of agribusiness had nothing to do with the efficient use of resources nor did they result in better or cheaper food.

U.S. agribusiness proposes to export their system around the world under the guise of helping developing countries improve their agricultural capacity and thereby feed hungry people. But the American agricultural system is no panacea, no perfect answer to increasing food production or feeding hungry people. Each country has to build its agricultural system suited to its particular needs and using its unique resources. Suitability has nothing to do with how close it comes to imitating the U.S. system. In fact, following the U.S. model may pose for developing countries many of the inequities U.S. farmers now face.

A 1974 annual report of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) credits the Pakistani affiliate of Arbor Acres Farms, a U.S.-based worldwide poultry-breeding company with devising a clever plan for bringing together small farmers and the poultry business:

> *To start the process in motion, the company provides the farmer with the basic materials needed, including 100 to 500 chicks produced at its hatchery in Lahore, seed to grow corn for feed, a low-cost chicken house, feeders and watering equipment. It then teaches him the techniques involved, supervises his operation and buys the mature chicken for resale to people in crowded urban areas. In turn the farmer pays the company back from his earnings on an installment basis over a period of three years.*

The plan is not as ingenious or original as it might first appear. Ralston Purina and other corporate integrators fathered this poultry system in the United States back in the 1950's. The corporate integration of the poultry industry is a well-known horror story in rural America. Tens of thousands of family farmers were driven out of business and those who remained became sharecroppers under contract to the corporations. The typical integrated broiler-producing marketing firm has its own hatchery, feed mill and processing plant, as well as contract broiler growers. In 1959, 60 percent of all broilers were grown by independent farmers; now 98 percent of chickens are grown under contract.

In a recent interview, George Anthan of the *Des Moines Register* described a poultry area in northern Alabama:

> *Traditionally the area was one of small independent farmers raising chickens and selling them through local marketers. In the 1950's these local marketers were brought up by corporate integrators who would then only process chickens raised under contract to them. In the early 1960's, the integrators put on a major campaign to sign up farmers.*
>
> *For farmers to get a contract, certain "improvements" specified by the corporation had to be made on their farms. These investments were financed by the farmers through local banks. Failure to meet the specifications would result in the contract being withdrawn, leaving the farmer virtually without a market. The integrators did not offer long-term contracts in exchange for the farmers making the changes the companies insisted upon.*


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The farmers I talked to said that every time it looked like they were going to get the loan paid off, the integrators would come up with a new "improvement" like gas heaters, insulated chicken houses, and automatic feeding equipment. Once in debt, the farmer had to stay in business, but to stay in business they had to get deeper in debt. One of the farmers described himself and other poultry farmers as the "new slaves."

Most of the farmers had to take jobs in town to supplement their incomes and usually had a wife or daughter working in the local poultry processing plant for minimum wages. Farmers were getting about 2¢ a pound for their chicken. I didn't find a single farmer making more per pound than they made five to ten years ago, but their costs had doubled.

A USDA Packers and Stockyards report done in 1967 concluded that the low income of poultry farmers and their vulnerability to "offensive marketing practices" were a result of their lack of bargaining power when dealing with integrators. Growers are reluctant to complain about unfair trade practices for fear of being blacklisted.

The farmers of the United States had no power to stop an entire industry from being redesigned to fit the needs of input and marketing corporations. Most did not understand how this change would work against their economic interests until it had already happened. If the American farmer, privileged by world standards, couldn't cope with this power, what is the likelihood that the Pakistani farmer can? The fate of chicken farmers in northern Alabama should serve as a warning for developing countries enchanted with corporate models.

Arbor Acres, by providing credit to farmers in countries where loans are difficult to obtain, will assure that resources for producing food are directed to fit with corporate plans. Domestic production can be accomplished without binding farmers to a complex system, controlled by multinational corporations, that makes farmers dependent on the integrator for inputs and markets or displaces land from badly needed food crops to corn grown for feed.

Most Pakistani consumers do not benefit. Chickens may be shipped to people in crowded urban areas but 90 percent of the population is so poor they don't buy chicken. It winds up on the tables of the more affluent in Lahore. IBEC's Arbor Acres is pushing a poultry production system that is inappropriate for Pakistan and other developing countries. We may be stuck with it in this country, but they don't have to be. After all, chickens are just not that difficult to raise. Inexpensive chicken cholera vaccination would do more to increase poultry production in Asia than factory farms.

The 1974 annual report of OPIC commented on the beginning of an integrated hog production system;

The Hormel Company took the first steps to inaugurate an integrated swine processing and production marketing project based in the rural state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. The opportunity was brought to the company's attention by the Minas Gerais development agency, the U.S. non-profit Agribusiness Council, and OPIC, through the first U.S. "Agribusiness Investment Mission" to that state last year.

In the United States there have been sporadic corporate forays in the swine industry. But Midwestern hog farmers saw what happened to poultry farmers and will fight against a corporate take-over of their industry. Maybe Hormel knows that and has decided life would be much easier and more profitable in Brazil.

The fact that more and more meat is being raised in Latin America (Brazil is the third largest beef producer in the world) doesn't mean that the people of Latin America have more to eat. According to Alan Berg's *Nutrition Factor,* although beef production increased 40 percent in Guatemala, average beef consumption decreased 6 percent and a 92 percent production increase in Costa Rica was accompanied by a 26 percent decline in consumption. The beef produced doesn't provide the malnourished with needed protein. Instead it ends up in franchised-restaurant hamburger in the United States.

[JOIN THE SYSTEM]

The international food supply system is following a growth pattern which began in the United States after World War II and is best described as an "integrated systems approach." Basically this system, as it has developed, means that previously independent levels of the food business are tightly coordinated into the marketing sector. In the United States it has resulted in larger but fewer farms, larger but fewer food manufacturers, and powerful food marketers able to set prices. Sometimes one sector owns another; sometimes coordination is arranged through contracts. The marketing sector, having the most power, has the greatest influence on the terms of those contracts.

As multinational agribusiness offers its "expertise," "technical proficiency," "management know-how," and "marketing ability" as a solution to the world's food problem, we should remember how over the last three years, American farmers and consumers have had a taste of corporate power in the food industry. Farmers who had been getting about 38¢ out of every dollar spent for food saw their share rise to 46¢. Food prices skyrocketed. Then farmers watched their share drop back and hang at about 40¢. Yet food prices continued to rise. What happened to the difference? It went right into the pockets of all the middlemen corporations that process, package, transport, wholesale, and retail America's food.

Compared to the peasants of India, Colombia, or Kenya, American farmers have considerable political clout. Compared to the people of Pakistan, the Dominican Republic or Nigeria, American consumers have considerable political power. Yet, having said that, American farmers and consumers are unable to obtain adequate protection from their government. USDA makes transparent excuses for the increased farm-to-retail spread. FTC conducts studies of the food industry that rarely result in decreasing the concentration of the industry. The ICC doesn't seem to notice the misuse of rail cars by the giant grain corporations. The Congress grants lucrative tax breaks that favor multinational corporations at the expense of national businesses and jobs.

A public that by world standards is informed and politically influential has somehow lost control over its food system. Now in response to the world food crisis, this system we find so difficult to monitor, let alone control, is to be exported and internationalized. It is a depressing prospect for Americans, and a devastating alternative for developing countries.

Susan DeMarco and Susan Sechler are co-directors of the Agribusiness Accountability Project based in Washington D.C. This article was excerpted from a 140-page report.

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SUPERWEAPONS

(From page 27)

• **New ABM Systems.** The SALT agreements limit the U.S. and the Soviet Union to a paltry 100 ABM launchers each. The Safeguard ABM system, the subject of intense Congressional debate in 1969 and 1970, is now in operation at Grand Forks, North Dakota, protecting a Minuteman ICBM field. Safeguard cost $5.4 billion, $54 million per ABM launcher. Already, however, the Pentagon is seriously considering mothballing the Safeguard system and deploying something called Site Defense.

The fiscal 1976 budget requests $348 million for ABM systems, more than last year. Research is being done on ABMs that would use lasers, and on maneuvering ABMs to shoot down hypothetical Soviet MARVs. Senator McIntyre's subcommittee, recognizing the folly of spending vast amounts of money for such limited protection, cut all $140 million requested for the Site Defense program.

• **AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).** AWACS is the Air Force's big surveillance, warning, and control aircraft, consisting of special avionics, computers, and large radar installed in a modified Boeing 707 airframe. The plane is designed to serve as an airborne command post, warning of Soviet air attack, and controlling and directing NATO war planes in combat over Europe. The Administration is requesting $690 million for AWACS in fiscal 1976. The Air Force hopes to acquire 34 AWACS aircraft; Congress to date has funded three research and six production aircraft. Estimate program cost is $3.8 billion, $111 million each.

AWACS was originally developed to serve as an air defense unit in the U.S. for protection against Soviet bomber attack, but because of the decline of the Soviet bomber threat, the AWACS's mission was shifted in 1973 to a tactical role in Europe. Recent studies by the General Accounting Office indicate that AWACS is vulnerable to jamming by relatively inexpensive ground-based equipment. AWACS would also be highly vulnerable to attack by interceptors and surface-to-air missiles and would likely have to spend much of its time coordinating its own defense. The other main criticism raised by opponents is that although it is being built for use in Europe, U.S. NATO allies have contributed nothing toward the cost of AWACS. Members of Congress are particularly sensitive about the continuing disproportionate burden of defense spending within the NATO alliance.

• **SAM-D Missile.** The SAM-D surface-to-air missile system is another weapon originally conceived for air defense of the United States against a Soviet bomber threat that never even materialized. To keep the system alive it is now justified for use in Europe to protect allied and U.S. troops against Soviet air attack. SAM-D is a high altitude (above 40,000 feet) air defense missile designed to replace the Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk SAMs in the mid-1980's. The current program cost is estimated at $5.8 billion of which $850 million has already been spent. The fiscal 1976 defense budget requests $130 million to continue research and development.

Congressional critics, notably Senator Birch Bayh, argue that SAM-D should be canceled because of the absence of a significant high-altitude threat (Soviet aircraft will have to descend to lower altitudes to effectively attack targets) and because the great cost of SAM-D means that it is not worth the money. Each SAM-D fire section will cost $41.8 million, more than it presumably would cost the Soviets to destroy it. A General Accounting Office study concludes: "Cost-effectiveness of the SAM-D or its variants apparently cannot be proven based on realistic assumptions. It would appear that even if the SAM-D technology works and even if the threat materializes, the SAM-D will probably not be necessary if F-15's are available." As in the case of AWACS, European countries have not come forward to help pay for a weapons system that will be used theoretically for their defense.

• **XM-1 Tank.** The Army is asking for $51 million to continue research on a new main battle tank. The XM-1 is the latest designation for the Army's cancelled MBT-70 and XM-803 tank programs, both of which were stopped by Congress because of cost and technical

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





ABM test



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

SAM-D Missile

Above: XM-1 Tank
Top Left: Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) Missile
Top Right: B-1 Bomber

problems. Estimated program cost for the XM-1 is $6.2 billion, or $1.9 million each for the planned 3312 tanks.

The XM-1 is to replace the Army's present tank, the M-60, in Europe. Serious questions have been raised, however, as to whether it makes any sense for the Defense Department to invest billions in potentially obsolescent tanks. Recent developments in anti-tank weapons and the experience of tank losses in the October 1973 Mideast war indicate that anti-tank weapons have overcome defenses available to tanks and that advantage may continue indefinitely. A relatively inexpensive $2,000 TOW anti-tank missile can destroy a $500,000 tank.

• **C-5A Aircraft.** The C-5A's troubles never go away. The Air Force spent $4.5 billion on 81 aircraft built by Lockheed in a $2 billion cost-overrun scandal. Four have been destroyed in accidents, the latest on April 4, 1975 in Vietnam with a plane-full of Vietnamese children on-board. Now the Air Force says that it needs $900 million to fix the dangerously weak wings on the C-5As.

The C-5A is the world's biggest plane, 248 feet long with a gross weight of 716,500 pounds. It was developed to implement the New Frontier concept of the U.S. as the world's policeman, to "go everywhere, bear every burden" aircraft to rush American troops and tanks in an instant to the remotest trouble spot. But even the C-5A's much heralded successes turn out to be less than meets the eye. Although it was lauded by the Air Force for bringing military supplies to Israel during the October 1973 Middle East War, a subsequent study by the General Accounting Office shows that 60 percent of the C-5A fleet was inoperable because of mechanical problems or lack of spare parts. Almost all of the equipment arrived after the cease-fire and, according to the GAO, "had no decisive effect on the war's outcome."

The Air Force has requested the $900 million program to build new C-5A wings because the life of the current wing is estimated at about 10,000 hours, compared to a planned 30,000 hours. It will cost $11 million for each plane to fix the wings. Air Force Secretary McLucas regretfully

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admitted that this happened because the Air Force rushed the C-5A into production before it knew whether the plane worked: "We had a large number of aircraft built before we had even completed the fatigue tests to see whether or not the aircraft was structurally sound." The B-1 may turn out to be the same kind of horror story.

• **Tactical Aircraft.** The Defense Department's impulse to modernize at any price finds its most profuse flowering in the new generation of tactical fighter aircraft, the Air Force's F-15 and the Navy's F-14. This year the Defense Department is spending $24 billion on tactical air. The military services have almost always preferred the most complex, technologically sophisticated and thus most expensive weapons. A fully equipped F-14 will cost about $28 million. A basic, stripped down F-15 costs $15 million. Although Pentagon officials sometimes try to make it appear that increases in weapons costs are due primarily to inflation, recent studies by analysts at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. indicate that most of the rising cost of tactical aircraft is attributable to the increasing technical complexity of the aircraft themselves and the compulsion to incorporate almost everything that is technologically feasible. The result is weapons that are often overdesigned for their missions.

The Air Force plans to buy 729 F-15s, at a cost of $10.9 billion and the Navy wants an additional 390 F-14s to put on its aircraft carriers at a cost of $7.6 billion. Even these quantities are not enough and both services are also developing "cheap" lightweight fighters in the $7 million [per plane] range. The Air Force has selected General Dynamics to build 650 YF-16s but the Navy apparently prefers Northrop's YF-18. Some Congressional and Defense Department officials had hoped that the Air Force and Navy could get together on a common choice to keep down the price.

These are just a few of the more prominent superweapons. Others include tactical nuclear weapons ("mininukes"), binary chemical weapons, new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, killer satellites, unmanned aircraft, laser cannons, the computerized electronic battlefield, and new airlift and naval programs that could project U.S. military forces around the world. Most of these Defense Department budget items, unfortunately, will be accepted with relatively short and superficial attention from the Congress.

It is pathetic that the world's most powerful country continues to suffer from exaggerated fears and anxieties that have led our leaders to conclude that, in the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, "In our ever-changing world, strength means military strength." The militarization of American foreign policy has been the result. Our real fear should not be that we will be dominated, but that we will be dominating. If the tragic experience in Indochina has meant anything it is that the powerful must learn to control their inclination to excess and arrogance. The consequences of unrestrained military power can be almost as damaging for our country as for others.

David Johnson is Research Director of the Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C.

DETERRENCE

(From page 30)

millions of people, not the hundreds of thousands Schlesinger optimistically calculates, would be killed. What conceivable gain could the Russians achieve from this type of attack that would warrant the risk that after such provocation we would decide not to retaliate and destroy them as a civilized nation, a capability which would be unaffected by the Russian attack?

Furthermore, if the threat of a preemptive strike against our ICBMs is what Schlesinger is worried about, then his programs are not the answer. Increasing the explosive power and accuracy of our ICBMs does nothing to decrease their vulnerability. In his 1974 Defense Department Report, he said we "must not contribute to any failures of deterrence by making the strategic forces a tempting target for attack." Yet in 1975 he admits that the acquisition of a more efficient counterforce capability could do just that. Counterforce ICBMs are attractive targets. If the Russians fear that our ICBMs could destroy their land-based missiles by catching them in their silos, the temptation would be increased for them to launch first, particularly in time of crisis. Even though the initiation of a nuclear strike is most unlikely because of potential risks, they might as a precaution place their ICBMs on a hair-trigger alert so they could be fired on warning of our launch but before the arrival of our warheads. Such a command policy is an invitation to mutual disaster through accidental nuclear war. At the very least, the planned acquisition of a counterforce capability by the U.S. would provide the Russians with a strong motivation to develop new, larger, and less vulnerable strategic forces. Counterforce capabilities fuel an arms race which has no end and only encourage the belief that a nuclear war can be fought and won. Nuclear war should never be made more "thinkable."

Although our acquisition of more efficient counterforce and nuclear-war fighting weapons does not add to our military security regardless of what


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program the Russians carry out, will a Soviet lead in counterforce capability have damaging political repercussions? Secretary of State Kissinger recently said: "While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the appearance of inferiority – whatever its actual significance – can have serious political consequences." It was this shibboleth of parity that forced the Vladivostok accords to such high ceilings, since agreement could only be achieved at or above the highest level of another country.

There seems little question at the present time that evoking the fear of inferiority has very strong national political implications. The military learned long ago that the most effective means of acquiring funds from the Congress is to wave the red flag of Russian superiority in nuclear arms. Each year around budget time, the public and Congress are flooded with a spate of horror stories of new Russian weapons developments. This year it is the long-overdue initiation of MIRV deployment. Few Congressmen have the courage to defend to their constituents a cut in a weapons program when accused of weakening the U.S. After many years the public was educated to settle for parity instead of superiority, but to accept inferiority is too much to ask any politician.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have so many asymmetries in types of weapons, technology, geography and strategies that it is easy to select some criteria to support any desired conclusion on relative strength. Senator Jackson successfully discredited the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons because it allowed the Russians to have superiority with a maximum of 1,618 ICBMs to our 1,054, and 950 submarine missiles to our 710. Meanwhile, he ignored the fact that we had long since unilaterally stopped adding to the number of our launchers but were instead procuring MIRVs and would have by 1975 more than 7,000 missile warheads to their 2,420. Even though the Vladivostok agreement allows both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. equal numbers of delivery vehicles and missiles carrying MIRVs, Senator Jackson will again be able to discredit it because the Russians have much larger payloads on their ICBMs and thus have the potentiality for either having more warheads or more explosive power per warhead.

In all out policies and actions we must always keep before our eyes the dangers of a single nuclear explosion. Our real security in the nuclear age does not depend on matching the U.S.S.R. bomb for bomb, nuclear test for nuclear test, or counterforce weapon for weapon. It lies in working with the Soviets to establish an international climate where nuclear weapons have less meaning for all countries. We must seek to dispel the misperception that nuclear weapons have military or even political value. Arms control agreements should be aimed at reducing existing stockpiles rather than being the framework for justifying further expansion. We cannot allow the continued emphasis on the importance of nuclear parity or superiority as a means of escalating military budgets. All our actions should be directed toward minimizing the spread of nuclear weapons. We cannot tolerate another Hiroshima or Bikini Bravo.



Since mid-1973 the U. S. has deployed almost three times as many new strategic nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union.

Herbert Scoville, Jr., was formerly a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is now a member of the board of the Center for Defense Information.

BROWN

(From page 33)

To the California farm workers there is no more detestable symbol of their subordination than *El Cortito,* the infamous short-handled hoe which the state's growers have always held to be a necessary tool for cultivating most vegetable crops. The growers even used to argue (some still do) that the "squat" build of the *mestizo* made him easily adaptable to the hated implement and successfully resisted all efforts to have its use banned. But Brown's Department of Industrial Relations, after hearing testimony, banned the short hoe. Cesar Chavez said the farm workers could hardly believe it, that "they didn't think it would ever happen". Chavez, incidentally has always blamed his own severe back troubles on the hours he has had to spend wielding *El Cortito.*

The Brown Administration supports the bills in the legislature looking toward the creation of a state superagency for land use planning. But passage of such legislation is probably a long way off. Few people really know

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what land use planning ought to be like and how it ought to be done. People in the administration, however, seem ready to have a go at it. Claire Dedrick will use departments of the Resources Agency to do *ad hoc* land use planning. Quinn will use the requirements that builders and developers must file air and water quality impact reports to monitor land use. Richard Maullin will do the same with the Energy Commission's power over site selection for all energy producing plants. This may seem brash and uncoordinated, but it does indicate that there is plenty of appetite within the Brown administration for confronting the power of private interests. The examples cited here may be only skirmishes rather than full-scale confrontations. But all the indications from these skirmishes indicate that despite the lack of rhetoric about the abuses of private power, this administration is prepared to check those abuses with public power in situation after situation.

[HOW TO GET THERE?]

There is an improvised or *ad hoc* quality to this, however. If, for example, one asks Quinn or Maullin what values, what standards, will inform or illuminate their determinations about land use, they become less positive, less certain, and tend to talk about "community values" or the "protection of the public interest". Given the backgrounds of most members of this administration, again, it is not surprising that they would come on like tigers against specific abuses. They have been trained for that. It is also the case that American liberals have not been drawn to political theory, preferring to perceive "problems" and to devise specific "solutions," confident that with the proper distribution of abundance everyone would somehow be "free" to fix their own values and determine the ends for their own actions. Hence, for mainstream American liberalism, the preferred "solution" to most problems has been continuous economic growth.

The Brown administration, however, has faced the fact that continuous growth is no longer likely; indeed, that we are running out of the resources that permit continuous growth. Brown and his appointees, moreover, seem to agree that the consequences to communal, family, and individual life of a system in which getting and spending constitute the *summum bonum* of existence are simply destructive and that some other highest good must be found. A race of getters and spenders would be the very worst citizens of the world we now must live in.

But how do you talk to poor people, to the elderly, members of the ethnic minorities who have never had their share of the American abundant life and who, understandably, think of "making it" in terms of getting and spending, of cutting back on consumption and learning to do with less? How do you talk to workers in the building trades about the dignity of work when they fear that their jobs depend on continuing economic growth? Beyond Brown's talk of more simple, less consumption-oriented, less resource-destructive life, his administration has not developed a theory of the common good or a method to pursue it. They cannot, therefore, confidently communicate a sense of direction and purpose that might induce people to be willing to do with less in the name of the common good. In Mario Obledo and Robert Gnaizda, Brown has people of dedication, compassion, and understanding in the key health and welfare positions. But Brown is asking the hard-pressed as well as the comfortable to make do with less. Can that be done in the absence of a shared vision of the good and just society?

Similarly, Brown must find ways to make acceptable to the comfortable middle classes the income transfers he is confident his administration can devise. And while most people want clean water, clean air, good public transport, and an environment that refreshes and uplifts the spirit, few of us want to be inconvenienced or deprived by the cost of getting them. Intricate systems of indirect rewards and penalties as spurs to action have not worked in the past. Will the middle classes in California take direct restraints on their freedom of action and choice in the absence of a shared sense of necessity? Thus far Brown has not made much headway in developing the basis for such a collective sense.

It was the intention of the Political Reform Initiative (Prop. 9) of 1974 to break the hold of private wealth over politics in California. Brown was a sponsor and advocate of Prop. 9. Undoubtedly the most positive element of Brown's public image up to now is his association with this. But is it enough to be opposed to the "old politics?" What is to be put in its place? If the Brown administration is headed toward a series of clashes with the major private interests, it will need the support of a determined political party or political movement. The parties in California are as moribund as they are anywhere else. Brown shows little interest in his own party and the party's cadres, such as they are, don't show very much enthusiasm for or loyalty to Brown. Even if the party activists were solidly in Brown's grasp, the party is so ineffective and has such little public affection that it would not be a very strong ally for Brown in a crunch. Though he is clearly popular right now, Brown is not really well known to the voters. They do not know what he is up to. His popularity is based on an "image" that is really very shallow. He cannot be said to have a secure political base.

[A CASE IN POINT]

This lack of a political base is closely linked to the trouble Brown is having with his farm labor bill. It is a very carefully balanced bill giving a little bit of something to all parties and a lot to farm workers and, specifically, to Cesar Chavez and his United Farm Workers (AFL-CIO). It gives less to Chavez' rival Teamsters and still less to the state's agricultural business, or "growers", as they like to style themselves. It aims at long-delayed justice and a measure of stability in California agriculture. At the same time, the preamble to the bill acknowledges that no single bill can overcome all social injustice or all instability.

Basically the bill extends to farm labor the same status that industrial labor has enjoyed since the New Deal – mainly the right to bargain collectively through unions freely chosen by secret ballot, to be secure against unfair labor practices by employers, to be secure in the contracts signed, and

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the right to strike either to win union recognition or as a tactic in the bargaining process. The Brown bill would also permit agricultural labor to use the secondary boycott when no certified labor contract exists, though once a valid election has been held the employer is protected against any boycott of his products by the losers in the election. Under Brown's bill, only contracts signed after the secret ballot certification process could be considered valid. This would invalidate many of the labor contracts currently in existence between the Teamsters and several growers, thus affording the UFW the chance to recover much of what it has lost to the Teamsters in the past three years.

The Administration bill also directs that the supervising Agricultural Labor Relations Board must "presume" the preferability of a single industrial union-type bargaining unit over multiple, smaller craft unions for each farm or employer. Brown's bill is silent on the fretful question of employment of illegal aliens and it does not restore the right to vote in representation elections to employees who have voluntarily or involuntarily left an employer over a prior labor dispute. More specifically, this means that the old "original" Gallo workers who were fired in the first UFW strike there could not vote in an election at Gallo unless they had been able to get back on the payroll.

The Brown bill is so well-balanced that it is opposed by Chavez, by the growers, and by the Teamsters. Each of the three parties has a preferred bill in the hopper. Brown has said, placatingly, that his bill is "not written in stone" and that he is prepared to negotiate some issues. It is especially grievous for Brown that Chavez opposes his bill. But the Chavez spokesmen, union counsel Jerry Cohen and Los Angeles Assemblyman Ray Alatorre being the most vocal, snipe away at the bill. Alatorre, who is feuding with Brown anyway, is trying to flood the capitol with UFW supporters when the Assembly opens hearings on a farm labor bill in May. The UFW insists that Brown's bill wobbles on what everybody calls the "pre-existing" Teamster contracts – sweetheart contracts, in Chavez' view, though the Governor's bill clearly states that the agricultural labor board can certify only those contracts reached after the secret ballot process. The UFW also fears that the Brown bill gives the board too much discretion to permit "craft" union contracts, a discretion they see as favorable to the Teamsters. Finally, the silences of the Brown bill on the illegal alien and striking worker questions also alienate the UFW.

Meanwhile, the Teamsters, who have one of the best financed and undoubtedly the best organized and most effective lobbies in Sacramento, lie low and build up their forces to support a bill by Sen. George Zenovich, a bill which falls far short of the Brown bill in the latitude it offers to farm workers. Agribusiness has a bill, too, introduced by Republican Assemblyman Ken Maddy of Fresno. Probably the growers will throw in with the Teamsters and some blend of the Zenovich and Maddy bills will get the support of both Teamster and grower strength. Alatorre has a bill, Assembly Bill 1, which embodies the UFW positions and will command support from a core group of urban liberal Democrats.

Brown's bill has respectable sponsorship in each house and Speaker McCarthy appears to favor it. But in order to pass it will have to move through the legislative minefields and the enfilading fire of its opponents. In that situation Brown cannot rely on the manifest even-handedness and thoroughness of his bill to get it through. He needs clout. He needs a political base strong enough to hold against Teamsters, agribusiness, and the devoted friends of the UFW. The legislative arena is a very hard place for a reform administration. There, bills do not pass on their merits. It is the balance of forces lined up for and against that determines their fate. If the Brown Administration hopes to come close to the reach of their aspirations for change, they must have a political base strong enough to move the legislature on the things that count.

It is an irony that Brown, who dislikes elites and establishments, has such an elitist administration. Without vital connections to the grass roots in the state, Brown and his intense, committed, and able cohorts will be all but defenseless against coalitions of private interest. Without a real political party and with no means but the media and image projection to reach and to mobilize voters, Brown will have to rely on parliamentary maneuver, log-rolling, and vote-trading. This might work for a while but ultimately he will need a public behind him. Democratic politics requires a constant dialogue between the people and their representatives. No merely priestly class of experts can survive on the virtue or excellence of their programs alone.

Francis Carney is professor of political science at the University of California at Riverside. He has written for the New York Review of Books, *the* Nation, *and the* American Review.

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

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